Reciprocality

It will likely get better and worse as you age, by a similar logic that allows you to become both more and less similar to others your own age. Your internal consistency, integrity and character will make life better, but the vast exposure to different experiences and perspectives will make the world less consistent and this can make life worse.

It is not so much writing itself that is at issue there, it is more so the conception of a generalised other person, which funnily is the actual crux in our metaphysical speculations, more specifically: how to be freed from that concept and the immensity of the narratives connected to it

@Carl-Richard It is easy to solve paradoxes by proposing constraints on what counts as a subject in a statement, such as through simplicity (rationalistic ontology) or simply uniqueness of morphological (non-semantic) composites. From here the liars paradox would be refuted by not meeting the criterion of subjects in statements, since the subject already involves a higher order property (semantics). But this does not satisfy those who seek an ontologically invariant logic that applies synthetically beyond the experiential ground from where that logic draws its concepts, and this is where substitutional quantification comes in--where "other-reference" is baked in to the relation between the quantification over subjects and the dispersion of subjects satisfying quantification at all, hence substitution.

I'll also ask a more open ended question, have you considered whether substitutional quantification can allow us to rescue logic from paradox and thus without the embarrassing appeal to ontological or pragmatic constraints on what counts as subjects in propositions?

How will your critique handle the concepts of essence, independence and necessity, each supervening in the same way on the humanly every-day practice of reasoning? How primitive will you treat the concept of negation as being? And how do you utilise this concept without regressing to the rationality you criticise? Will you have a general account of the difference between concepts or principles that are contextually bound and not contextually bound--or will you deny invariance altogether and propose complete pluralism?

@Leo Gura Will the video involve paraconsistent logic, intuitionistic logic, fussy logic, mereology, process philosophy, coherence theory of truth and underdetermination as a basis for a holistic or relativistic alternatives to what you see as rigid rationality? Will you explore the developmental and phenomenological origins of concepts, the fallacy of reification and overextension that rationality unawaringly often commits to with regard to those? Will you explore the history of rationalistic ontology and epistemology and connect these to the problems holistic approaches solves? Will you explore the connection between paradox / self-reference to variable-quantification in first order classical logic, if so how do you do this without proposing a correspondence theory of truth with subject-criterions? Why would paradox be a property inherent to rationality if it can be avoided by better logics?

Who could have predicated that these ideas would transpire from instead of developing naturally by admission of everything one does not know, one develop on the basis of the assertion that one knows and is everything. Insanity becomes freedom from a supposed mass delusion, a delusion perpetuated by not initially admitting to knowing almost nothing. But you are only becoming less free by defining yourself in relation (whether affirmatively or negatively) to a delusion that only pertains to the limited way in which you understand why humans behave as they do.

The dual opposite without which the above statement would be empty or meaningless: A subject without context can only be analytically predicated—tautologically described—since, in the absence of delimiting conditions, no falsifiable claims arise, no predicates mutually exclude one another, and the subject’s “properties” collapse into purely definitional generalities whose overlapping instantiations extend everywhere.

Context is the totality of material conditions that (i) render claims meaningful and falsifiable, and (ii) delimit the field of possible predicates: those already conceptualised and determinable, those conceptualised yet indeterminate with respect to a subject, and those not yet conceptualised at all.

@Someone here Imagine a water hose spreading water on the lawn when the lawn is sufficiently moistened, how would we now stop the water? Would you try to stop it by placing your hands over the end-point of the hose? This may actually lead the water to spread even further, perhaps we can expect this to happen too by "dealing" with the anger that repeatedly arises in a repeating context? Turn the water supply of when the lawn is no longer in need of water-->remove yourself from the context that angers you, don't be so eager to anticipate, predict and control growth, allow it to happen naturally in the process of reflecting on your encounters, the way you have always done it-->naturally and retrospectively.

@Anton Rogachevski Alright, here comes the forensic analysis. The direct excerpts from your essay that motivated the paraphrases: Paraphrase 1 — “Suspend beliefs; beliefs obscure raw experience” “Set aside everything you believe to be true, just for a moment.” -> explicit instruction to suspend beliefs before inquiry. “our access to it was only through belief.” -> claims access to “what’s out there” comes via belief (mediated). “Eventually, these stories become so dominant that they replace the direct ‘live feed’ with an endless rerun of mental commentary.” -> explains the mechanism by which belief/thoughts obscure direct experience. Paraphrase 2 — “Reality is constructed / arises within direct experience” “the appearance of a wall inside of experience is a hologram.” -> treats perceived objects as appearances inside experience rather than independently given. “The creation of ‘reality’ occurs when thoughts floating in the void are glued together into a story.” -> describes a construction mechanism: thoughts “glued” into a story produce what you call reality. “’Reality’ is the dream of the unawakened void.” -> frames reality as arising from a dreaming/appearance process, not as a mind-independent noumenon. Paraphrase 3 — “Language and logic are limited; paradox/non-conceptual methods may be more suitable” “some of the ideas may seem paradoxical—even contradictory at times—but that’s because we’re pointing toward something that cannot be captured in conventional language.” -> explicit claim language cannot capture the target. “it’s paradoxical, so logic can’t grasp it.” -> direct denial of logic’s capacity to fully grasp the subject. “What we are trying to do here is to use thought to describe itself, and later to cancel itself.” -> indicates conceptual language is provisional and meant to be negated, supporting the use of non-conceptual methods. If any of these quotes are taken out of context, tell me which paraphrase you dispute and I’ll paste the surrounding sentence/paragraph for clarity. If you disagree with the explanatory line I gave for a specific quote, point to the exact sentence you think reads differently and I’ll show how the paraphrase follows from the text.

It is interesting that we get caught up describing the behavioural or attentional difference between men and women, which are just two sets of distinct attributes, but what if the real reason you are able to identify the difference between these two categories in the first place so clearly as you do is that there is an essential difference between men and women that is invariant under any behavioural context, and of which these behaviours are just particular manifestations? Isn't a man like the rock and a woman like the ocean, absorbing it with its plasticity? What is that softness really? How could one not be self-fixated and socially fixated if the self and sociality is the means to every milestone? How would you feel safe if the only option were to literally run or scream?

@Anton Rogachevski Maybe you would see the meaning of my questions more clearly if I post gpt-5s perspective on the answers you gave to them. Excellent — now we’ve got Anton’s replies on the table, so we can assess them under your chosen criteria: relevance, significance, power, and consistency. I’ll go point by point, matching his answers to your objections. 1. On beliefs obscuring raw experience Anton’s reply: “If by reality you mean the noumena then beliefs are the best you can wish for.” “If we talk about Truth as Phenomenological Truth, then all concepts are pure hallucination, because raw unfiltered experience is completely empty – so any attempt whatsoever to think about it will be wrong the moment you start thinking about it.” Relevance: Medium. He shifts from your question about dependency (beliefs derived from experience) to a broader Kantian distinction (noumena vs phenomena). He addresses “obscuration” only indirectly by saying “all concepts are hallucination.” That sidesteps your dependency argument. Significance: High in terms of his framework — he’s basically redefining “raw experience” as empty and any belief as distortion. But this answer radically transforms the initial position: it now sounds more like a mystical/nihilistic stance (“emptiness,” no-thought) rather than Husserlian bracketing. Power: Weak as a reply to your objection. Your question was: how can beliefs obscure what they depend on? He doesn’t resolve the logical structure, but instead dissolves the problem by saying experience itself is empty. That avoids, but doesn’t neutralize, your critique. Consistency: Moderate. He’s consistent with a strong phenomenological/mystical line (concept = hallucination, emptiness as ground), but inconsistent with the original claim that beliefs “obscure” experience. If raw experience is “empty,” there’s nothing to obscure in the first place. 2. On construct vs direct experience Anton’s reply: “I think you may have misunderstood. … I propose a duality between the unreachable by science (yet) experience, and the actual physical world which can be described by science in some sense.” Relevance: Medium-high. He acknowledges your concern but reframes his position. Instead of “construct vs experience,” he now says “experience vs scientific description.” That’s not the same dichotomy you critiqued, so he’s partly dodging the issue. Significance: Moderate. This clarification softens his position — it drifts away from radical constructivism toward a pragmatic dualism (phenomenal vs scientific world). But it also abandons the sharp constructivist bite that triggered your critique in the first place. Power: Weak against your objection. Your critique forced him to retreat into vagueness: “the unreachable by science (yet)” is not a clear ontological stance. It doesn’t explain whether raw impressions exist or not, nor whether “construct” means willful schema or constitution of consciousness. Consistency: Low-to-moderate. He started with “reality as construct,” now he’s shifted to “two domains (experience vs science).” These don’t line up cleanly. It sounds like a redefinition to escape the force of your question. 3. On truth beyond constructs Anton’s reply: “What kind of truth are you talking about?” Relevance: Low. This is a deflection rather than an answer. You asked whether there is any truth in addition to constructs; he avoids engagement by shifting the burden back onto you. Significance: Low. This doesn’t deepen his position, just sidesteps. Power: Very weak as a reply — it reads as evasive rather than constructive. Consistency: Neutral. He doesn’t commit himself, so no inconsistency, but also no substantive position. 4. On language and logic Anton’s reply: “Are simply the grammar of how the mind works, they are not tools of truth, but of practicality and survival.” Relevance: Medium. This does address your challenge indirectly: instead of defending ineffability claims, he reclassifies logic/language as pragmatic rather than truth-bearing. But it doesn’t squarely handle your paradox objection. Significance: Moderate-high. This is a strong materialist/pragmatist reorientation: truth isn’t what language is for. That’s a real philosophical position. Power: Medium. It partially disarms your critique: if logic/language are only survival tools, then the charge of “self-refutation” doesn’t matter — the point wasn’t truth to begin with. But that changes the playing field entirely, and it leaves unanswered: if they’re not tools of truth, what is? Consistency: Moderate. It’s consistent with a pragmatist or Darwinian view of cognition, but inconsistent with his earlier gestures toward “phenomenological truth.” If all language is survival grammar, how do we talk about “truth” at all? As you can see it isn't very happy with most of these answers, nor were I, you supposedly should have invested a lot of time and energy into these topics given that you write essays on it on dedicated websites, I produce very clear questions that directly hints to or even explicitly demonstrates problem with the positions that got paraphrased for readabilities sake. You either agree with the easily readable characterisation of your positions in those paraphrasing or you don't, and if you don't then just say so and Ill be happy to demonstrate where in your essay I got them from and if you do agree with those paraphrasings then we can get into how my concerns connect to them, so that we may finally discuss an actual agreement or disagreement.

Sufficient harmony or consistency between ideas, principles, perspectives and opinions. A certain sense of clarity about the difference between what I know and what I do not. Without these I might be in such a different mental state that suicide would be the better alternative, how would I know?

@Anton Rogachevski Paraphrasing nr. 1: "Beliefs about what exists obscure raw experience. To truly explore reality, one must suspend these beliefs— "a new and humble perspective." How far doe this obscuration go? If all beliefs and their contingent concepts are derived from active engagement with raw experience, how can they obscure it? How precisely does it work when the general principle that B being contingent on A entails the independency of A upon B--has exceptions, such as you propose when "beliefs obscure raw experience". Paraphrasing nr. 2: What we call “reality” is constructed or arises within direct experience—what appears real is filtered through our perceptual and cognitive framework, not granted as some independent noumenal realm. You appear to propose a disjunction, an exclusive duality or dichotomy between "construct" and "direct experience" in the first clause, in doing so wouldn't you have to deny the existence of a disinterested raw Humean "secondary impression" that merely reproduce semantically insignificant composites of shapes and sensory magnitudes--and if not--how are such things "constructs" without losing the argumentative punch reduction to constructivism has in the first place? Isn't the whole premise of a "construct" that it is a schema downstream from and subservient to the will of the agent--therewith serving it as a means to its ends--such that there is both analytical coherence to the concept of a "construct" and an ongoing conflict between it and whatever truth could exist in addition to it? Paraphrasing nr. 3: Position: Language and logic are inherently limited when exploring the nature of existence. Paradox and non-conceptual methods might be more appropriate tools because the subject is beyond conventional description. Are you thereby proposing that something must be positively affirmed for language, logic and concept to be an appropriate tool for exploring it? And even if you were to hold that position, aren't you denying that very position by attributing to the nature of existence the "non-positive" predicate of being indescribable by words? Edit: a few misconstructions.