Martin Ball says he's not solipsistic

[Natasha Tori Maru]

40 minutes ago, Salvijus said:

Individuation is a logical necessity for God to know itself. 

This, agree

[Nemra]

@Salvijus, individuated consciousness is imaginary because of logical necessity.

You will never be able to prove the existence of other consciousnesses that other people have in your experience that you believe that they are experiencing something somewhat like you.

You are projecting the sense of the consciousness that you are experiencing onto others in your experience, and then you think you have proved their separate existence in your experience by just forgetting that you have projected it from the beginning.

Edited May 27 by Nemra

[Bluevinn]

5 minutes ago, Nemra said:

@Salvijus, individuated consciousness is imaginary

Including yours

[Nemra]

1 minute ago, Bluevinn said:

Including yours

If I believe that I have a sperate consciousness existing with others, then yes.

Other than that, I don't know and don't have answers. I have realized that much.

[zurew]

16 minutes ago, Nemra said:

individuated consciousness is imaginary because of logical necessity.

You will never be able to prove the existence of other consciousnesses that other people have in your experience that you believe that they are experiencing something somewhat like you.

I dont understand how the issue that you raise there is only applicable to non-solipsistic views.

1) You raise an epistemic objection about the limitations of proving a given thing, but epistemic limitation doesn't show that its ontologically problematic, its just shows my lack of ability to prove something. It can be true that others have consciousness and it can also be true that I don't have ability to prove that.

2) I dont see how the same epistemic objection couldnt be raised when it comes to Solipsism.

 

Edited May 27 by zurew

[Bluevinn]

9 minutes ago, Nemra said:

If I believe that I have a sperate consciousness existing with others, then yes.

Other than that, I don't know and don't have answers. I have realized that much.

You just straight up twisting stuff for no reason. c'mon man

Yes you do have a separate consciousness now. Otherwise you won't be here talking these stuff.

 

Edited May 27 by Bluevinn

[Nemra]

2 minutes ago, zurew said:

its just shows my lack of ability to prove something. It can be true that others have consciousness and it can also be true that I don't have ability to prove that.

It's not that you don't have the mental ability to prove it.

It's just that you will never find proof, which is the proof.

[Breakingthewall]

1 hour ago, Salvijus said:

The possiblity of diving endlessly into God is what proves my point. It puts you into a position of an individuated conciousness (a child of God) rather than a sole conciousness. 

You can't dive endlessly, you can be totally open to your absolute nature, then any form is just a form. Thinking that only this form exist is confusing the form with the substance. Who "knows" that only this form exist is the form believing that it's god. Tell to that god to change the form, or levitate or anything, let's see if he can. 

[zurew]

11 minutes ago, Nemra said:

It's just that you will never find proof, which is the proof.

How does that proof of solipsism ?

Again it only shows my epistemic limitations -which isn't anything other than a skill issue on my part (but it doesnt say anything about the ontology part).

 

If you want to claim that others having consciousness is logically impossible - then I will ask an argument that shows that from starting with the premise 'others have consciousness' you can somehow show the entailment deductively that  'it is the case others have consciousness and it is not the case that others have consciousness'.

Edited May 27 by zurew

[Natasha Tori Maru]

I see it as, we are Gods dream. He is the Dreamer.

But we are not dreaming each other.

We are the fragments that coalesce into matter to house consciousness. God endures, fed, based on the experience created by the friction of all individuated consciousness in tandem.

[Nemra]

10 minutes ago, Bluevinn said:

You just straight up twisting stuff for no reason. c'mon man

Yes you do have a separate consciousness now. Otherwise you won't be here talking these stuff.

Yes, I'm imagining both of us having an individuated consciousness at the time that I'm speaking with you.

What can I do? I'm not accustomed to it yet.

[zurew]

Whats the argument that everything that is true needs to be provable ?

Like why would I accept this?

[zurew]

19 minutes ago, zurew said:

2) I dont see how the same epistemic objection couldnt be raised when it comes to Solipsism.

Also waiting for a response  to this as well

[Wilhelm44]

@Leo Gura  The one part I dont get, is when you said that when you die, the whole universe stops existing with that event. But people die all the time, and the universe is still here ? We are all equally imaginary, so why should the universe stop existing when my imaginary character dies, and not so when my imaginary neighbor dies ?

[Salvijus]

1 hour ago, Nemra said:

@Salvijus, individuated consciousness is imaginary. 

Seperation of fingers is ultimately imaginary. But functionally fingers are individual parts of the same hand. You can't ignore the functional reality of existence. Conciousness is one, but functionally in many places all at once also. This functional individuation is necessary for consciousness to recognize itself.

 

Edited May 27 by Salvijus

[Salvijus]

Individuation is a functional necessity for conciousness to know itself.

Just like the eye cannot see itself without a mirror, conciousness needs to individuate itself (functionlly speaking) to recognize itself. 

Bye bye solipsism. 

Edited May 27 by Salvijus

[Nemra]

35 minutes ago, zurew said:

If you want to claim that others having consciousness is logically impossible - then I will ask an argument that shows that from starting with the premise 'others have consciousness' you can somehow show the entailment deductively that  'it is the case others have consciousness and it is not the case that others have consciousness'.

Let's say others have consciousness.

Then you would have to think that what and how you experience stuff is somewhat the same for others. Like, literally others should have an experience of reality.

But the thing is that that's not happening at this moment in your experience and that you have only had your experience, and any experience you will have, only you will be conscious of.

If you say to me that you are experiencing reality separate from me, and if I want to prove that you are experiencing it, then I should also make myself experience what you experience exactly; otherwise, it's not happening, and I'm just projecting my sense of experiencing reality onto you.

Edited May 27 by Nemra

[Nemra]

25 minutes ago, zurew said:

Also waiting for a response to this as well

Please clarify.

[Nemra]

1 hour ago, Salvijus said:

Separation of fingers is ultimately imaginary. But functionally fingers are individual parts of the same hand.

Imagining that something has a separate consciousness is different from things being separated from each other by some boundary.

When you say that something has consciousness, you literally believe that a whole reality exists in that thing, which you are not experiencing.

Edited May 27 by Nemra

[zurew]

32 minutes ago, Nemra said:

Please clarify

It seems to me that there are epistemic limitations on Solipsism as well.

So for example, if you ask yourself the question how do you definitely know that there are no other minds? Then Im not sure what kind of bulletproof justification you can provide there.

It seems that just as how people on non-solipsistic  cant provide a bulletproof justification that there are other minds, you as a solipsist cant provide a bulletproof non question-begging justification that there are no minds .

38 minutes ago, Nemra said:

If you say to me that you are experiencing reality separate from me, and if I want to prove that you are experiencing it, then I should also make myself experience what you experience exactly; otherwise, it's not happening, and I'm just projecting my sense of experiencing reality onto you.

Thats an inference that you are making but that doesn't show logical impossibility.

You making the inference that you should be able to experience what other minds experience - but thats an inference that is something that I would ask a supporting argument for.

Why should I think that: if there are other minds, then I should have the ability to experience those minds?

 

Again my problem is underdetermination that your argument doesn't help with - your argument is compatible with a world where there are other minds and people don't have the ability to experience those minds.