Breaking News: Major Combat Operations in Iran 🇺🇸 🇮🇱 🇮🇷

[Husseinisdoingfine]

5 hours ago, Stick said:

Breaking: ben shapiro speaks out in support of the war:

 

Who gives a shit? He’s a propagandist.

[Elliott]

见道网

https://www.seetaoe.com

Beyond the Strait of Hormuz, the China Iran railway corridor

Oil out, missiles in......

 

 

Not all of these pipelines are complete

Edited Tuesday at 02:13 AM by Elliott

[Stick]

5 hours ago, Husseinisdoingfine said:

Who gives a shit? He’s a propagandist.

Ben shapiro has been supporting the war since the beggining.
I just wanted to post that in a sarcastic way; I even added 'Breaking'
Maybe I am bad at jokes

[Elliott]

Saudi Arabia Is Pressing U.S. to Drop Its Hormuz Blockade

Gulf energy exporters worry Iran could escalate and close the Bab al-Mandeb, the main exit route for bottlenecked Persian Gulf oil

https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/saudi-arabia-us-strait-of-hormuz-blockade-25fbd430

 

US-sanctioned Chinese tankers pass Strait of Hormuz despite US blockade, data shows

By Reuters

April 13, 202611:42 PM EDTUpdated 

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-sanctioned-chinese-tanker-passes-strait-hormuz-despite-us-blockade-data-shows-2026-04-14/

 

Three Iran-linked tankers pass through strait of Hormuz - Reuters

Three Iran-linked tankers have passed through the strait of Hormuz on the first full day of the US blockade of Iranian ports, Reuters has reported, citing shipping data

.https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/apr/14/middle-east-crisis-live-hezbollah-urges-lebanon-to-pull-out-of-talks-with-israel-blockade-of-strait-of-hormuz-begins?filterKeyEvents=false&page=with%3Ablock-69de0bae8f081c0d263c21fa

 

https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2026/apr/14/middle-east-crisis-live-hezbollah-urges-lebanon-to-pull-out-of-talks-with-israel-blockade-of-strait-of-hormuz-begins

The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah will not abide by any agreements that may result from direct Lebanon-Israel talks in the US, negotiations it firmly opposes, a senior Hezbollah official has said.

Wafiq Safa, a high-ranking member of Hezbollah’s political council, spoke on the eve of talks expected in Washington between Lebanese and Israeli ambassadors to the US

Edited Tuesday at 05:31 PM by Elliott

[NewKidOnTheBlock]

Bloated!

[Elliott]

Yemen may close key Red Sea strait amid US threats to blockade Iran: Report

Monday, 13 April 2026 3:08 PM [ 

 

$12 gallon gas!!!!!!! That isn't low on groceries level, that's your neighborhood neighbors will be trying to kill you prices; or, to put it another way, the Pope will kill Trump. (This isn't going to last)

 

https://thedefensepost.com/2026/03/16/china-ai-us-bombers-iran/

Chinese AI Monitoring System Allegedly Tracked Stealth US B-2 Bombers ...

Mar 16, 2026 — Chinese defense technology has intercepted radio transmissions from stealth US B-2 Spirit bombers involved in a March 1 strike on Iran,

The company previously said it had intercepted radio transmissions from US B-52 bombers conducting deterrence patrols near Taiwan and parts of the West Philippine Sea

 

https://nypost.com/2026/04/09/world-news/trump-urges-netanyahu-to-scale-back-lebanon-strikes-threatening-cease-fire/?utm_source=aol&utm_campaign=nypost&utm_medium=referral

Trump urges Netanyahu to scale back Lebanon strikes — as Israel set to negotiate with Beirut

Edited Tuesday at 05:45 PM by Elliott

[Elliott]

Trump is going to be the biggest green revolution president in history! Go MAGA!!!!

 

Dallas oil CEO says gas prices could hit '$5 or $6' per gallon due to US, Israeli war with Iran · 'Fill up anything you can right now' · How 

https://www.kxan.com/news/national-news/dallas-oil-ceo-says-gas-prices-could-hit-5-or-6-per-gallon-due-to-us-israeli-war-with-iran/

 

investingLive

https://investinglive.com

Over 100 empty oil tankers head to US ports to load export crude

4 minutes ago — Over 100 empty oil tankers heading to US to load crude; Surge includes 54 VLCCs (~2m barrels each), signalling strong export demand; US

 

Reuters

https://www.reuters.com

Trump says empty oil tankers heading to U.S. to load up with oil, gas

3 days ago — "Massive numbers of completely empty oil tankers, some of ‌the largest anywhere in the World, are heading, right now, to the United States to

 

Order your bicycle parts and walkin' shoes, folks. MAHA

We, uh, still have been given zero reason for this war, what the goal is, nothing.

Edited Tuesday at 08:48 PM by Elliott

[Elliott]

Beyond Strait of Hormuz: How China Iran rail system countered US threat

Mar 3, 2026 — The news agency said that with the rail line far from any American military presence, "Iran can export oil and import goods from China with ease ..

The train's journey was 30 days shorter than the time usually taken by ships to sail from Shanghai to Iran's Bandar Abbas por

https://www.businesstoday.in/world/story/beyond-strait-of-hormuz-how-china-iran-rail-system-countered-us-threat-518864-2026-03-03

 

So, Iran may make MORE money over the blockades, with doubling oil prices. This blockade may not be leverage at all, just shooting ourselves in the dick.

 

CNBC

https://www.cnbc.com

Dollar falls on hopes for revived Middle East peace talks

20 hours ago — The dollar fell on Tuesday, poised for a seventh straight daily decline, as investors grew optimistic that a peace deal between the U.S.

The greenback has fallen more than 2% during its seven-day decline, its longest since a nine-session skid ended December 3, when ‌investors were largely expecting at least two rate cuts from the Federal Reserve this year. Chicago ‌Federal Reserve President Austan Goolsbee said interest-rate cuts may need to wait until 2027, depending on how long oil prices stay high.

The dollar extended declines after data from the U.S. Labor Department showed the Producer Price Index (PPI) for final demand rose 0.5% in March, short of ⁠the estimate of economists polled by Reuters calling for a 1.1% increase, after a downwardly revised 0.5% gain in February.

Edited Tuesday at 09:23 PM by Elliott

[Elliott]

All Trump is asking for is 5 more years of delayed enrichment than Obamas deal, lol. Obama had a 15 year deal, Trump canceled it, Then Iran got pretty close to weapons grade enrichment, and now we're back to asking for Obamas deal again. Lolz, and Iran won't take it, they're essentially saying they're getting a nuclear weapon now since trump reneged on the first US deal. What an idiot, he has driven them to nuclear weapons and has ZERO leverage now.

 

"The 2015 Iran nuclear deal (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action - JCPOA) negotiated under President Barack Obama did not require Iran to halt all nuclear enrichment, but it did impose strict, time-bound limitations on its enrichment activities. [1, 2, 3]

Key Details of the Obama-Era Iran Deal:

Enrichment Level Limits: Iran was allowed to continue enrichment but agreed to cap it at 3.67 percent U-235, which is suitable for civilian nuclear power, far below the 90 percent needed for a weapon.

Stockpile Restrictions: Iran was required to reduce its stockpile of enriched uranium by 98%, limiting it to 300kg for 15 years.

Centrifuge Reduction: Iran agreed to cut its operating centrifuges by two-thirds, reducing them to 6,104 units of the oldest, least efficient models at the Natanz facility for ten years.

Fordow Restrictions: Iran agreed to halt all uranium enrichment at its underground Fordow facility for 15 years.

 

Post-Obama Developments:
After Trump withdrew in 2018, Iran began increasing its enrichment, eventually reaching 60 percent, according to reports in 2026. [1, 2]"

 

New York Post

https://nypost.com

US pitched Iran on 20-year uranium enrichment 'pause' during Pakistan ...

1 day ago — The US asked Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program for at least two decades during weekend cease-fire negotiations in Pakistan,

 

All of this just because trump is racist against Obama, WOW. 

Edited yesterday at 01:48 AM by Elliott

[Nivsch]

https://x.com/avner_vilan/status/2044015526209294518?s=20

" In recent days I’ve been hearing that people are starting to “move the goalposts” and change the definition of what a nuclear Iran actually is. All kinds of nonsense like “the danger is only in an operational weapon, not in a desert test,” or “they’ve always had the ability to enrich to 90%.”

So let’s put things in order. I promise it will be simple—but we have to look reality in the eye and not make excuses for ourselves.

There are several levels of risk when it comes to a nuclear Iran:
Control of enrichment and weapons technology → fissile material → a “nuclear device” explosion → operational weapon → nuclear arsenal → use of weapons against us.

Control of enrichment and weapons technology:

They’ve basically had this since the mid-2000s. We’ve already passed that stage.
Fissile material:This is the core issue.

Under the JCPOA, they were about a year away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb. They were allowed to accumulate no more than 400 kg enriched to ~3%, with any excess removed from the country, under strict international monitoring by the IAEA.
After the U.S. withdrew from the deal, two major things happened:

First, Iran expanded enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow and began enriching material at an industrial scale. By June 2025, they had accumulated about 450 kg of uranium enriched to 60%—which is 99% of the way to enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. In addition, there are about 130 kg at 20%, enough for another bomb and a bit more. Most enrichment work since the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 went into building this stockpile.

450 kg may not sound like much, but producing that amount requires significant industrial infrastructure and years of continuously feeding uranium into thousands of centrifuges.

Second, beyond monitoring uranium and facilities, the deal imposed stricter oversight on Iran than on a “normal” country, due to lack of trust. Monitoring extended even to centrifuge component production.

After the U.S. withdrawal, this oversight stopped, and the West lost the ability to track centrifuge production. That means hundreds, if not thousands, of centrifuges are now unaccounted for—and could be used to build a small clandestine enrichment site.
Bottom line:

On the eve of “Am K’Lavi” (operation), Iran was days away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb, and weeks away from enough for an arsenal of 12 bombs. It had fortified enrichment facilities to do so.

“Am K’Lavi” prevented an immediate breakout by disabling industrial enrichment sites—but left Iran with enriched material, hundreds or thousands of centrifuges, the knowledge, and most importantly the motivation.
As long as Iran has enriched uranium, it doesn’t need large industrial sites like Natanz or Fordow. It can build a small covert facility with 2–3 cascades—something that could fit in half a sports hall.

Building such a facility might take about six months. With 200–300 advanced centrifuges, they could enrich enough material for a bomb in about a month.
If they had to start from scratch, it would take about two years per bomb—but that’s less realistic.

Assuming we would detect such a facility is very dangerous. Intelligence coverage is excellent—but not airtight. We might even see indications and not understand them, as happened with Fordow.

In other words, when we say it would take six months to build such a facility, no one says that those six months didn’t already start a year or two ago.

Therefore, the main goal must be:
Remove all enriched uranium from Iran. Not part of it. Every gram.

Every 40 kg of uranium enriched to 60% equals roughly one nuclear bomb.

Another key point: nuclear material leaves physical traces and cannot be hidden. Even years later, inspectors can detect residues—as happened with secret Iranian sites from the early 2000s.

That’s why the red line has always been obtaining fissile material.

I’m starting to hear defeatist voices saying Iran already effectively has the capability to reach 90%, and it can’t be stopped. Accepting that is a massive failure.

Nuclear Device Explosion

A “nuclear device” is the minimum needed to turn fissile material into an explosion—either a desert test or a basic bomb deliverable by aircraft or transport.
Iran was already preparing for such tests in 2003. It wouldn’t be surprising if they try again in 2026.

Turning enriched material into a bomb involves chemical and engineering processes—not trivial, but not extremely complex either. With enough margin for error, it could take 6–12 months, even starting from scratch.

Claims that killing scientists erased Iranian knowledge are unrealistic. Iran has enough capable physicists.
Tracking such activity is very difficult—few clear indicators, easy to miss without intelligence leads.

Also, much of the preparation can be done before having highly enriched uranium. Once 90% material exists, a test explosion could be ready within weeks.
Some will say: “But that’s not an operational weapon.”
I say: bullshit.

The day Iran conducts a nuclear test, no U.S. president will risk attacking it. Look at North Korea.

That same day, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Turkey will accelerate nuclear programs—turning the Middle East into a nuclear region within years.
And delivery doesn’t have to be a missile. A bomb could be smuggled via sea or land—in a container, truck, or yacht.
Operational Weapon

Next stage: a reliable warhead mounted on a missile.

This is harder. Eliminating scientists may delay it—from about a year to 2.5–3 years—but we don’t know when the clock started.
A covert team might already be working. Or Iran could even buy weapons from North Korea.
And it can escalate further—arsenals, delivery systems, deterrence, second-strike capability—but that’s a place we don’t want to reach.

Most of the consequences will already be felt once Iran conducts a nuclear test—not only when it has dozens of warheads.
Conclusion
We can debate policy—but first agree on facts:

As long as enriched uranium remains in Iran, the regime is dangerously close to a bomb—and could achieve it without us knowing.
Relying on intelligence alone is a dangerous gamble.
We must not let people downplay the threat by saying “they don’t yet have an operational weapon.”
The immediate goal: remove all enriched uranium.

And equally important—acknowledge that past policy led us here. After leaving the nuclear deal in 2018 and failing to act meaningfully until 2025, Iran advanced significantly.

We canceled an agreement that limited enrichment—but didn’t stop their progress while it was still manageable.
Even if recent action came just in time, we must ask how we got so close—and admit the danger hasn’t passed.

Today, fully dismantling their capabilities militarily would require a complex ground operation with a very high cost.
The real question:

Can we translate military achievements into a political outcome—removing the material and preventing enrichment for years?
Eyes on the ball "

Edited 19 hours ago by Nivsch

[MrTruf]

@Nivsch , thanks for another random X post. Real solid dose of war-justifying "analysis".

Sooo… when are you signing up?

[Elliott]

3 hours ago, Nivsch said:

https://x.com/avner_vilan/status/2044015526209294518?s=20

" In recent days I’ve been hearing that people are starting to “move the goalposts” and change the definition of what a nuclear Iran actually is. All kinds of nonsense like “the danger is only in an operational weapon, not in a desert test,” or “they’ve always had the ability to enrich to 90%.”

So let’s put things in order. I promise it will be simple—but we have to look reality in the eye and not make excuses for ourselves.

There are several levels of risk when it comes to a nuclear Iran:
Control of enrichment and weapons technology → fissile material → a “nuclear device” explosion → operational weapon → nuclear arsenal → use of weapons against us.

Control of enrichment and weapons technology:

They’ve basically had this since the mid-2000s. We’ve already passed that stage.
Fissile material:This is the core issue.

Under the JCPOA, they were about a year away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb. They were allowed to accumulate no more than 400 kg enriched to ~3%, with any excess removed from the country, under strict international monitoring by the IAEA.
After the U.S. withdrew from the deal, two major things happened:

First, Iran expanded enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow and began enriching material at an industrial scale. By June 2025, they had accumulated about 450 kg of uranium enriched to 60%—which is 99% of the way to enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. In addition, there are about 130 kg at 20%, enough for another bomb and a bit more. Most enrichment work since the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 went into building this stockpile.

450 kg may not sound like much, but producing that amount requires significant industrial infrastructure and years of continuously feeding uranium into thousands of centrifuges.

Second, beyond monitoring uranium and facilities, the deal imposed stricter oversight on Iran than on a “normal” country, due to lack of trust. Monitoring extended even to centrifuge component production.

After the U.S. withdrawal, this oversight stopped, and the West lost the ability to track centrifuge production. That means hundreds, if not thousands, of centrifuges are now unaccounted for—and could be used to build a small clandestine enrichment site.
Bottom line:

On the eve of “Am K’Lavi” (operation), Iran was days away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb, and weeks away from enough for an arsenal of 12 bombs. It had fortified enrichment facilities to do so.

“Am K’Lavi” prevented an immediate breakout by disabling industrial enrichment sites—but left Iran with enriched material, hundreds or thousands of centrifuges, the knowledge, and most importantly the motivation.
As long as Iran has enriched uranium, it doesn’t need large industrial sites like Natanz or Fordow. It can build a small covert facility with 2–3 cascades—something that could fit in half a sports hall.

Building such a facility might take about six months. With 200–300 advanced centrifuges, they could enrich enough material for a bomb in about a month.
If they had to start from scratch, it would take about two years per bomb—but that’s less realistic.

Assuming we would detect such a facility is very dangerous. Intelligence coverage is excellent—but not airtight. We might even see indications and not understand them, as happened with Fordow.

In other words, when we say it would take six months to build such a facility, no one says that those six months didn’t already start a year or two ago.

Therefore, the main goal must be:
Remove all enriched uranium from Iran. Not part of it. Every gram.

Every 40 kg of uranium enriched to 60% equals roughly one nuclear bomb.

Another key point: nuclear material leaves physical traces and cannot be hidden. Even years later, inspectors can detect residues—as happened with secret Iranian sites from the early 2000s.

That’s why the red line has always been obtaining fissile material.

I’m starting to hear defeatist voices saying Iran already effectively has the capability to reach 90%, and it can’t be stopped. Accepting that is a massive failure.

Nuclear Device Explosion

A “nuclear device” is the minimum needed to turn fissile material into an explosion—either a desert test or a basic bomb deliverable by aircraft or transport.
Iran was already preparing for such tests in 2003. It wouldn’t be surprising if they try again in 2026.

Turning enriched material into a bomb involves chemical and engineering processes—not trivial, but not extremely complex either. With enough margin for error, it could take 6–12 months, even starting from scratch.

Claims that killing scientists erased Iranian knowledge are unrealistic. Iran has enough capable physicists.
Tracking such activity is very difficult—few clear indicators, easy to miss without intelligence leads.

Also, much of the preparation can be done before having highly enriched uranium. Once 90% material exists, a test explosion could be ready within weeks.
Some will say: “But that’s not an operational weapon.”
I say: bullshit.

The day Iran conducts a nuclear test, no U.S. president will risk attacking it. Look at North Korea.

That same day, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Turkey will accelerate nuclear programs—turning the Middle East into a nuclear region within years.
And delivery doesn’t have to be a missile. A bomb could be smuggled via sea or land—in a container, truck, or yacht.
Operational Weapon

Next stage: a reliable warhead mounted on a missile.

This is harder. Eliminating scientists may delay it—from about a year to 2.5–3 years—but we don’t know when the clock started.
A covert team might already be working. Or Iran could even buy weapons from North Korea.
And it can escalate further—arsenals, delivery systems, deterrence, second-strike capability—but that’s a place we don’t want to reach.

Most of the consequences will already be felt once Iran conducts a nuclear test—not only when it has dozens of warheads.
Conclusion
We can debate policy—but first agree on facts:

As long as enriched uranium remains in Iran, the regime is dangerously close to a bomb—and could achieve it without us knowing.
Relying on intelligence alone is a dangerous gamble.
We must not let people downplay the threat by saying “they don’t yet have an operational weapon.”
The immediate goal: remove all enriched uranium.

And equally important—acknowledge that past policy led us here. After leaving the nuclear deal in 2018 and failing to act meaningfully until 2025, Iran advanced significantly.

We canceled an agreement that limited enrichment—but didn’t stop their progress while it was still manageable.
Even if recent action came just in time, we must ask how we got so close—and admit the danger hasn’t passed.

Today, fully dismantling their capabilities militarily would require a complex ground operation with a very high cost.
The real question:

Can we translate military achievements into a political outcome—removing the material and preventing enrichment for years?
Eyes on the ball "

Thanks

 

Iran can make a nuke in an otherwise mineral mine, no one would know. But, the u.s. and Israel has no way to stop that NOW. The only way was diplomacy, yet our side has child molesters at the table that no one would trust. 

 

PBS

https://www.pbs.org

Israeli PM steps up calls to end the Iranian nuclear deal

May 6, 2018 — Netanyahu said Israel is sharing a trove of confiscated Iranian nuclear documents with the six world powers that signed the deal, as well as

 

Now, what matters is if Iran will use a nuclear weapon, and with BIBI and Trump Iran has little choice, Iran must destroy Israel, just like Israel must destroy Iran(impossible). Iran has no incentive not to use nukes, they're already sanctioned and bombed and threatened with nukes without having nukes, and Trump sanctioned them when they agreed to no nuclear enrichment.

Iran must take the middle east from the u.s., the red sea and Persian gulf. There's no reason for Iran to take any US deal, only the US to take Iran's. Trump had every advantage, didn't even have to do anything, and now he's possibly getting his favorite country nuked.

Edited 16 hours ago by Elliott

[Ima Freeman]

4 hours ago, Nivsch said:

https://x.com/avner_vilan/status/2044015526209294518?s=20

" In recent days I’ve been hearing that people are starting to “move the goalposts” and change the definition of what a nuclear Iran actually is. All kinds of nonsense like “the danger is only in an operational weapon, not in a desert test,” or “they’ve always had the ability to enrich to 90%.”

So let’s put things in order. I promise it will be simple—but we have to look reality in the eye and not make excuses for ourselves.

There are several levels of risk when it comes to a nuclear Iran:
Control of enrichment and weapons technology → fissile material → a “nuclear device” explosion → operational weapon → nuclear arsenal → use of weapons against us.

Control of enrichment and weapons technology:

They’ve basically had this since the mid-2000s. We’ve already passed that stage.
Fissile material:This is the core issue.

Under the JCPOA, they were about a year away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb. They were allowed to accumulate no more than 400 kg enriched to ~3%, with any excess removed from the country, under strict international monitoring by the IAEA.
After the U.S. withdrew from the deal, two major things happened:

First, Iran expanded enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow and began enriching material at an industrial scale. By June 2025, they had accumulated about 450 kg of uranium enriched to 60%—which is 99% of the way to enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. In addition, there are about 130 kg at 20%, enough for another bomb and a bit more. Most enrichment work since the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 went into building this stockpile.

450 kg may not sound like much, but producing that amount requires significant industrial infrastructure and years of continuously feeding uranium into thousands of centrifuges.

Second, beyond monitoring uranium and facilities, the deal imposed stricter oversight on Iran than on a “normal” country, due to lack of trust. Monitoring extended even to centrifuge component production.

After the U.S. withdrawal, this oversight stopped, and the West lost the ability to track centrifuge production. That means hundreds, if not thousands, of centrifuges are now unaccounted for—and could be used to build a small clandestine enrichment site.
Bottom line:

On the eve of “Am K’Lavi” (operation), Iran was days away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb, and weeks away from enough for an arsenal of 12 bombs. It had fortified enrichment facilities to do so.

“Am K’Lavi” prevented an immediate breakout by disabling industrial enrichment sites—but left Iran with enriched material, hundreds or thousands of centrifuges, the knowledge, and most importantly the motivation.
As long as Iran has enriched uranium, it doesn’t need large industrial sites like Natanz or Fordow. It can build a small covert facility with 2–3 cascades—something that could fit in half a sports hall.

Building such a facility might take about six months. With 200–300 advanced centrifuges, they could enrich enough material for a bomb in about a month.
If they had to start from scratch, it would take about two years per bomb—but that’s less realistic.

Assuming we would detect such a facility is very dangerous. Intelligence coverage is excellent—but not airtight. We might even see indications and not understand them, as happened with Fordow.

In other words, when we say it would take six months to build such a facility, no one says that those six months didn’t already start a year or two ago.

Therefore, the main goal must be:
Remove all enriched uranium from Iran. Not part of it. Every gram.

Every 40 kg of uranium enriched to 60% equals roughly one nuclear bomb.

Another key point: nuclear material leaves physical traces and cannot be hidden. Even years later, inspectors can detect residues—as happened with secret Iranian sites from the early 2000s.

That’s why the red line has always been obtaining fissile material.

I’m starting to hear defeatist voices saying Iran already effectively has the capability to reach 90%, and it can’t be stopped. Accepting that is a massive failure.

Nuclear Device Explosion

A “nuclear device” is the minimum needed to turn fissile material into an explosion—either a desert test or a basic bomb deliverable by aircraft or transport.
Iran was already preparing for such tests in 2003. It wouldn’t be surprising if they try again in 2026.

Turning enriched material into a bomb involves chemical and engineering processes—not trivial, but not extremely complex either. With enough margin for error, it could take 6–12 months, even starting from scratch.

Claims that killing scientists erased Iranian knowledge are unrealistic. Iran has enough capable physicists.
Tracking such activity is very difficult—few clear indicators, easy to miss without intelligence leads.

Also, much of the preparation can be done before having highly enriched uranium. Once 90% material exists, a test explosion could be ready within weeks.
Some will say: “But that’s not an operational weapon.”
I say: bullshit.

The day Iran conducts a nuclear test, no U.S. president will risk attacking it. Look at North Korea.

That same day, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Turkey will accelerate nuclear programs—turning the Middle East into a nuclear region within years.
And delivery doesn’t have to be a missile. A bomb could be smuggled via sea or land—in a container, truck, or yacht.
Operational Weapon

Next stage: a reliable warhead mounted on a missile.

This is harder. Eliminating scientists may delay it—from about a year to 2.5–3 years—but we don’t know when the clock started.
A covert team might already be working. Or Iran could even buy weapons from North Korea.
And it can escalate further—arsenals, delivery systems, deterrence, second-strike capability—but that’s a place we don’t want to reach.

Most of the consequences will already be felt once Iran conducts a nuclear test—not only when it has dozens of warheads.
Conclusion
We can debate policy—but first agree on facts:

As long as enriched uranium remains in Iran, the regime is dangerously close to a bomb—and could achieve it without us knowing.
Relying on intelligence alone is a dangerous gamble.
We must not let people downplay the threat by saying “they don’t yet have an operational weapon.”
The immediate goal: remove all enriched uranium.

And equally important—acknowledge that past policy led us here. After leaving the nuclear deal in 2018 and failing to act meaningfully until 2025, Iran advanced significantly.

We canceled an agreement that limited enrichment—but didn’t stop their progress while it was still manageable.
Even if recent action came just in time, we must ask how we got so close—and admit the danger hasn’t passed.

Today, fully dismantling their capabilities militarily would require a complex ground operation with a very high cost.
The real question:

Can we translate military achievements into a political outcome—removing the material and preventing enrichment for years?
Eyes on the ball "

A radical religious regime should not get into possession of nuclear weapons - and the same is true for Iran

[Elliott]

 

The Guardian

https://www.theguardian.com

This chart on oil prices shows why Qantas and Virgin are cutting flights ...

56 minutes ago —

 

 

CNBC

https://www.cnbc.com

A 'systemic' jet fuel shortage is brewing in Europe — and flights could be hit hard

1 day ago — In the U.S., the price of jet fuel nearly doubled, increasing from $2.50 a gallon on Feb. 27 to $4.88 a gallon on April 2. A Lufthansa passenger

 

Fox News

https://www.foxnews.com

Airline sparks anger as it demands extra fees from already booked ...

20 hours ago — Volotea, a Spanish budget airline, is reportedly demanding that flight passengers pay an extra fuel surcharge of $8 to $11 after booking,