Carl-Richard

I think the reason I got into music with weird time signatures so much is that my dad used to play this song in the car a lot when I was 6-7. It's not really until later that I realized how brilliant it is.

These are arguments less against science and more against people who hold science as a religion. As for my arguments, it depends on what sciences you're talking about. Sciences that study humans quantitatively (e.g. sociology, anthropology, psychology, medicine, political science) infamously have problems with replicability (can you repeat the study and get the same results?) and generalizability (do the results apply more generally to the world and not just inside the particular study?). Many (ex-)scientists have made strong criticisms about these problems, some even claiming that they're practically unsolvable and that this kind of quantitative science is a lost cause, while others are more optimistic and constructive, while some are in denial and keep doing what they've always done. There are many sub-problems that feed into the two main problems, and some of them are summed up by the concept of "questionable research practices", while others relate to for example limitations with methodologies like null hypothesis testing. There has been a great effort to address these problems though, through initiatives like open science, file drawer journals, preregistrations, etc. Qualitative sciences (e.g. interviewing people about their feelings and experiences) bypass many of these kinds of problems, but they're less able to make precise predictions, so you lose something there. "Hard sciences", particularly those that are largely independent of humans (e.g. physics, chemistry), have less of these problems. For them, the problems go back to again holding science as a religion (basically physicalism), which bleeds into the culture through the idolization of pop science communicators ("the scientific priesthood") and is upheld by modern society's disconnect with wisdom and spirituality.

Then that is your deficiency Some people are so relaxed that dopamine would probably be their only way to become more social. You should see the med student who conducts our brain dissection lab sessions. He is a walking brick wall 😆 (not in an autistic way). On a slightly (un)related topic, I've been thinking a bit about the relationship between neuroticism (in the strictly emotional lability sense) and creativity which we talked about one time. I consider myself way above average in creativity, and I've always been highly neurotic. I'm high in openness too, yes, but the combination with neuroticism and openness I think creates a creative beast. My dad is like that (BP1 diagnosis, arguably the definition of openness + neuroticism). My friend from class is high in openness but comparably low in neuroticism (by my estimation), and he doesn't seem as creative in the strictest sense but certainly intellectually gifted. Same with the aforementioned med student. Another slightly tangential thought to that, I had a wild idea that maybe sprinters or explosive athletes are more neurotic on average. It sort of makes sense that one's personality would be associated with some deeper biological traits like that. In other words, being able to quickly change your physiological state in terms of muscle fiber recruitment could be mirrored in being able to quickly change your psycho-emotional state (emotional lability). Maybe there could be some co-selection of genes going on there to create the optimal "fast" phenotype. Again, this is of course just wild half-baked speculation. I haven't looked into any potential data on that yet Also, back to creativity, I say "in a strictly emotional lability sense" because I believe that even though I have severely reduced my more "Freudian" neuroticism (internal conflict, repetitive and irrelevant mental chatter), I still have a mind that changes quickly while zeroing in on a task. In other words, my mind finds more relevant information and faster. So in a sense, it's possible to distinguish between a more generally dysfunctional neuroticism and a more generally functional neuroticism: emotional lability with or without task-irrelevant mind-wandering. Then again, I'm not saying task-irrelevant mind-wandering is by definition dysfunctional; I'm just saying generally (most people in the modern would could certainly benefit to have less of it). I hope I'm not derailing the thread 😳 (I got carried away, I'm sorry 😣; just ignore everything but the first paragraph if you're not Nilsi. This is what happens when I take breaks from the forum and post at night 🤭).

@Scholar When you equate physicality to logic and when you call Kastrup a physicalist, that sums up the level of semantic disconnect that we're having, and I don't think we'll solve that in 10 years. As someone who aspires to be semantically connected to the larger scientific and philosophical community (academia), as someone who studies neuroscience in academia, I believe you're semantically disconnected from that community. That is not to say your understanding of reality is invalid. It's just that the language you use and the language I use (and ostensibly my peers) is very different. I see no reason for this conversation to continue. It was interesting, I guess. And just so you don't think I'm making stuff up, I'll recap some of the terms you use that seem unfamiliar to me, either in the way you use them or just full-stop unfamiliar: Direct vs. indirect causality Causative vs. causal influence vs. causal relationship Relation (actual relation vs. apparent relation) Metaphysical relationship "Neuronal structure of two" Functional understanding If there is one thing we can maybe agree on, it's that concepts like causality are at the end of the day just concepts we use to make sense of our experience as apes on planet Earth. They don't reflect reality in the ultimate sense. Reality in the ultimate sense is far beyond that. But it's still useful to talk about that if you care about making sense of our experience.

Surely you have more examples. Is the brain-experience relationship direct or indirect? Regardless, when we're talking about the brain and experience, any reference to causality is going to be problematic. It doesn't matter how many variations of causality you want to invent. At the end of the day, causality is causality, and causality is when the happening of one thing (or things) precedes the happening of another thing in time and when you have a reasonable mechanism connecting the two. Hence I don't see why the distinction you have brought up is relevant. It's at best tangential to the discussion. Instead of insinuating that it's relevant and that I'm just too slow to understand, clarify how it is relevant. Be clear. To conclude, as far as I'm concerned, you've been talking about causality in some way or another, and I'm saying that is problematic for the reasons stated: 1. lack of a reasonable causal mechanism, 2. various empirical contradictions. And before you do the "argh you just don't understand me, I have made myself clear so many times, try harder", try to clarify at least this one thing: why is the distinction between so-called direct and indirect causality relevant for understanding the brain-experience relationship? If not, we're probably done.

Nah. Whatever that is. Give me an example of a direct causal relationship and an indirect causal relationship and tell me how the distinction is relevant in this discussion.

You have two main options: either find something you enjoy, something you believe you're good at and somewhere where you belong, or work on your mind. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_distortion; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_restructuring There are several ways to work on your mind: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cognitive_behavioral_therapy; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meditation; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_fitness

Yes you can. Depends how bad though.

🦦

I'm the weasel who wrote another multi-paragraph response to one of your points which you apparently didn't see most likely because of the palpable emotional reaction that you're now displaying. Of course, I have to ask: what is the difference between "causative" and "causative influence" and "causal relationship"? It seems like something you just made up, a bit like "metaphysical relationship". What "causative vs. causative influence" does remind me of is the idea that you can have one thing that causes another thing or you can have many things that causes the same thing. So one causal factor vs. many causal factors. The problem is that this is tangential to what we're talking about, a bit like when you invoked the problem of infinite regression. So again, I have to ask you what you mean. That's my daily dose of gaslighting. You're free to clarify your clear examples. On the topic of being a weasel, now when we've finally managed to distill the conversation down to a very specific and important detail (the definition of causality vs. correlation), you're getting very poor on words and it seems like you're backing out. That could say a lot about what is happening here. @zurew pointed out the importance of getting clear on terms and language in general. If you're allergic to that, then I guess all this makes sense.

I remember when I first got into Self-Determination Theory (SDT), it was the two factors "competence" and "autonomy" that made the most sense to me and that seemed to play into each other in a logical way. Firstly, SDT is a psychological model about three factors (or "needs") that create motivation in an organism, but to me, it's a much broader model about what makes a healthy organism. The three factors are "competence", "autonomy" and "belonging" ("relatedness"). "Competence" is the organism's need to exercise their innate capacities (and fulfill their evolutionary needs, either directly or by proxy): for example, a cheetah running to catch their prey, a bear catching salmon in a river, an amoeba following a trail of food, an Olympic spear thrower throwing their spear, or a musician playing their instrument. Expressing your competence feels inherently pleasurable, meaningful and valuable. "Autonomy" is the psychological side of that. It's the organism's need to subjectively experience that they're able to be who they want to be, not what somebody else or something else wants them to be. This naturally leads to acting in a way that is consistent with their innate capacities, because your innate capacities is in a real sense who you truly are, thus expressing who you are (autonomy) will naturally involve expressing your innate capacities (competence). In other words, you naturally want to do what you're good at (or what you're "made to do"). When something interferes with the expression of your innate capacities (through "extrinsic motivation", e.g. being forced to play a music instrument as a kid), you tend to dislike it and experience less motivation, because innate/intrinsic motivation is the strongest kind of motivation there is, and again, to deny somebody's intrinsic motivation is to deny who they intrinsically are. So those two factors seem to fit together quite nicely and in a logical way. Now, I've always struggled with how to make "belonging" belong to those other two. Here is a definition from Wikipedia: "Will to interact with, be connected to, and experience caring for others". It seems a bit odd and forced to be put in there, and it seems to only apply to indeed social animals. "Well, we need a social aspect in there as well, so why the hell not?". That's what I thought when I first learned about it. But of course, at least for social animals, it makes sense if you look at the fact that being social seems to be an important aspect of health and evolutionary fitness. But it doesn't seem to have the same level of logical connection to the other two factors, at least on the surface. But just today when watching this video of John Vervaeke (requires membership to iai.tv), the pieces suddenly fell into place. He talked about belonging in this way: We usually think of evolution as organisms being shaped by their environment to fit that environment (which again creates their innate capacities). But in reality, there is a co-creation going on: organisms also shape their environment ("niche construction"). In humans, this becomes very clear when looking at society and culture. It's essentially niche construction gone wild. It's when social animals come together and develop language, technology and other new ways of shaping their environment. The last part is the most important: we are each other's environment, and we're shaping each other. That is what being social means. So what is belonging then? Belonging is when the innate capacities of the organism fit with the environment. There! It actually fits perfectly with the other two factors, and now it explains belonging both in a human social sense and a more general non-social sense: Why do you gain health, strength and love from being with your family (most likely)? Because you're most likely very similar. You share the same innate capacities, and you're therefore each other's well-fitted environment. You belong to each other. Why does sharing similar interests with your friends feel so fun and meaningful? Because you share similar capacities and act as each other's well-fitted environment, thus you belong to each other. Why does being deeply open and honest with your partner feel good? Because you act as each other's well-fitted environment and thus belong to each other. Why are you here, together with people who share the same interests, same life goals, same worldviews, same outlook on life? Because you belong here. And of course, even the amoeba can be said to belong to their environment if their environment best facilitates their innate capacities (e.g. just the right pH level, salinity, food availability). Again, it doesn't have to be just the social environment, but it's just that the social environment makes it really clear. And again, I really do appreciate how this definition ties all the way down to the base biological level, even unicellular organisms, just like the other two factors do (if we assume amoebas have a subjective experience, which you can argue they have). It shows the scientific and metaphysical depth of the theory (which you could say resonates with my innate capacities, or at least interests ). What this has made clear for me (but which I've also intuited for a long time) is that I need to find environments where I belong, particularly occupationally and interpersonally, but also more generally. Finding your strengths, your passions, your dreams is one thing, but finding the environments that resonate with that is another. That requires effort and vision, unless you're lucky to already be in that environment. Maybe you have to create some of that environment yourself (like we've always done as organisms ), or maybe it's waiting for you somewhere. Whatever is the case for you, it's something to aim for. It has also emphasized for me nuances like why there could be cases where it's reasonable to say leave your family, even though that would seems like a big loss on a social level, because you might just not belong there (e.g. it's a toxic environment for some reason). That said, I've never thought that leaving your family was an absolute no-no, but this new framing makes it even more clear why it's indeed not an absolute no-no. But of course, that shouldn't really be on most people's minds (I hope). It was just a thought related to some earlier discussion. That's it

For me personally, if not create something similar on my own, I would like to join something like the Essentia Foundation and contribute to some meaningful work there.

So you're challenging me:

That is why it helps to be super focused on the clarity of language in general. I think that award goes to @DocWatts or @Nilsi or the legendary @Oeaohoo (RIP he was the most fun person on this forum 😭; btw, he just left, he didn't die irl 😂) ☺️

I identified another salient point in your post: The problem of infinite regression in causal chains is a different problem than what I've been talking about. With the brain and experience, you don't even have a chain. That is the problem. And again, it has to do with a lack of a satisfactory causal mechanism. What is a satisfactory causal mechanism? Well, it gives you a sense of understanding and continuity between the proposed cause and effect. There is a recognition of "ah it makes sense". It sounds subjective now, but it's reflective of a deeper point which I'll explain later. Anyways, when you take a concept like gravity and look at the different practical instances where it can apply, and when you apply it to the example of the apple falling, you do get the sense of "ah, it makes sense". It's a satisfactory causal mechanism. It's a "quality" about that causal mechanism. Now, the problem of infinite regression is more "quantitative": you can keep adding an infinite number of satisfactory causal mechanisms without finding the bottom so to speak. That's of course a problem, but again, it's a different problem than establishing a satisfactory causal mechanism in the first place. In other words, you've been talking about finding a satisfactory number of mechanisms, while I've been talking about finding a satisfactory kind of mechanism. Both are significant problems in their own right, but they are indeed different. And why is "neurons firing" not a satisfactory causal mechanism for the brain-experience relationship? Because just look at it: Like "what?!" "ATP and shit" and then boom -> "psychological transformation, rapture, fear, amazement, awakening". There is a clear discontinuity there, and in this case, it's mostly because you're dealing with two different ontological categories ("abstract physical stuff" -> "concrete mental stuff"). Now compare that with the falling apple: You see a kind of continuity there that is absent in the brain-experience relationship. It's a continuous process of different kinds of abstract physical stuff bringing about other kinds of abstract physical stuff. It's a difference in forms, but it's not a difference in fundamental ontological categories. Also, hearking back to an earlier point about another big problem, i.e. the empirical problems contradicting the brain-experience causal hypothesis; when there is a gravitational field present, you can predict that an apple will fall. When there is brain activity present AND when there is brain activity not present (or it's reduced), you can predict that there will be experience (and more intense experiences). Again, that's another big issue for the hypothesis, and even there, the mainstream paradigm will throw ad hoc hypotheses at you like no other ("there is some activity deep in the brain stem...", "there is an increase in brain noise...", "functional connectivity...", etc.).

Love is being connected to life, being one with reality, no separation, full immersion, intense experience, no hesitation, no second-guessing, trusting, caring, seeing, feeling, understanding, grasping, grokking, giving, receiving.

It's causative, because winters appear before jackets and not the other way around. People put on jackets because it's winter. It's not that it's winter because people take on jackets. There are also satisfactory causal mechanisms for it, e.g. people put on clothes when the temperature drops to help maintain homeostasis. I'll just leave it at that.

Let me add that when you propose a causal relationship and somebody calls you out on a lack of satisfactory causal mechanism (one that provides a good sense of continuity between the cause and the effect), and then you say "it's simply mysterious, it's God, Infinity, Divinity"; that's called "God of the gaps", or an appeal to an unknown, or an "ad hoc hypothesis". An ad hoc hypothesis is when you conjure up a new hypothesis to protect the main hypothesis and when it doesn't make any new predictions and is often unfalsifiable (which it is in this case). It's a sneaky way to protect a paradigm from critique. It's what the creationists did when dinosaur fossils were carbon dated and falsfied their 6000 year old universe ("God put them there to test our faith"), and it's what the physicalists are doing with the the brain-experience causal hypothesis ("it's mysterious now, but we'll find out some day"). It's unscientific behavior. You wouldn't accept it for anything else that you would call scientific. For example, if I had said "I caused the Jenga tower to fall", and then you ask "how?", instead of providing the obvious causal mechanism ("I pulled out the bottom Jenga brick"), I instead say "reality is mysterious", you would tell me "that's bullshit!". That is what is happening here. So what I'm saying is instead of proposing a causal relationship with a bullshit mechanical explanation, pull back and choose a less bullshit position: correlation.

SDT in a nutshell: Competence: you like to do things you're good at, because that is fun, pleasureable and enjoyable. Autonomy: you like to do things by your own choosing, and if you're allowed to choose, you will tend to do the things you're good at. Relatedness: you like to be in an environment that supports your competence and respects your autonomy.

I can see that. Remember to put on a jacket, it's cold outside. Gotta keep those non-metaphysical relationships in order 🤔

I have no idea what you're talking about. I'm serious. What the heck is a "metaphysical relationship" that exists between movement of individual atoms but not movements of jackets (which is actually atoms) and movements of seasons (which is also actually atoms)? Not really. That's only a probabilistic prediction. Hume showed that with the problem of induction. You can't know for 100% certainty whether something will behave a certain way in the future based on a previous observation. Also, according to quantum mechanics, the atom itself is a probabilistic entity which only exists in relation to a measurement, unless you're a physicalist who believes physical entities have standalone existence. And suddenly, you also seem to be talking about causality again (this time explictly), so again, physicalist assumptions somehow seem to seep through every time you speak. So we're indeed back to the brain-experience causal hypothesis. Glad we could make that clear. It is mysterious indeed, and causality is ultimately just a way of analyzing reality, not ultimate reality. But once you start analyzing reality and pretend to do so in a logically consistent way, logical consistency should not be a mystery to you (unless you want to say debate Aristotelean logic vs intuitionist logic), because now you're dividing reality into parts and looking at it logically. If somebody points out a mistake in that process for you, you shouldn't revert to "ah, but reality is so mysterious". No, it's most likely your logical process which is mysterious, or flawed. Or I'm simply tediously pointing out inconsistencies in your thinking which frustrates you because it is inconsistent with your view of yourself. I actually think we both are sincerely trying to understand each other. Again, you seem to attribute a one-sided causal relationship there That's what understanding is. We might just be living in completely different realities.

If there is no relation between jacket and winter because winter can exist without jacket, why is there a relation between atom and atom? Can't an atom exist without another atom? That doesn't make sense to me. Are you simply talking about an identical semantic relation, i.e. atom = atom? Other than that, it seems like you're maybe doing a Fritjof Capra "there is no such thing as causality in reality; all things are relational", meaning every part in an interaction is a part of a greater whole. If so, I do very much resonate with that. But even so, it can still be useful to talk about causal relationships. Also, it still bothers me the way you've been talking about the brain-experience relationship. To me, it makes little sense to on the one hand say that you're merely talking about relationships, while on the other you're using words like "x is just y" and "x is due to pre-existing y". Again, that type of language, if you're familiar with most philosophical and scientific discussions, quite explicitly refers to classic linear causal relationships. If that is not what you had in mind while using that language, then sure, we might be miscommunicating, but I would like you to explain why you used that language. Anyways, until then, I can try to make more clear what a causal relationship entails and why it doesn't work for the brain-experience causal hypothesis: If you want to propose a causal relationship ("one thing leads to the next"), at some point you have to justify it through a causal mechanism, or else there is no way to account for the relationship between the cause and the effect. For example, with the atoms, you can invoke Newtonian physics; concepts like mass, energy and Newton's three laws of motion; which would give you a mechanism for how one atom causes the movement of another: when one atom hits the other, it transfers its kinetic energy because of Newton's law of ... etc. With the leaves falling from the trees in autumn, you can invoke biochemical changes in the stem of the leaf that responds to seasonal changes. With people putting on jackets in autumn, you can use some bio-behavioral model. Now, in all of these examples, there seems to be a satisfactory level of continuity between the cause, the mechanism and the effect. On the other hand, in the case of the brain-experience causal hypothesis, there is an obvious lack of satisfactory continuity, hence the Hard problem: how does ions moving across lipid membranes lead to the experience of Red? More generally, how does quantitative descriptions of the brain lead to the qualitative experiences of the mind? There is an obvious mechanistic gap there, and it interferes with justifying a causal relationship. Some people, idealists, say it's a malformed question and that it's actually impossible to get qualities from quantities, while physicalists say we will probably get to a satisfactory mechanism at some point. Anyways, the point is that while you can propose a causal relationship, it's not a well-justified causal relationship unless you can find a satisfactory causal mechanism, and that is what I'm saying is lacking with the brain-experience causal hypothesis which again you seem to be touching on routinely throughout your responses. I personally don't see how you could call any part of this interaction lazy, but as I've figured, you seem to like to invoke classic linear causal relationships, so I guess it's all my fault 😝

Me neither. So in other words, experiences correlate with brain activity? Yes... The first part of the sentence: I don't understand why you're saying that. The second part: I don't understand what that means. And I don't see how it relates to the next sentence, which is why I've chopped it up. On a meta note, you honestly should try to simply the way you write. I think you write in a kind of abstract and cryptic way. I've read some papers on brain function, so if you're talking about basic principles of how the brain works, I should be able to understand that if communicated well. Uhm, yes, both are true. When I'm next to a sad person, or an angry person, or a scared person, that correlates both with a change in my experience and a change in my brain, and both can be predicted quite accurately. For example, my experience will probably mirror the emotional state of the person, and my brain will probably show a change in activation of the amygdala and other limbic systems. But what compels you to say that one "alters" the other? Why not just say "there is a correlation"? Yes. I think "correlation" is the functional understanding here. So in other words, the Gestalt shift you see is not informed by sensory information, which means that only some of our experience correlates with sensory information. Are you simply repeating what I'm saying in other terms? Certainly. Sometimes you speak like one, sometimes I don't understand what you're saying. Why is it not? "Correlation" is fundamentally synonymous with "relation". It's just that in science, "correlation" is generally used to describe relations of behavior (how things act or change together), because that is what science is concerned with investigating (as opposed to e.g. ontology which is concerned about investigating relations of being, which is more general). So if when my experience changes, my brain also changes in a certain predictable way, we tend to say that they're correlated. Ok, but as you've now eased off calling it a causal relationship, why not just say "information in the brain correlates with experience" rather than "the experience is just already existing information in the brain"? Those words "is just" and "already existing" mean something, and they seem to imply an order of how things arise; in this case, the brain before the experience; i.e. causation. Ok, so now "relation" suddenly means "direct relationship" in your idea of the word, which again seems to point to causality, as again, you seem to be implying an order of how things arise. That is causality: "cause" and then "effect". If we go back to the scientific use of the term, a correlation is when the behavior of two or more things are interconnected. For example, when leaves fall in autumn, people seem to put on jackets. They're correlated. Now, it's probably not that leaves falling causes people to put on jackets. That would probably be a spurious relationship (a non-causal correlation). The actual causal factor here would probably be the cold winter temperatures, which causes both the leaves to fall and the jackets to be put on. Still, the correlation between leaves falling and people putting on jackets is actual in the sense that there is such a correlation. But it's different from a causal relationship. A correlation can be hinting towards a causal relationship, but if you falsify that possibility, then there is no causal relationship, which is what psychedelics, OBEs and NDEs do with the hypothesis that experience is caused by brain activity; they falsify it. So what you're calling "actual vs. apparent correlation" is actually "actual causality vs. actual correlation". So if we're assuming your use of the terms is consistent with the general scientific understanding of them, then it actually seems like you do believe the brain causes experience. We've gone over this language stuff. I think I have, as per the images showing the Gestalt shifts and various other top-down perceptual phenomena that I can show you. And technically, millions of people self-reporting psychic phenomena that falsifies brain-experience causality is a form of evidence, just not hard evidence. I would be happy to call it a dream, but not caused by a brain. Well, you're certainly making claims about the experience and the world, which requires evidence just like any other claim. Your claims aren't exempt from that just because it's the mainstream ideology. And it's laughable to call claims about psychic phenomena "new" claims when these experiences have existed for all of human history and when it's the hypothesis of brain-experience causality which has probably barely existed for 300 years (if we grant that honor to the "Enlightenment philosophers"). That's a nice prediction. Let's see how it will reproduce cardiac arrest NDEs No idea how that explains anything. Like? You know, I wouldn't say synaesthesia is when color "becomes" sound, etc. I would say it's when color and sound correlate But that's more a joke than a sincere point (which is also what you responded to in the first place). Which they probably have (psychic senses). Why wouldn't they? Feeling when somebody is looking at your back is evolutionarily advantageous. Having precognitions is evolutionarily advantageous. Telepathy, etc. Also, I actually think I could give a satisfying "material" explanation for some psychic phenomena if you're interested (which doesn't "disprove" the reality of the phenomena, but only provides coherence between different ways of viewing the phenomena). Whatever that means. Are amoeba individuated? Sea sponges? Jellyfish? Coral reefs? There are parapsychology studies on animals that speak against that claim. I would refer to Rupert Sheldrake for that. Maybe people should get research grants and PhD programs at mainstream universities for that (like other sciences) and not just some obscure universities funded by hippie decamillionaires. You mean "downloading metaphysical assumptions from the larger culture". True, just like reality, and no brain-experience causality involved. Then I would like to see how you would explain the OBE of the patient in the above video who was declared dead for 20 minutes after a failed heart surgery, came back with detailed information about the room he was laying in that wasn't there before he was put under anesthesia.

Because your trip is not just a chemical. Your trip is your mind, your body and the surrounding environment: set and setting.

Depends on what you mean by "universe". What is "my" consciousness? Depends on what you mean by "my" consciousness. Sleep is not a lack of Consciousness. Neither is death. They're different states than your usual waking state. Not at all. It proves that different states appear to exist. Yes, which is why egoic solipsism is untenable, because it relies on taking forms as something fundamentally real and not just appearances.