Hardkill

Yeah, but then what kind of change are most Americans looking for now?

I find that hard to believe what the OP saying unless he's talking about men who have masculine traits that are too extreme. Being a real man means to be brave, bold, strong, aggressive, unique, resolved, decisive, inspiring, and a visionary leader. There is a reason why women have always been attracted to such men. Straight women have never really been attracted to men who are cowardly, plays it too safe, weak, spineless, don't have their own thoughts/opinions, indecisive, boring, and have no real vision/purpose for himself or for others as a leader. Moreover, if you come off as too emotional like a woman on her period too often, especially when you haven't gotten intimate with her yet or not in a serious relationship with her yet, then the woman is going to think "this guy can't handle life and won't be able to protect me." That being said, I think one of the hardest parts of attracting women is being emotionally compelling and stimulating to women.

Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system. Trust in government, trust in democracy, trust in media, trust in institutions—all of it is near historic lows. Yet at the same time, the major structural barriers that prevent reform seem completely locked in. Here’s the contradiction I’m noticing, and I’m curious how others here think about it: 1. The public clearly wants systemic reform. Polls show: Huge majorities want limits on money in politics. Majorities think politicians don’t represent ordinary people. Confidence in democracy is falling year after year. People across the spectrum think the system is corrupt or captured. There’s a widespread feeling that “something is fundamentally broken.” 2. But the major choke points for reform aren’t moving. Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo have effectively constitutionalized unlimited outside spending. The Supreme Court is nowhere near overturning them. Congress doesn’t have the votes for federal campaign-finance reform. Most state legislatures don’t either, especially in red or purple states. The donor class and large economic interests continue to dominate the political process. So the legal and political architecture that created the current system is essentially frozen. 3. This produces a weird pressure cooker dynamic. People feel the system is illegitimate, but the system has no viable institutional path to correct itself. In other words: Public dissatisfaction grows, but the reform channels remain blocked. Historically, when a political system has rising dissatisfaction and blocked reform pathways, the pressure tends to escape in other ways: Right-wing populism Demagogues Cynicism and apathy Lower democratic engagement Institutional distrust Localized flare-ups Attempts to “smash” the system rather than reform it Political nihilism (“both sides are corrupt so why vote?”) We’re already seeing many of these patterns in the U.S. 4. Politicians behave rationally within a broken structure. Even Democrats who privately dislike the influence of big donors still rely heavily on PACs, wealthy individuals, bundlers, and corporate money. And realistically, why wouldn’t they? In our current environment: If a candidate unilaterally swears off big money, they’re at a competitive disadvantage. Their opponent’s Super PACs will still spend millions. Congress/Supreme Court won’t fix the rules. Unilaterally “disarming” doesn’t change the system—it usually just gets you beaten. The few exceptions (AOC, Bernie, Mamdani, etc.) are structural outliers with unusually favorable conditions. So the behavior of most politicians reinforces stagnation, not because they’re evil, but because the incentive structure rewards conformity. 5. So here’s my core question: What happens to a society when the mass public grows more frustrated, more cynical, and more distrustful—while the structural mechanisms for reform stay shut? Does the system: Drift into a soft oligarchy? Become more populist and chaotic? Enter cycles of strongman politics? Fragment into local experiments of reform while the federal system decays? Or eventually face a legitimacy crisis big enough to force some kind of overhaul? I’m not asking from a partisan angle—I’m asking from a systems / consciousness / long-term societal development perspective. Where does a democracy go when the public is angry but reform is structurally impossible? What’s the “next stage” in a scenario like this? Would love to hear people’s thoughts, especially from a developmental psychology or systems-theory lens.

You feel more of that "hellish" burn from lifting moderate to heavy weights with 10+ reps than lifting even heavier weight with less than 8-10 reps.

Sadly, that is true. Republicans have no principles and Democrats have no spine. Although I will admit that getting Trump and the Republicans to agree with the Democrats in Congress to extend the ACA subsidies was always a long-shot, especially after Trump, Mike Johnson, and their entire party in Washington all made it very clear recently that they are an completely hard no on that. But I still think that all of the Democrats should've held the line for one more month. Also, I really don't like how those 8 Democrats in Senate who voted for the bill came off as feckless, weak, and defeated. hey all suck at communicating to the public Schumer himself comes off as a feeble weak leader who can't hold his entire caucus together anymore. He needs to be replaced.

I am worried about how much of a precedent that this will set....

This is another reason why Democratic leadership desperately needs to change. There are still too many Democrats who have no spine.

I asked ChatGPT many questions on whether or not it thinks that the US will fall into a dictatorship like in Russia because of Trumpism. It said that that is very unlikely to happen for the following reasons: Structural guardrails Federalism & fragmentation: 50 states + thousands of counties/towns run elections, police, courts, and schools. There’s no single switch to flip. Independent judiciary by design: Life-tenured federal judges with protected pay; removal only by impeachment. State courts use mixed selection systems—no one pipeline to capture. Two-key appointment system: Presidents nominate, but the Senate confirms; turnover is staggered over decades, preventing personalist control. Decentralized elections with paper trails: Nearly universal paper ballots / verifiable records, routine audits, and bipartisan local administration. Reformed electoral certification: Post-2020 reforms (e.g., clarifying the VP’s ceremonial role, raising objection thresholds) closed a major loophole for national subversion. Legal and constitutional brakes First Amendment: Robust protections for press, speech, assembly—any blanket crackdown on critics/journalists gets enjoined fast. Due process & jury trials: Independent courts and juries, plus state/federal dual sovereignty, make retaliatory prosecutions hard to sustain. Military limits at home: Posse Comitatus and a narrow Insurrection Act; the armed forces are trained to refuse unlawful domestic orders. Plural power centers Free press & civil society: Investigative media, NGOs, universities, bar associations, watchdogs, and opposition parties operate freely and sue effectively. Elected and independent officials: Governors, state AGs, secretaries of state, DAs, and local clerks can—and do—resist federal overreach. Markets and investors: Heavy-handed illiberal moves trigger immediate political, legal, and economic blowback. Culture, norms, and incentives Public opinion: Americans are frustrated with performance, but majorities still prefer democratic rules; “strongman” support remains a minority view. Professional ethics: Judges, prosecutors, military, and career civil servants have strong norms and legal duties that resist politicization. Transparency & detection: FOIA/public-records laws, disclosures, audits, inspectors general, whistleblower protections, and an adversarial press raise the cost of corruption or covert schemes. What makes the U.S. different from Russia’s path No captured national media system: Government cannot lawfully nationalize or centrally script news; independent outlets proliferate. No centralized judicial discipline machine: The executive cannot hire/fire/discipline judges for outcomes; career leverage is limited. Competition remains real: Opposition candidates, parties, and courts operate nationwide; alternation of power happens regularly. Realistic risks to watch (not Russia-level, but worth vigilance) Soft illiberalism: extreme gerrymanders, partisan election-law “hardball,” chilling effects on protest/activism, or selective investigations. Concentrated influence that’s legal: big money in politics, media concentration, targeted funding of state/local offices. Disinformation & intimidation: threats to election workers, deepfakes, and harassment that strain administration capacity. Early-warning lights Proposals to let the executive discipline or remove judges. Laws that criminalize routine journalism or ban opposition on vague grounds. Moves to bar independent election observers, centralize election control, or curtail paper audits. Attempts to nationalize/censor major media or systematically block civil society. U.S. institutions are messy by design, with many veto points, strong constitutional rights, and a vibrant ecosystem of watchdogs. That architecture—plus public culture that still leans pro-democracy—makes a Russia-style authoritarian turn extraordinarily hard to execute or sustain. Continuous attention to the “soft” risks keeps it that way.

It's another very sad moment for our society.

I think that NYC under Mamdani will be a real-world sandbox for “Bernie-style” economic populism.

and yet half of the people in the country were willing to tolerate Trump being president again and not be held accountable for any of his crimes..... This world is so fucked up.

I honestly have found that just having good looks has really led to very underwhelming results with getting women. It's like how even Dr. Mike himself said in a video he did about steroids, where he explained that becoming super jacked from bodybuilding and taking steroids had led to him having very underwhelming results with getting women.

Last night was a really good night for Democrats and progressives! However, this war has only begun.....

Honestly, I hope that this thread ages terribly. Yes, yesterday was very good night for Democrats and the Left; however, we are still not close to being out of the woods yet. There is still a serious chance that Democrats may not win the midterms because of all of the extreme gerrymandering by the Republicans throughout the country. Trump and the MAGA Republicans are going to do everything they can to steal the 2026 midterms. Not to mention, that the Democratic party still has an even lower approval rating than Trump and his party does which is crazy. Plus, the next presidential election will be even much harder for the Democrats to win because presidential elections always have a much greater percentage of lower propensity, less engaged, and less informed voters than special elections, off year elections, and midterm elections do. Democrats are still far behind Trump and the Republicans in winning over lower propensity, less engaged, and less informed voters. Additionally, Trump and his party are of course going to do everything they can to try to steal the 2028 presidential election. That is why the Democratic party still desperately needs a stronger leadership with better communication strategies to save themselves and save the country. Btw, Chuck Schumer really needs to step down and let some other Democrat in the US Senate who is much younger, more fiery, and more talented of a communicator than he is be the new leader of the Senate Democrats in Congress.

I never thought that I would ever want a muslim who is also true Socialist to win, but I am actually so happy that Mamdani won the race. I also am very intrigued to see how a Democratic Socialist mayor of NYC will govern the city.

While it is unrealistic for America to fall under an authoritarian regime like Russia or China in the foreseeable future, some experts have warned about the risk of “Orbanization” in the U.S. — meaning the country could increasingly resemble Hungary. Path-dependence of norms: Once a party learns that norm-breaking (press intimidation, selective non-compliance, threats to civil servants) pays and isn’t punished, it becomes the new baseline. Norm erosion is a ratchet. State-level power as a workaround: Even if federal capture is hard, state governments can alter election rules, districts, and media/public-records environments—creating pockets of tilted competition that add up nationally. Legal shifts that change incentives: Court decisions that insulate executive actions or weaken agency capacity can lower the cost of overreach, making Hungary-style tactics (pressure on regulators/independents) more tempting. Media economics, not censors: You don’t need a ministry of information if local news collapses, ad markets consolidate, and a few platform or carrier decisions can starve disfavored outlets. That can mimic capture’s effects. Intimidation at the nodes: Threats against election workers, prosecutors, and journalists can produce self-censorship and capacity loss even without formal control—an American analogue to “soft” authoritarian tools. Polarization + minority entrenchment: With gerrymanders, malapportionment, and partisan administration, a coalition can keep governing with minority support, making “win at all costs” strategies rational. Crisis opportunism: Wars, pandemics, or riots can be used to centralize discretion and marginalize oversight (emergency powers tend to outlive emergencies). However, after learning about how things work in Hungary or in other Eastern European countries like Ukraine, I now don't think that America will even go through a democratic backsliding to the degree that it will be like even Hungary or Ukraine. America’s mix of federalism, independent courts and agencies, decentralized media funding, much more entrenched protest culture and democratic traditions, overlapping watchdogs, and frequent competitive elections makes a single-party capture or wholesale media takeover far harder here than in Hungary or even in a country like Ukraine. What seems plausible in my mind is that there will be more uneven, state-by-state illiberalism, deeper chilling effects, and a gradually tilted national playing field if multiple stressors coincide (economic downturn + court shifts + state-level rule changes + intimidation). thoughts?

Even though Navalny completely failed, maybe enough people in Russia will one day be inspired to believe in his cause.

Yeah, but actually in the US, no leader or party in power can own more than about 39% of the entire media environment unlike in Hungary because of how much more fragmented and diverse the media environment is in a country like the US than in a country like Hungary. Furthermore, the US has legal and structural guardrails that Hungary doesn't have including: 1. No single branch can dictate content. The First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and federal procurement and antitrust laws all block the executive branch from directly coercing media or corporations. 2. Independent agencies and courts intervene. The FCC, FTC, DOJ, and federal courts have all stepped in against overt political interference before — and would again if a line were crossed. 3. Private ownership diversity. U.S. media, entertainment, and legal industries are massive and decentralized. No administration can capture all studios, platforms, or firms simultaneously. We have to also considered the Political and market backlash that comes with an authoritarian leader in a county like America trying to cancel shows, movies, and news outlets just because our president and the Republicans didn't like what they heard: 1. Jimmy Kimmel, heavy-handed moves generate huge public, corporate, and advertiser backlash. 2. U.S. firms are highly brand-sensitive: if they’re seen as bowing to censorship, they lose younger audiences, international markets, and talent. 3. Shareholders, unions, and advocacy groups (WGA, SAG-AFTRA, ACLU, etc.) quickly mobilize when freedom-of-expression issues surface. There's more Institutional pluralism in the US than even in a country like Hungary: 1. There isn’t one centralized “elite” to capture. Power is distributed among states, regulators, courts, press outlets, streaming platforms, independent production houses, and NGOs. 2. Even if one network or company caves, others often go the opposite direction — competition itself protects pluralism. I now see that the real risk is incremental chilling, not total control: 1. I think that experts worry about self-censorship and “soft compliance” when threats become routine — not about full autocratic capture like Hungary or Russia. 2. The danger is cumulative erosion (companies avoiding controversy), but every attempt at direct suppression tends to spark loud resistance that reinforces democratic norms.

Yeah, I mean I am still very worried about what may happen with the country in the future. However, the more I think about it and the more I learn about different countries outside of the US, the more I realize how different a country like Hungary or Ukraine is in terms of history, geography, system, culture, and traditions. Doesn't the USA still have a higher level of development and culture overall than Hungary or Ukraine do? Hungary doesn't have the decentralized democratic media environment that the U.S. does, doesn't have deep, successful protest traditions that repeatedly reset the political game the way the U.S. does, doesn't have the cultural diversity that the U.S. does, and its elections aren't nearly as decentralized as elections in the U.S. are; moreover, its elections do not have the same level of oversight, the same degree of voting protections, or the same independence and “teeth” of the courts and legal remedies that the U.S. system has. The U.S. has also always had better stability, anti-corruption systems, and journalist safety/protections than even Ukraine, which, of course, is still a strong ally of Western nations and clearly believes in EU-style democratic standards. Moreover, I now don't think that Trump and his party have the time or the means to install enough loyalists in the military, law enforcement, and other parts of the government who would allow him to do a true systemic capture of the military, law enforcement, the machinery of elections, other government agencies, or other institutions. Additionally, Trump has never had net positive approval ratings and popularity ratings amongst the general electorate in America, whereas Orban has had net-positive approval ratings and popularity ratings at various points during his time as PM of his country.

So True. Btw, what do you think about how many people, including centrists and even some pragmatic progressives blame Biden for the historic level of illegal border crossings during his presidency? Personally, I feel like he did the best he could to deal with such an unprecedented wave of illegal foreigners desperately trying to get into the country due to the ending of COVID and their own countries having suffered from really bad conditions at the time. Not to mention all of the legal constraints, partisan gridlock in Congress, and lack of infrastructure he didn't until he finally had enough in place to close down the border effectively in the summer of 2024. Plus, that immigration crisis actually helped save our country from the inflation crisis and gave our entire economy a significant boost.

What AI chat do you use and did you buy any paid versions?

When I was your age, I used to think that maybe it was getting too late for me to learning pickup, dating, social skills, etc. I am glad that I was able to disprove that by the following year, which is when I really began to get real results. It was a very painful journey of self-improvement for me, but I only kept getting better and better with all of that in the long-run, including getting some sex partners without ever needing to pay for a hooker or escort and finally getting my first true gf ever by age 30. I believe that I could've gotten even much better and faster results if I got to game in a big city practically every day as a routine lifestyle during my first years of improving my social and seduction skills. Even when you get to your 30s, you will still be well into your prime for developing social and sex appeal, along with LTR experience. Plus, there is a reason why as a man in your 30s, 40s, and 50s you are generally at your peak potential years for a serious relationship, if you develop material success in your life by having a good career that you are happy with and make enough money for both you and your romantic partner to live off. To be clear, having those things aren't even necessary to attract women for casual or short-term relationships. However, the greater your material success, the greater appeal you will have to women who want to lock down a guy for an LTR, especially for marriage. Moreover, accomplishing serious achievements in your life helps improve your self-worth, increases your confidence around others, and makes you look like an impressive catch.

It's not always feasible for scientists to come up with findings that are based on one individual. They usually aren't clinicians who work with individual patients.

@Daniel Balan @NewKidOnTheBlock I get what you're saying and there is some truth to what you're saying about how using ChatGPT in the wrong way can lead to too much groupthink and atrophy of critical thinking skills and original thought. However, I constantly push back against AI whenever I find something it says that I don't agree with or doesn't add up. I also, try the best that I can to have it respond to me with little to no bias towards my views.

But you know that no progressive politicians, including Bernie Sanders and the Squad, aren't for open borders. Even Bernie said before, "Nobody thinks illegal immigration is appropriate." Even Cenk and Ana believed that Biden should've closed the border much sooner, despite how complicated legally, logistically, and geopolitically it was for him.