Why we have thoughts

[Reciprocality]

When we ask "why do I have thoughts" or "how come the thoughts I have are such and such instead of differently?" would it not be weird if the following did not answer these questions?

 

When we have an experience this will be easily available in our mind in the following moments though the experience is no longer literally there, when in a later moment we experience something akin to what we experienced in the former, say first we experienced a blue candle and then a pillar in the next moment, then as we experienced the second object our mind recalls spontaneously the first object.  What can be inferred from this situation?

I would first say that since we can analyse the respective objects to be similar, sharing a cylindrical shape, plausibly implies that this is the reason that the spontaneity occurred. Secondly I would generalise from this occurrence a principle of sufficient similarity for spontaneity and ask how generally this principle can be applied to instances of cognition?

Does it apply when we listen to our favourite music from ten years ago? Does it apply to the doorhandle as we enter the door? What about human faces? Or our cat? Perhaps a distinct smell we smelled on the corner of a street last week inducing certain memories from our childhood? 

We rarely recall something were the cause were not external, can we not in such moments of recall find that in the two distinct identities which is similar? What kind of attribute would such similarities be made of? Could these attributes be made out of distinct parts and form a composite (hetereogeneity) or can they always be reduced to a quantity either of mathematical character of extension or a character of intensity? (homogeneity)

 

I don't know about you but I have begun reflecting on a wide variety of perceptions during my day and the principle seems to hold true of them all, but one kind of thought is distinct from these, and can not have any discernible property whether mathematical or intensive, it is the thought of "existence", since it has no properties then it can not be thought through a spontaneity of sufficient similarity and since accident denotes the relation between all things which are inessential for another thing and that thing then properties are accidents of existence.

But since as we know from the aforementioned principle of sufficient similarity an actual property though it is accidental for the predicate to which it spontaneously gives rise then it is plausible that the same kind of relationship is true between predicates and existence itself.

If that is true, that is that there can not be existence except for through a property and any property would suffice, then since as we can theorise on valid grounds that the predicate requires will or purposivity (primary operation/function of consciousness) for the sufficient similarity to even occur and the very properties available for such a similarity is already conditioned on past will then how far of a reach would it be to say that the same purposivity can be said to "hide" behind the predicates themself, some composition of which, as already argued are necessary?

Edited February 23 by Reciprocality

[caspex]

Being aware of 'Existence' is more of a feeling, awareness, and could even be called a mental state. This is why it seems to have no properties, and is often called a property itself, when compared to other thoughts. However, 'existence' as simply a concept, does have a property which is the property of 'having a property'. When you delve into the contemplation of properties, it is natural to have the thought of 'existence'. It wouldn't violate your principle of sufficient similarity, as this thought would only arise after sufficient observation of the concept of 'properties'. The similarity/pattern here being 'predicates/properties'.

Correct me if I am wrong, but your principle suggests that thoughts occur in a chain in which each thought is sufficiently similar to the last and not entirely different; and the first item of that chain would be present experience. It implies that individuals cannot have completely independent and new thoughts and require some sort of stimulus or ground to begin with, which is current experience. This would explain why one's thoughts are a certain way and not another. I largely agree with you, as even most insights occur from intense observation of present experience.

However, I would disagree with the implication that independent thoughts cannot occur due to a lack of sufficient similarity with something else. Take the case of Ramanujan for example, even if we don't believe in the concept of deities implanting thoughts and insights in your head, and believe that his revelations were internal calculations of his subconscious mind, it still suggests that his mind was capable of producing new insights and thought about mathematical concepts by using the building blocks of his knowledge without any sufficiently similar ground to begin on.

As for the discussion on predicates. I don't agree with you that it requires will to find similarity between predicates. Your brain is a pattern recognition machine and it wouldn't require conscious will in many cases to recognize patterns. It would be done automatically for you.