Hardkill

There is a big difference in intelligence on both sides. Sure, there are a lot of Democrats and leftists in the country who are stupid and naive. However, it's still asymmetrical. There are a lot more Republicans and right-wingers than Democrats and left-wingers in the country who are idiotic and primitive. Also, most Independent voters are still easily influenced by the right-wing media machine into believing that "both sides are equally bad." Furthermore, most people in America are still tradition-oriented, and the Republican Party is still very much the party that represents traditional values more than the Democratic Party does.

This is so heartbreaking. I never would've thought that an Arab would save many jews in that situation like this.

Doesn't mean that the Democrats will win the midterms in 2026 let alone the presidency in 2028. The midterms have an even greater percentage of less informed, less educated voters who are easily swayed by the right-wing propaganda and anti-mainstream messaging than special elections and off-year elections do. Presidential elections, especially have the greatest percentage of voters who are so stupid, so simple-minded, and so uninformed about what the fuck is really going on in the world that they are the most easily seduced by the devilry of the right-wing propaganda, anti-mainstream propaganda, and a charismatic demagogue into still voting Republican over Democrat. What if Tucker Carlson, Dan Bilzerian, or some other charismatic right-wing figure like them actually runs for president in 2028 and runs as another "outsider" populist who promises to burn down the entire system and make "real change"?

That's good to know. I'd like to see how much of a change this will make many years from now.

Every right-wing media outlet since the 1990s has caused media manufacturing consent and blatant media bias for every radical right-wing Republican.

Wouldn't you say that the military and law enforcement are necessary forms of conformity?

Leo, earlier you told me Democrats should not copy GOP/right-wing economics, and instead should adopt a strong economic populist agenda: Fixing inequality, busting monopolies, ending corporate domination/lobbying, not raising taxes on the bottom 80%, etc. That all sounds like a more humane, Green-ish direction within capitalism. How do you reconcile that prescriptive advice with your prediction that we’ll have ‘nothing but neoliberalism for the next 100 years’? Are you basically saying: the meta-frame stays neoliberal, but within that, we should still push toward the most progressive/economic-populist version possible? I’m trying to understand whether you see economic populism as a realistic near-term path within neoliberalism, or mostly as a higher-consciousness ideal that the current level of development won’t actually implement.

I don't think that even the Scandinavian countries are currently solid Green or have Green as their center of gravity, right?

Yeah, I agree with that. The “100 years of neoliberalism” line feels more like a statement about the psychological paradigm than a literal forecast of institutional stability. From a complexity/physics angle, I agree the substrate is already fraying — ecological overshoot, demographic drag, and sheer complexity costs are all pushing the system toward some kind of structural instability that voting alone can’t resolve. Where I’d integrate your point with the SD framing is: even if neoliberalism becomes impossible to maintain on its own terms, that doesn’t automatically mean we transition to something higher. A decaying substrate just opens a fork in the road. With our current level of development, that fork can lead to: – more Green-ish / social-democratic / mixed-economy reforms, or – more Red/Blue authoritarianism, ethno-nationalism, and oligarchic capture. So I’d say: I agree the system is running into hard biophysical and complexity limits; the real question then becomes whether the consciousness is there to channel that destabilization into a wiser order, or whether it just collapses into a more brutal one. That’s where Leo’s “push” point and the whole development piece still matter, even on top of the physics.

I see. That makes sense. So, even if the broader paradigm stays neoliberal/Orange for a long time, it still makes sense for Dems/left-populists to push economic populism as far as the culture will allow, and let that tug-of-war slowly shift things over decades. And you’re not saying we’ve hit some hard point of no return where people care so much about “individual liberty” that they’ll never want more help from government again for the next 50+ years. It’s not like the collective has consciously decided: “No, that’s it, we’re done with the government helping us, we want it totally out of our lives.” It’s more that people are confused, underdeveloped, and pulled by Orange/Blue values, so any move toward more economic populism is slow and contested, not impossible. We of course have already seen how severe but “smaller” crises nudge change even without a full Great Depression: the 2008 financial crisis, COVID + the 2020 recession + the 2021–2023 inflation mess, mass civil unrest like the BLM riots, and lingering systemic stuff like anger over the endless Middle East wars. None of those flipped the paradigm, but they did shake confidence in the status quo and push certain reforms and shifts in public consciousness. So it feels like a long grind of incremental pushing, punctuated by crises that sometimes open temporary windows for deeper change—depending on where development is at. For the time being, that probably means reforms will have to come more incrementally than in the New Deal or Great Society eras, unless you get some truly cataclysmic shock (another depression-level event) plus a very powerful, higher-consciousness movement and leadership ready to capitalize on that window. And on top of that, it depends on how united the political consensus is around those liberal/progressive policies—something that has recently become much clearer to me as a crucial factor. New Deal and Great Society moments weren’t just about crisis; they were also about having enough of the country, elites included, aligned behind a reform direction. Until something like that lines up again, it’s mostly the slow tug-of-war you’re talking about rather than big, clean leaps.

I wouldn’t frame it as a single global cabal. It’s more like overlapping networks of authoritarian governments, oligarchs, and Western corporate/financial enablers. Think: certain foreign regimes, fossil-fuel interests, defense contractors, big finance/real-estate, and the disinformation ecosystem. They don’t coordinate as one group—they just share incentives for weak rule of law, secrecy, and deregulation

Thanks for the response. I agree that Stage Orange can accept economic populism if it’s framed around opportunity, fairness, and stopping corruption — not moralizing or anti-achievement messaging. That’s why FDR’s New Deal worked even for early Orange: it was sold as restoring stability and giving people a fair shot. The U.S. right now isn’t just Peak Orange — it’s Peak Orange sitting on top of a big Stage Blue base with Red elements underneath. That’s why cultural issues get weaponized so easily. Economic populism can still work, but I guess it has to be framed in a way that appeals to Orange self-interest and Blue stability, not just Green values. I agree that global elites and power networks exist, but in Spiral Dynamics terms they’re not outside the model — they’re expressions of late-Stage Orange values scaled globally (finance, tech monopolies, multinational corporations, etc.). SD doesn’t deny power structures; it explains the value system that produces them. Where I’m more cautious is the idea of a single coordinated plan to “destroy the U.S.” Most elite groups compete with each other, and a lot of what looks like a plan is actually emergent behavior from late-Orange incentives. So yes — elites matter, but they’re part of the SD dynamic, not separate from it.

Leo, I have a question about how you understand voters’ psychology around “change” in modern U.S. politics. In the last few election cycles, it feels like the winners have almost always been the candidate who best embodied “change” against the status quo: Obama 2008 & 2012 – “Hope and Change,” post-Bush, anti-Iraq, generational shift Trump 2016 – anti-establishment wrecking ball against both parties’ elites Biden 2020 – “return to normalcy,” a change away from chaos and Trump Trump 2024 – again framed as a change away from Biden and the current direction So on the surface, voters do seem to want “change” over and over. Yet at the same time, the public still doesn’t really go for genuinely progressive / systemic change when it’s offered in a more explicit way by people like: Bernie Sanders AOC Elizabeth Warren Zohran Mamdani, etc. These people are arguably the ones proposing the deepest structural reforms (on capitalism, healthcare, labor, oligarchy, etc.), but most voters don’t rally behind them the way they do behind more “safe” change candidates like Obama or Biden — or right-wing populists like Trump. So my question to you is: How do you explain this psychologically and spiritually? Why do voters repeatedly choose symbolic or surface-level “change” (Obama, Trump, Biden/2020, Trump/2024) while rejecting the more genuinely transformative progressive candidates who would actually challenge the system at a deeper level? More specifically, I’d love to hear your take on: Survival & fear: How much of this is just survival bias — people wanting “change” but only within a narrow safety zone that doesn’t threaten their ego, identity, or material security? Stage development (Spiral Dynamics): Are progressives like Bernie/AOC/Warren/Mamdani simply too far ahead of the median voter’s stage of development, so that even people who are dissatisfied still prefer ego-flattering, tribal, or nostalgic forms of “change” (like Trump or soft-liberal change) rather than true systemic reform? Comfort with institutions: Do most Democratic voters, for example, still trust the basic institutions enough that they’ll opt for “reformist” change (Obama/Biden) instead of “revolutionary” change (Bernie-style), whereas Republicans are more willing to embrace destructive change (Trump) because their distrust has gone much deeper? Media & narrative control: To what degree are people’s “change” preferences basically manufactured by media framing — so that the only acceptable “change” on offer is the kind that doesn’t threaten corporate or elite interests too much? Why does the collective ego keep saying it wants change, then rejecting the people who actually represent deeper change, and instead choosing candidates who either offer mild reform or outright reactionary backlash? I’m curious how you’d unpack this using your frameworks around consciousness, survival, ideological bias, and Spiral Dynamics.

So, do all of you believe that incrementalism is the only kind of change that's possible?

Yeah, but then what kind of change are most Americans looking for now?

I find that hard to believe what the OP saying unless he's talking about men who have masculine traits that are too extreme. Being a real man means to be brave, bold, strong, aggressive, unique, resolved, decisive, inspiring, and a visionary leader. There is a reason why women have always been attracted to such men. Straight women have never really been attracted to men who are cowardly, plays it too safe, weak, spineless, don't have their own thoughts/opinions, indecisive, boring, and have no real vision/purpose for himself or for others as a leader. Moreover, if you come off as too emotional like a woman on her period too often, especially when you haven't gotten intimate with her yet or not in a serious relationship with her yet, then the woman is going to think "this guy can't handle life and won't be able to protect me." That being said, I think one of the hardest parts of attracting women is being emotionally compelling and stimulating to women.

Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system. Trust in government, trust in democracy, trust in media, trust in institutions—all of it is near historic lows. Yet at the same time, the major structural barriers that prevent reform seem completely locked in. Here’s the contradiction I’m noticing, and I’m curious how others here think about it: 1. The public clearly wants systemic reform. Polls show: Huge majorities want limits on money in politics. Majorities think politicians don’t represent ordinary people. Confidence in democracy is falling year after year. People across the spectrum think the system is corrupt or captured. There’s a widespread feeling that “something is fundamentally broken.” 2. But the major choke points for reform aren’t moving. Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo have effectively constitutionalized unlimited outside spending. The Supreme Court is nowhere near overturning them. Congress doesn’t have the votes for federal campaign-finance reform. Most state legislatures don’t either, especially in red or purple states. The donor class and large economic interests continue to dominate the political process. So the legal and political architecture that created the current system is essentially frozen. 3. This produces a weird pressure cooker dynamic. People feel the system is illegitimate, but the system has no viable institutional path to correct itself. In other words: Public dissatisfaction grows, but the reform channels remain blocked. Historically, when a political system has rising dissatisfaction and blocked reform pathways, the pressure tends to escape in other ways: Right-wing populism Demagogues Cynicism and apathy Lower democratic engagement Institutional distrust Localized flare-ups Attempts to “smash” the system rather than reform it Political nihilism (“both sides are corrupt so why vote?”) We’re already seeing many of these patterns in the U.S. 4. Politicians behave rationally within a broken structure. Even Democrats who privately dislike the influence of big donors still rely heavily on PACs, wealthy individuals, bundlers, and corporate money. And realistically, why wouldn’t they? In our current environment: If a candidate unilaterally swears off big money, they’re at a competitive disadvantage. Their opponent’s Super PACs will still spend millions. Congress/Supreme Court won’t fix the rules. Unilaterally “disarming” doesn’t change the system—it usually just gets you beaten. The few exceptions (AOC, Bernie, Mamdani, etc.) are structural outliers with unusually favorable conditions. So the behavior of most politicians reinforces stagnation, not because they’re evil, but because the incentive structure rewards conformity. 5. So here’s my core question: What happens to a society when the mass public grows more frustrated, more cynical, and more distrustful—while the structural mechanisms for reform stay shut? Does the system: Drift into a soft oligarchy? Become more populist and chaotic? Enter cycles of strongman politics? Fragment into local experiments of reform while the federal system decays? Or eventually face a legitimacy crisis big enough to force some kind of overhaul? I’m not asking from a partisan angle—I’m asking from a systems / consciousness / long-term societal development perspective. Where does a democracy go when the public is angry but reform is structurally impossible? What’s the “next stage” in a scenario like this? Would love to hear people’s thoughts, especially from a developmental psychology or systems-theory lens.

You feel more of that "hellish" burn from lifting moderate to heavy weights with 10+ reps than lifting even heavier weight with less than 8-10 reps.

Sadly, that is true. Republicans have no principles and Democrats have no spine. Although I will admit that getting Trump and the Republicans to agree with the Democrats in Congress to extend the ACA subsidies was always a long-shot, especially after Trump, Mike Johnson, and their entire party in Washington all made it very clear recently that they are an completely hard no on that. But I still think that all of the Democrats should've held the line for one more month. Also, I really don't like how those 8 Democrats in Senate who voted for the bill came off as feckless, weak, and defeated. hey all suck at communicating to the public Schumer himself comes off as a feeble weak leader who can't hold his entire caucus together anymore. He needs to be replaced.

I am worried about how much of a precedent that this will set....

This is another reason why Democratic leadership desperately needs to change. There are still too many Democrats who have no spine.

I asked ChatGPT many questions on whether or not it thinks that the US will fall into a dictatorship like in Russia because of Trumpism. It said that that is very unlikely to happen for the following reasons: Structural guardrails Federalism & fragmentation: 50 states + thousands of counties/towns run elections, police, courts, and schools. There’s no single switch to flip. Independent judiciary by design: Life-tenured federal judges with protected pay; removal only by impeachment. State courts use mixed selection systems—no one pipeline to capture. Two-key appointment system: Presidents nominate, but the Senate confirms; turnover is staggered over decades, preventing personalist control. Decentralized elections with paper trails: Nearly universal paper ballots / verifiable records, routine audits, and bipartisan local administration. Reformed electoral certification: Post-2020 reforms (e.g., clarifying the VP’s ceremonial role, raising objection thresholds) closed a major loophole for national subversion. Legal and constitutional brakes First Amendment: Robust protections for press, speech, assembly—any blanket crackdown on critics/journalists gets enjoined fast. Due process & jury trials: Independent courts and juries, plus state/federal dual sovereignty, make retaliatory prosecutions hard to sustain. Military limits at home: Posse Comitatus and a narrow Insurrection Act; the armed forces are trained to refuse unlawful domestic orders. Plural power centers Free press & civil society: Investigative media, NGOs, universities, bar associations, watchdogs, and opposition parties operate freely and sue effectively. Elected and independent officials: Governors, state AGs, secretaries of state, DAs, and local clerks can—and do—resist federal overreach. Markets and investors: Heavy-handed illiberal moves trigger immediate political, legal, and economic blowback. Culture, norms, and incentives Public opinion: Americans are frustrated with performance, but majorities still prefer democratic rules; “strongman” support remains a minority view. Professional ethics: Judges, prosecutors, military, and career civil servants have strong norms and legal duties that resist politicization. Transparency & detection: FOIA/public-records laws, disclosures, audits, inspectors general, whistleblower protections, and an adversarial press raise the cost of corruption or covert schemes. What makes the U.S. different from Russia’s path No captured national media system: Government cannot lawfully nationalize or centrally script news; independent outlets proliferate. No centralized judicial discipline machine: The executive cannot hire/fire/discipline judges for outcomes; career leverage is limited. Competition remains real: Opposition candidates, parties, and courts operate nationwide; alternation of power happens regularly. Realistic risks to watch (not Russia-level, but worth vigilance) Soft illiberalism: extreme gerrymanders, partisan election-law “hardball,” chilling effects on protest/activism, or selective investigations. Concentrated influence that’s legal: big money in politics, media concentration, targeted funding of state/local offices. Disinformation & intimidation: threats to election workers, deepfakes, and harassment that strain administration capacity. Early-warning lights Proposals to let the executive discipline or remove judges. Laws that criminalize routine journalism or ban opposition on vague grounds. Moves to bar independent election observers, centralize election control, or curtail paper audits. Attempts to nationalize/censor major media or systematically block civil society. U.S. institutions are messy by design, with many veto points, strong constitutional rights, and a vibrant ecosystem of watchdogs. That architecture—plus public culture that still leans pro-democracy—makes a Russia-style authoritarian turn extraordinarily hard to execute or sustain. Continuous attention to the “soft” risks keeps it that way.

It's another very sad moment for our society.

I think that NYC under Mamdani will be a real-world sandbox for “Bernie-style” economic populism.