Reciprocality

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  1. You have been type-matching every minute since u were a couple of months old, it were what worked when object permanence and object identity were established, if something works at such a rudimentary level how could it fail at any other level, if all the other levels are entirely dependent on it? There are several problems with types. A primary one is that many of them do not contain or imply each other, this alone would make for the wandering tendency of thoughts you describe. When one type does imply another there is the problem of the path and intermediate stages between them, which may have been socialised away, how do you re-access those? Then there is the problem of the relationship between the type and the things that exemplifies it, sometimes this path too can not be fully drawn, such that you can not lucidly judge that if given enough time or context you could have abstracted the type from the example itself. There is too the problem of the plurality of types that any one example can substitute for, or said simply: all the various properties of one and the same object. Not only in the sense that many of those properties have so much distinctness that it is hard to see precisely at which higher-order level they reconnect with a common type, but also the demand that precisely the least general common type is their only proper predicate, but also the lingering problem of whether they ever connect at all (pluralism). There is then the fallacy of division and composition that all these endeavours will inevitably run across at every turn (often due to the intuition that intersections are typifying), particularly when you consider the rich composition of objects and episodes, the very things your types are here to flatten the turmoil of. Then there is type-like behaviour, like idempotency, where a given abstraction is exhausted by the singular thing that exemplifies it, such that every example is such an abstraction thus that "copies" of it are nothing but "it", and yet since there is no separation of the extension and intension it is not really a type at all. Do you have control of these things? can you map them out in a mental landscape? If I could not do that it would be proportional to an increase of distress.
  2. @Nick_98 Intersections and invariances Your thoughts are the recurrent patterns of what you have witnessed, these become integrated and easily accessible, thoughts derived from one situation helps to dissect the variables of another situation such that you can finally reach a conclusion. Thoughts are there as the motion necessary to reach the conclusions that reduces the distress from chaos and unpredictability. We apply our private notion of the "whole world" as the backdrop against which we compare the difference of thoughts that we hold in the foreground, "ceteris paribus" or "everything else being equal" allows us the objective metric to make the relative difference of judgements to play themselves out. There is no fantasy here, only your own undying demand for correct judgements, only now you have more direct access to the mere concepts of those judgements that were important in situations long gone, and can not help but to ask what all these concepts are for.
  3. Society is a discipline, its unique properties is a mirror, to see sociality as an inhibition is to see invariance in customs and thus to see sincerity in it, and certainly no delusion in it.
  4. Joke is a life do you recall kindergarten? it is also like that now
  5. Why would you begin with terms and end up in theory? And if the theory is correct on its own right, haven't you done it a disservice if you risk it not matching the terms of natural language? It seems strange to me to give this a lot of thought and then end up asking "what do people generally mean when they use a word (such as intellect)?, and then to device a discussion based on whether the former maps to the latter. You are far from alone in this, i have seen it many places, could it be that you want to ensure that you use the terms in the right way when speaking?
  6. When we form a hypothesis it will be much easier and straightforward to infer why evidence contradicts it when it does so, reading works the same way, you should have expectations of all kinds when you read. When evidence does not contradict the hypothesis you have now a cross reference of sort for why to believe what your read and can use mental energy to generalise and infer beyond it. So know what you are expecting or fail at comprehending.
  7. @Raphael Close your eyes and recall the meaning of what you knew were important when you read it after having read it, do not allow yourself to learn things in isolation but instead think about what you already know such that what you are reading either confirms or excepts it. Everything you learn must be a meaningful statement, and every statement must connect to more general properties that allows those statements to be made at all (universal generalisation), just as every statement must pertain to every instance of its predicate (universal instantiation). This is actually how you think already, as justified through Curry-Howard correspondence and Topos theory, it is a strong mapping between logic, computation and geometry. (check also category theory, logic, type theory, categorical logic) Cross reference what you read, this allows the part of your mind that recognises the essence of things to operate with full force via the intersection of those things, it also is a method for brute forcing the universal generalisation mentioned earlier.
  8. Consider the intersection of marriage, etiquette, property and leaders The most general intersection would be intent or identity. But what are their least general intersection? Any set in the list of cultural universals has intersections, but some subsections of those universals intersect at far more unique properties than "intent/identity", and you likely form groups of these subsections intuitively while reading that list, this implies an automated cognitive process whereby relevance are attributed thresholds of uniqueness. Is it possible for two "cultural universals" to only intersect at the most general property, such that all they have in common is only what they have in common with all the other "cultural universals"? In such a case, is it still possible to map those two to something more unique that those two universals share to the exclusion of any of the others? Functionalism would be the first contender here, since it allows things that have no unique intersection to be defined by a common unique function both serves, we can consider this an intensional intersection or a second order intersection. Would the appeal to functionalism fail too if we could show that "serving a function" is already inherent to the most general properties "intent/identity" that were naturally the intersection of all the "cultural universals"?
  9. Misery? The father stated the child loves life and it doesn't look like he's lying. Theres no reason to suspect he wont be taken care of his whole life, and he will have no way of internalising the misery we may project onto him when imagining being in his state.
  10. The effect internet has on you, can anything else cause it? If not, what is the closest effect anything has on you to the effect internet has? Can something besides that effect substitute for it without even being similar? Could you stop doing internet and be fine?
  11. All those universals seem to come in two categories 1. What all humans attend to 2. What only some humans attend to, which non the less are functionally identical to what all humans attend to via how any true statement about these subsets of human behaviours binds us to more general statements that converge with more and ultimately all behaviour. One universal can be observed, the other must be inferred.
  12. Just those eyes alone are wild, but given the context it may not indicate much. Misdirected hatred could be justified. Come to a conclusion that accounts for the contextual variables, or wait till there is a more even playing field.
  13. Some relations are between parts and wholes, some parts pertain almost exclusively to some wholes and some wholes are almost exclusively associated with certain parts. It is reasonable to expect intellectual inertia to pertain to such relationships, there appear to be two general ways to disrupt such inertia and both appear to potentiate or actualise originality. You could find a whole for which such a part could theoretically pertain (lateral thinking) or you could theorise from such a part-whole relationship a contingency on some external variable--that is not itself contingent on either of the part or the whole--such that the absence of biconditionality between the part and whole justifies theoretical relation between that part and a potential other whole. In either case you have altered the implication between a part and a whole to a part and more than that whole, you have pluralised its application, relative to the rigidity of the initial part-whole relationship this is original. How many examples are there of famous works of art where the inertia of a part-whole relationship has not been overcome, and when they are so overcome, by which process other than the two i proposed?
  14. Is the next natural question .. Do we reject others, why so? Could we do so without it accompanying the unique self? And is the natural antimony following therefrom, this? Either we can both be original but must remain in the unique self-construct, or be unoriginal and achieve a state of no self?
  15. Can rejection be cause for originality, or can the reason you reject something also be the reason you have an original thought? Why do you reject certain things at all, and in which contexts? Are there patterns to the rejections, are there patterns to what is rejected? Could these patterns be anything else than an intersection of events, an identification of what is the same between different things? How many terms can be substituted for "rejection" where originality is still necessitated some of the time? Is this list of substitutions exhaustive, invariant under any change of environment or discourse? If so, what is this nebulous principle pertaining to all these? You may propose some specified intentionality as that principle, is there anything that could substitute for that? If not, what is the intentionality necessary to produce original thought independently of whether it does so through whatever can substitute for rejection (if the situation were such that your mind can not naturally allow you to think of anything that can substitute for rejection such to achieve originality then shouldn't this be quite telling as to what originality essentially is?)?