Carl-Richard

Ah, the Sam Harris method: "imagine..." ?

There is growing research in cross-cultural developmental psychology, but none of the grand narrative models are linear stage models. They look more like Bronfenbrenner (contextual models). If you want a grand model, you need grand effort

In the case of linear ontogeny, it can be something like Graves' student essay methodology, only applied to a huge data set with different categories of cross-cultural people (something like the image I posted). At some point, we'll probably have extremely advanced cross-cultural developmental models that work like computer simulations where you can plot in dozens of contextual variables (education, current nationality, past nationalities, socioeconomic status etc.) and get a detailed report of a person's developmental trajectory. It might have some linear stage theory aspects as well (maybe not an universal one, but several possible paths). It would probably require an AI that could create standarized values for each contextual variable for each person and some revolutionary data gathering instrument (as opposed to highly inaccurate self-assessment sheets). AI would also be useful for running algorithms for things like Graves' student essay methodology with huge complex data sets.

True. Science is about testing if that is the case. You can't get around structuring a model a certain way (Western assumptions or not), but you can at least try to do sober empirical research (circumventing WEIRD bias).

Who denies development? The critique is about claims of universality of linear, non-contextual stage models with empirical WEIRD bias.

Man that's a cool thought. So a more expanded form of spiritual bypassing (applied to knowledge in general). Epistemic bypassing? ☺ Is it like when Orange thinks it is Yellow? ? (I'm not sure if this is coherent at all. It's a pretty off-the-wall late-night bed thought): So in the post-metamodern application of epistemic bypassing, the internal transformation would be described using a metamodern developmental framework (e.g. SD), which then would be used to critique a person's level of understanding of the metamodern level of analysis itself (either that very framework, i.e. SD, or a comparable model), so it's interlooping with itself pretty hard. Is this interlooping action what MHC (Commons) refers to by denoting "performative-recursive" in meta-cross-paradigmatic cognition?

Doesn't work very much like a brain then This is a good talk on ontology (in favor of idealism, but it's good for understanding materialism as well):

I would use the term "self-awareness" to refer to the awareness of the small self and "awareness" to be awareness of the big Self. Self-awareness or meta-awareness is the ability to re-represent internal representations (perceptions), which means to think about something that is not currently in your experience. A more complex form of meta-awareness is the ability to make higher-order symbolic representations (classes like "cat" or "dog" or "human") out of these re-representations, which you can weave into abstract narratives, i.e. a self-story (e.g. "I am a human"). Higher-order symbolic meta-awareness is what humans have (we make stories about ourselves and the environment), some animals probably have a lower form of meta-awareness (they can think about past experiences), and some probably don't re-represent perceptions at all.

I'm not a philosopher, and all these terms have sub-categories which complicates things and which I can't recite from the top of my head, but I would still make a small correction: You did explain substance dualism correctly, but materialism is a monism which says everything is made out of matter, and that mind is an emergent property of matter (brains). It's emergent in the sense that a substance called matter somehow produces a different type of substance called mind. Substance dualism merely poses that matter and mind are produced separately and have no causal correlation, i.e. brains don't have anything to do with mind (which is in some ways less ridiculous than materialism). Yep, that's materialism.

Wrong. There is an increased functional connectivity between some brain areas (communication), but they don't increase blood flow to any of those areas (there is only a decrease). Blood flow is one of the main ways of measuring brain activity, because it's an indicator of increased glucose metabolism and energy expenditure.

I agree. If I can borrow your terms to reiterate: I'm pointing out the potential danger that arises in this new elevated position; of affirming that you've already acknowledged the lessons of the last predecessor (postmodern relativism), and to then inadvertently smuggle some of the thinking from the earlier predecessors (order, universality, progress) into places where they may not belong, in a way that de-emphasizes the postmodern lessons, maybe just as a form of a retrograde amnesia ("it's been a while since I've done a thorough postmodern account of my worldview"), and that it's therefore again only a reminder and a point on emphasis (as the lessons were in fact already learned). You could say it's a type of post-metamodern analysis Basically, it's a roundabout way of saying that one must be eternally aware of one's self-biases

If you build that computer and then damage some of its components, will it have an increase or decrease in consciousness?

And I'm glad the moderator team agrees with my decision . Please don't derail the topic.

Why does psychedelics and meditation lead to a decrease in brain activity but a widening of consciousness? Why do some types of brain damage lead to an increase in functioning? (e.g. Acquired savant syndrome).

I've stopped watching spiritual teachers in general because of the strong transmission effect, so I don't even dare to glance at that one

Jan Esmann. Crazy shakti.

Mountains in general.

It's a joke. They're actually good supplements

The "Bach" in "Gödel, Escher, Bach":

I think the argument is that 1st person experience (personalized bubbles of consciousness) merely arose at one stage of natural evolution, not as a product of information processing, but either as a product of selection or just sheer happenstance. It's another way of saying that we only know about lifeforms such as ours that have a subjective experience. Even if the computer evolved through natural selection, it's not necessarily a given that it too would have internal experience (because again, the possibility of happenstance).

The question is really how different that would look from biology (if we're indeed aiming for an organism with metabolism, as experience seems to be tied to metabolism). For example, phospholipid membranes and water are perfect for the transfer and catalyzing of chemical reactions of organic compounds. The idea that a synthetic organism ("machine") has to be electronic and consist of cold, dead, metallic parts is a bit juvenile.

You could argue that the computer in that case would literally create life. There are many traits you can use to create the category of life, but arguably the most central one is metabolism.

Bernardo Kastrup says we can simulate intelligence (behavior), but not understanding (1st person experience of intelligence), at least with current technology. Experience seems to be intrinsically tied to biology. 2:26:35 - 2:30:00 "Life/metabolism is what dissociative processes look like."

A biological neuron is more complex than an electronic neuron.

Humans tend to identify with the content of their self-referential thoughts (narratives derived from their autobiographical memory) to produce a self-identity that shapes one's perception of the world. When the frequency and repetitive nature of one's self-referential of thoughts is lessened, and when such thoughts are perceived for the fleeting phenomena that they are, rather than for being the base of one's reality, one can start to unveil this contracted perceptual overlay, a.k.a. the illusion of self.