Hardkill

Member
 View profile  See their activity

  • Content count

    5,229

  • Joined

  • Last visited

Posts posted by Hardkill

  1. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    1 hour ago, Leo Gura said:

    Push is the key word.

    Reforms require pushing, even if you don't get what you want.

    It's a tug of war.

    How fast will the reforms come? I don't know. Slower than we'd like.

    I see. That makes sense. So, even if the broader paradigm stays neoliberal/Orange for a long time, it still makes sense for Dems/left-populists to push economic populism as far as the culture will allow, and let that tug-of-war slowly shift things over decades.

    And you’re not saying we’ve hit some hard point of no return where people care so much about “individual liberty” that they’ll never want more help from government again for the next 50+ years. It’s not like the collective has consciously decided: “No, that’s it, we’re done with the government helping us, we want it totally out of our lives.” It’s more that people are confused, underdeveloped, and pulled by Orange/Blue values, so any move toward more economic populism is slow and contested, not impossible.

    We of course have already seen how severe but “smaller” crises nudge change even without a full Great Depression: the 2008 financial crisis, COVID + the 2020 recession + the 2021–2023 inflation mess, mass civil unrest like the BLM riots, and lingering systemic stuff like anger over the endless Middle East wars. None of those flipped the paradigm, but they did shake confidence in the status quo and push certain reforms and shifts in public consciousness. So it feels like a long grind of incremental pushing, punctuated by crises that sometimes open temporary windows for deeper change—depending on where development is at.

    For the time being, that probably means reforms will have to come more incrementally than in the New Deal or Great Society eras, unless you get some truly cataclysmic shock (another depression-level event) plus a very powerful, higher-consciousness movement and leadership ready to capitalize on that window.

    And on top of that, it depends on how united the political consensus is around those liberal/progressive policies—something that has recently become much clearer to me as a crucial factor. New Deal and Great Society moments weren’t just about crisis; they were also about having enough of the country, elites included, aligned behind a reform direction. Until something like that lines up again, it’s mostly the slow tug-of-war you’re talking about rather than big, clean leaps.

  2. Posted

    I wouldn’t frame it as a single global cabal. It’s more like overlapping networks of authoritarian governments, oligarchs, and Western corporate/financial enablers. Think: certain foreign regimes, fossil-fuel interests, defense contractors, big finance/real-estate, and the disinformation ecosystem. They don’t coordinate as one group—they just share incentives for weak rule of law, secrecy, and deregulation

  3. Posted

    5 hours ago, Infinity16 said:

    A lot of the economic stuff have been popular in the US, even during the pre-orange 30s. The issue comes when economic policy hinders achievement which is what stage orange is all about. The social stuff pertaining to stuff like systemic racism and cultural appropriation can also turn off people in stage orange for being "woke". Trump did win with the median voter in the swing states and the POC vote swung towards him. Anyone who cares more about the state of our democracy than about the price of eggs either voted for Harris or left it blank because of her stance on Israel.

    It's actually a bit worse than peak orange since there's a prominent stage blue minority in the US. I will be making a post in the future as to what economic policy may work best. It will attain the advantages of both capitalism and socialism so stay tuned.

    Thanks for the response. I agree that Stage Orange can accept economic populism if it’s framed around opportunity, fairness, and stopping corruption — not moralizing or anti-achievement messaging. That’s why FDR’s New Deal worked even for early Orange: it was sold as restoring stability and giving people a fair shot.

    The U.S. right now isn’t just Peak Orange — it’s Peak Orange sitting on top of a big Stage Blue base with Red elements underneath. That’s why cultural issues get weaponized so easily. Economic populism can still work, but I guess it has to be framed in a way that appeals to Orange self-interest and Blue stability, not just Green values.

    7 minutes ago, Breathe said:

    @Hardkill Spiral dynamics a limiting model for navigating the current landscape. The problem we are facing now is that the US is being torn down so the global elite can have full control. This is not a matter of left vs right wing politics, green vs orange, etc. The facade of left vs right wing politics is being exposed for what it is. It isn't actually there. It may seem like the right is beating the left but that's not the case. It's been the global elite running the show all along. Trump was installed to expedite the destruction of the US economy so that the global elite can own and control everything.

    Where does the global elite factor into your model? This is a multi-national network of public and private interests from all over the globe.

    I agree that global elites and power networks exist, but in Spiral Dynamics terms they’re not outside the model — they’re expressions of late-Stage Orange values scaled globally (finance, tech monopolies, multinational corporations, etc.). SD doesn’t deny power structures; it explains the value system that produces them.

    Where I’m more cautious is the idea of a single coordinated plan to “destroy the U.S.” Most elite groups compete with each other, and a lot of what looks like a plan is actually emergent behavior from late-Orange incentives. So yes — elites matter, but they’re part of the SD dynamic, not separate from it.

     

  4. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    Leo, earlier you told me Democrats should not copy GOP/right-wing economics, and instead should adopt a strong economic populist agenda:

    Fixing inequality, busting monopolies, ending corporate domination/lobbying, not raising taxes on the bottom 80%, etc.

    That all sounds like a more humane, Green-ish direction within capitalism.

    How do you reconcile that prescriptive advice with your prediction that we’ll have ‘nothing but neoliberalism for the next 100 years’?
    Are you basically saying:

    the meta-frame stays neoliberal, but within that, we should still push toward the most progressive/economic-populist version possible?

    I’m trying to understand whether you see economic populism as a realistic near-term path within neoliberalism, or mostly as a higher-consciousness ideal that the current level of development won’t actually implement.

  7. Posted

    Leo,

    I have a question about how you understand voters’ psychology around “change” in modern U.S. politics.

    In the last few election cycles, it feels like the winners have almost always been the candidate who best embodied “change” against the status quo:

    • Obama 2008 & 2012 – “Hope and Change,” post-Bush, anti-Iraq, generational shift
    • Trump 2016 – anti-establishment wrecking ball against both parties’ elites
    • Biden 2020 – “return to normalcy,” a change away from chaos and Trump
    • Trump 2024 – again framed as a change away from Biden and the current direction

    So on the surface, voters do seem to want “change” over and over.

    Yet at the same time, the public still doesn’t really go for genuinely progressive / systemic change when it’s offered in a more explicit way by people like:

    • Bernie Sanders
    • AOC
    • Elizabeth Warren
    • Zohran Mamdani, etc.

    These people are arguably the ones proposing the deepest structural reforms (on capitalism, healthcare, labor, oligarchy, etc.), but most voters don’t rally behind them the way they do behind more “safe” change candidates like Obama or Biden — or right-wing populists like Trump.

    So my question to you is:

    How do you explain this psychologically and spiritually?

    Why do voters repeatedly choose symbolic or surface-level “change” (Obama, Trump, Biden/2020, Trump/2024) while rejecting the more genuinely transformative progressive candidates who would actually challenge the system at a deeper level?

    More specifically, I’d love to hear your take on:

    1. Survival & fear: How much of this is just survival bias — people wanting “change” but only within a narrow safety zone that doesn’t threaten their ego, identity, or material security?
    2. Stage development (Spiral Dynamics): Are progressives like Bernie/AOC/Warren/Mamdani simply too far ahead of the median voter’s stage of development, so that even people who are dissatisfied still prefer ego-flattering, tribal, or nostalgic forms of “change” (like Trump or soft-liberal change) rather than true systemic reform?
    3. Comfort with institutions: Do most Democratic voters, for example, still trust the basic institutions enough that they’ll opt for “reformist” change (Obama/Biden) instead of “revolutionary” change (Bernie-style), whereas Republicans are more willing to embrace destructive change (Trump) because their distrust has gone much deeper?
    4. Media & narrative control: To what degree are people’s “change” preferences basically manufactured by media framing — so that the only acceptable “change” on offer is the kind that doesn’t threaten corporate or elite interests too much?

    Why does the collective ego keep saying it wants change, then rejecting the people who actually represent deeper change, and instead choosing candidates who either offer mild reform or outright reactionary backlash?

    I’m curious how you’d unpack this using your frameworks around consciousness, survival, ideological bias, and Spiral Dynamics.

     

  8. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    I find that hard to believe what the OP saying unless he's talking about men who have masculine traits that are too extreme.

    Being a real man means to be brave, bold, strong, aggressive, unique, resolved, decisive, inspiring, and a visionary leader. There is a reason why women have always been attracted to such men. 

    Straight women have never really been attracted to men who are cowardly, plays it too safe, weak, spineless, don't have their own thoughts/opinions, indecisive, boring, and have no real vision/purpose for himself or for others as a leader.

    Moreover, if you come off as too emotional like a woman on her period too often, especially when you haven't gotten intimate with her yet or not in a serious relationship with her yet, then the woman is going to think "this guy can't handle life and won't be able to protect me."

    That being said, I think one of the hardest parts of attracting women is being emotionally compelling and stimulating to women.

  9. Posted

    Americans have become increasingly dissatisfied with the political system. Trust in government, trust in democracy, trust in media, trust in institutions—all of it is near historic lows. Yet at the same time, the major structural barriers that prevent reform seem completely locked in.

    Here’s the contradiction I’m noticing, and I’m curious how others here think about it:

    1. The public clearly wants systemic reform.

    Polls show:

    • Huge majorities want limits on money in politics.
    • Majorities think politicians don’t represent ordinary people.
    • Confidence in democracy is falling year after year.
    • People across the spectrum think the system is corrupt or captured.

    There’s a widespread feeling that “something is fundamentally broken.”

     

    2. But the major choke points for reform aren’t moving.

    • Citizens United and Buckley v. Valeo have effectively constitutionalized unlimited outside spending.
    • The Supreme Court is nowhere near overturning them.
    • Congress doesn’t have the votes for federal campaign-finance reform.
    • Most state legislatures don’t either, especially in red or purple states.
    • The donor class and large economic interests continue to dominate the political process.

    So the legal and political architecture that created the current system is essentially frozen.

     

    3. This produces a weird pressure cooker dynamic.

    People feel the system is illegitimate, but the system has no viable institutional path to correct itself. In other words:

    Public dissatisfaction grows, but the reform channels remain blocked.

    Historically, when a political system has rising dissatisfaction and blocked reform pathways, the pressure tends to escape in other ways:

    • Right-wing populism
    • Demagogues
    • Cynicism and apathy
    • Lower democratic engagement
    • Institutional distrust
    • Localized flare-ups
    • Attempts to “smash” the system rather than reform it
    • Political nihilism (“both sides are corrupt so why vote?”)

    We’re already seeing many of these patterns in the U.S.

     

    4. Politicians behave rationally within a broken structure.

    Even Democrats who privately dislike the influence of big donors still rely heavily on PACs, wealthy individuals, bundlers, and corporate money. And realistically, why wouldn’t they? In our current environment:

    • If a candidate unilaterally swears off big money, they’re at a competitive disadvantage.
    • Their opponent’s Super PACs will still spend millions.
    • Congress/Supreme Court won’t fix the rules.
    • Unilaterally “disarming” doesn’t change the system—it usually just gets you beaten.

    The few exceptions (AOC, Bernie, Mamdani, etc.) are structural outliers with unusually favorable conditions.

    So the behavior of most politicians reinforces stagnation, not because they’re evil, but because the incentive structure rewards conformity.

     

    5. So here’s my core question:

    What happens to a society when the mass public grows more frustrated, more cynical, and more distrustful—while the structural mechanisms for reform stay shut?

    Does the system:

    • Drift into a soft oligarchy?
    • Become more populist and chaotic?
    • Enter cycles of strongman politics?
    • Fragment into local experiments of reform while the federal system decays?
    • Or eventually face a legitimacy crisis big enough to force some kind of overhaul?

    I’m not asking from a partisan angle—I’m asking from a systems / consciousness / long-term societal development perspective.

    Where does a democracy go when the public is angry but reform is structurally impossible?
    What’s the “next stage” in a scenario like this?

    Would love to hear people’s thoughts, especially from a developmental psychology or systems-theory lens.

  10. Posted

    7 hours ago, Leo Gura said:

    Not really.

    Brutal is doing the kind of workouts Arnold did. He was doing way more reps than that with insane weights.

    Bodybuilding requires more reps than strength training.

    For serious bodybuilding you want to be doing super-sets. But this is overkill for normies.

    Keep it simple and fundamental. No gimmickry.

    You feel more of that "hellish" burn from lifting moderate to heavy weights with 10+ reps than lifting even heavier weight with less than 8-10 reps.

  11. Posted

    6 hours ago, DocWatts said:

    For as livid as I am at Democratic leadership for being the Controlled Opposition, when I put on my Game Theory goggles I also recognize that there's a basic asymmetry here.

    For all of their glaring flaws, Democratic politicians care, to a degree that varies enormously between individual legislators, about the well being of their constituents.

    While Republicans do not give a flying fuck about the well-being of their own constituents, let alone the health and lives of Americans who didn't vote for them. Trump and his enablers would let millions of Americans starve rather that surrender some of their power.

    Sadly, that is true.

    Republicans have no principles and Democrats have no spine.

    Although I will admit that getting Trump and the Republicans to agree with the Democrats in Congress to extend the ACA subsidies was always a long-shot, especially after Trump, Mike Johnson, and their entire party in Washington all made it very clear recently that they are an completely hard no on that.

    But I still think that all of the Democrats should've held the line for one more month. Also, I really don't like how those 8 Democrats in Senate who voted for the bill came off as feckless, weak, and defeated. hey all suck at communicating to the public Schumer himself comes off as a feeble weak leader who can't hold his entire caucus together anymore. He needs to be replaced. 

  15. Posted

    8 minutes ago, Leo Gura said:

    I was never good buddies with him.

    I knew him and I knew he was a sociopath. His friends are in prison for rape and he was banned from the city of Las Vegas.

    Do you understand how bad you gotta be to be banned from the entire city of Vegas?

    and yet half of the people in the country were willing to tolerate Trump being president again and not be held accountable for any of his crimes.....

    This world is so fucked up.

  16. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    I honestly have found that just having good looks has really led to very underwhelming results with getting women.

    It's like how even Dr. Mike himself said in a video he did about steroids, where he explained that becoming super jacked from bodybuilding and taking steroids had led to him having very underwhelming results with getting women.

  18. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    9 hours ago, Elliott said:

    This thread didn't age well....

    Honestly, I hope that this thread ages terribly.

    Yes, yesterday was very good night for Democrats and the Left; however, we are still not close to being out of the woods yet.

    There is still a serious chance that Democrats may not win the midterms because of all of the extreme gerrymandering by the Republicans throughout the country. Trump and the MAGA Republicans are going to do everything they can to steal the 2026 midterms. Not to mention, that the Democratic party still has an even lower approval rating than Trump and his party does which is crazy.

    Plus, the next presidential election will be even much harder for the Democrats to win because presidential elections always have a much greater percentage of lower propensity, less engaged, and less informed voters than special elections, off year elections, and midterm elections do. Democrats are still far behind Trump and the Republicans in winning over lower propensity, less engaged, and less informed voters. Additionally, Trump and his party are of course going to do everything they can to try to steal the 2028 presidential election.

    That is why the Democratic party still desperately needs a stronger leadership with better communication strategies to save themselves and save the country. 

    Btw, Chuck Schumer really needs to step down and let some other Democrat in the US Senate who is much younger, more fiery, and more talented of a communicator than he is be the new leader of the Senate Democrats in Congress.

  20. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    4 minutes ago, Leo Gura said:

    He was, but he was too naive I think to understand what his fate would be.

    Some people are courageous and some are just naive and don't understand the risks they take.

    What Navalny did was foolish. There was no sense for him to return to Russia after they poisoned him. He should have been more afraid. Fools are sometimes fearless.

    This is a good example of why fear must exist. Without fear you do reckless things.

    Even though Navalny completely failed, maybe enough people in Russia will one day be inspired to believe in his cause.

  21. Posted

    9 minutes ago, Daniel Balan said:

    @Hardkill Orbanization is the biggest threat that liberal democracies will face. Orbanization is much, much more accurate than calling MAGA fascist. Fascism will never happen in the west the same as it did in the 20th century, those who propagate this idea are people desperate for clicks.

    However, Orbanization is extremely dangerous and oftentimes much more damaging than fascism because fascism is way to brutal to be tolerated in the 21th century. Orbanization means the normalisation of unchecked corruption and theft. Theft without police. That is what Orbanization means. Even in Hungary Orban can't really do what he wants because the Magyars are pretty educated, but even so, Orban managed to corrupt the entire governance apparatus from top to bottom with loyalists, the press in Hungary is basically similar to the Press in Russia, although to a lesser degree. In Russia if you criticise Putin you accidentally fall from a window, In Orban's Hungary, if you criticise the regime, the entire press that is subservient to Orban will accuse you of pedophilia, will find that you own obscene amounts of wealth while the average citizen has nowhere near the wealth that Orban's press found out that you "have" etc. Basically they will shoot the messenger until no one will believe that messenger. Hungary is not a bad place to live, but corruption is unchecked and the only way to have a successful business there is to be in bed with Orban's party. Basically Orban gave all the wealthy people in Hungary freedom to steal and exploit off of the plebs without any shame. 

    All right wing populist movements have in common the mantra that the corruption is not the bug, it is actually the feature. The people who vote for those parties don't want less corruption, they want more, they want to be allowed more to be corrupt themselves, they want to be allowed to pay less taxes, to do more fiscal evasion, to exploit more shamelessly the workers etc. 

    For Orban corruption is not a bug, it is a feature that must be amplified.

    Yeah, but actually in the US, no leader or party in power can own more than about 39% of the entire media environment unlike in Hungary because of how much more fragmented and diverse the media environment is in a country like the US than in a country like Hungary. Furthermore, the US has legal and structural guardrails that Hungary doesn't have including:

    1. No single branch can dictate content. The First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and federal procurement and antitrust laws all block the executive branch from directly coercing media or corporations.

    2. Independent agencies and courts intervene. The FCC, FTC, DOJ, and federal courts have all stepped in against overt political interference before — and would again if a line were crossed.

    3. Private ownership diversity. U.S. media, entertainment, and legal industries are massive and decentralized. No administration can capture all studios, platforms, or firms simultaneously.

     

    We have to also considered the Political and market backlash that comes with an authoritarian leader in a county like America trying to cancel shows, movies, and news outlets just because our president and the Republicans didn't like what they heard:

    1. Jimmy Kimmel, heavy-handed moves generate huge public, corporate, and advertiser backlash.

    2. U.S. firms are highly brand-sensitive: if they’re seen as bowing to censorship, they lose younger audiences, international markets, and talent.

    3. Shareholders, unions, and advocacy groups (WGA, SAG-AFTRA, ACLU, etc.) quickly mobilize when freedom-of-expression issues surface.

     

    There's more Institutional pluralism in the US than even in a country like Hungary:

    1. There isn’t one centralized “elite” to capture. Power is distributed among states, regulators, courts, press outlets, streaming platforms, independent production houses, and NGOs.

    2. Even if one network or company caves, others often go the opposite direction — competition itself protects pluralism.

     

    I now see that the real risk is incremental chilling, not total control:

    1. I think that experts worry about self-censorship and “soft compliance” when threats become routine — not about full autocratic capture like Hungary or Russia.

    2. The danger is cumulative erosion (companies avoiding controversy), but every attempt at direct suppression tends to spark loud resistance that reinforces democratic norms.

  22. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    9 hours ago, Leo Gura said:

    What is there to say? It's already happening. How far it will go is hard to predict.

    Vlad Vexler thinks that the 2030s in America will be more fascist than today. He thinks Trump is just the warm-up act.

    That's a terrifying notion but he might be right. He could also be wrong.

    Yeah, I mean I am still very worried about what may happen with the country in the future. 

    However, the more I think about it and the more I learn about different countries outside of the US, the more I realize how different a country like Hungary or Ukraine is in terms of history, geography, system, culture, and traditions.

    Doesn't the USA still have a higher level of development and culture overall than Hungary or Ukraine do? 

    Hungary doesn't have the decentralized democratic media environment that the U.S. does, doesn't have deep, successful protest traditions that repeatedly reset the political game the way the U.S. does, doesn't have the cultural diversity that the U.S. does, and its elections aren't nearly as decentralized as elections in the U.S. are; moreover, its elections do not have the same level of oversight, the same degree of voting protections, or the same independence and “teeth” of the courts and legal remedies that the U.S. system has.

    The U.S. has also always had better stability, anti-corruption systems, and journalist safety/protections than even Ukraine, which, of course, is still a strong ally of Western nations and clearly believes in EU-style democratic standards.

    Moreover, I now don't think that Trump and his party have the time or the means to install enough loyalists in the military, law enforcement, and other parts of the government who would allow him to do a true systemic capture of the military, law enforcement, the machinery of elections, other government agencies, or other institutions.

    Additionally, Trump has never had net positive approval ratings and popularity ratings amongst the general electorate in America, whereas Orban has had net-positive approval ratings and popularity ratings at various points during his time as PM of his country.

  23. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    24 minutes ago, Leo Gura said:

    From the statistics immigranta commit less crime than locals.

    You would need to statistically demonstrate the immigrants commit more crime.

    The immigration issue is truly about xenophobia. Xenophobia is a serious force. Don't underestimate it. Most humans are xenophobic.

    So True.

    Btw, what do you think about how many people, including centrists and even some pragmatic progressives blame Biden for the historic level of illegal border crossings during his presidency?

    Personally, I feel like he did the best he could to deal with such an unprecedented wave of illegal foreigners desperately trying to get into the country due to the ending of COVID and their own countries having suffered from really bad conditions at the time. Not to mention all of the legal constraints, partisan gridlock in Congress, and lack of infrastructure he didn't until he finally had enough in place to close down the border effectively in the summer of 2024.

    Plus, that immigration crisis actually helped save our country from the inflation crisis and gave our entire economy a significant boost.

  24. Posted · Edited by Hardkill

    While it is unrealistic for America to fall under an authoritarian regime like Russia or China in the foreseeable future, some experts have warned about the risk of “Orbanization” in the U.S. — meaning the country could increasingly resemble Hungary.

    Path-dependence of norms: Once a party learns that norm-breaking (press intimidation, selective non-compliance, threats to civil servants) pays and isn’t punished, it becomes the new baseline. Norm erosion is a ratchet.

    State-level power as a workaround: Even if federal capture is hard, state governments can alter election rules, districts, and media/public-records environments—creating pockets of tilted competition that add up nationally.

    Legal shifts that change incentives: Court decisions that insulate executive actions or weaken agency capacity can lower the cost of overreach, making Hungary-style tactics (pressure on regulators/independents) more tempting.

    Media economics, not censors: You don’t need a ministry of information if local news collapses, ad markets consolidate, and a few platform or carrier decisions can starve disfavored outlets. That can mimic capture’s effects.

    Intimidation at the nodes: Threats against election workers, prosecutors, and journalists can produce self-censorship and capacity loss even without formal control—an American analogue to “soft” authoritarian tools.

    Polarization + minority entrenchment: With gerrymanders, malapportionment, and partisan administration, a coalition can keep governing with minority support, making “win at all costs” strategies rational.

    Crisis opportunism: Wars, pandemics, or riots can be used to centralize discretion and marginalize oversight (emergency powers tend to outlive emergencies).

    However, after learning about how things work in Hungary or in other Eastern European countries like Ukraine, I now don't think that America will even go through a democratic backsliding to the degree that it will be like even Hungary or Ukraine.

    America’s mix of federalism, independent courts and agencies, decentralized media funding, much more entrenched protest culture and democratic traditions, overlapping watchdogs, and frequent competitive elections makes a single-party capture or wholesale media takeover far harder here than in Hungary or even in a country like Ukraine.

    What seems plausible in my mind is that there will be more uneven, state-by-state illiberalism, deeper chilling effects, and a gradually tilted national playing field if multiple stressors coincide (economic downturn + court shifts + state-level rule changes + intimidation).

    thoughts?

  25. Posted

    4 hours ago, Daniel Balan said:

    I do that too when I use AI, but for some reasons it always echoes back to me my pre existing worldview. I can't be already right on everything I already believe so it must be the case that AI is the same as Facebook, it only presents you in the feed your favorite conspiracy theories and your pre existing political agenda. Also when I push back against AI in the end it always reconfirms my pre existing bias. 

    Also I asked a far right nationalist acquaintance for his phone, I know that he also uses chatgpt to get information and I was shocked that it basically gave him the exact opposite information with the same conviction on the same questions or promts that I ask chatgpt on my account and device.

    This far right friend is nostalgic for the communist dictatorship from the cold war era and chatgpt confirmed, validated and further strengthened his self bias for dictatorship and totalitarianism saying that people in deed lived a more prosperous life under communism and now people have it worse and they don't have a stable job etc. Basically chatgpt was spewing communist propaganda that was displayed on tv during that era.

    That was the moment I decided I will never ask AI to give me information that could potentially shape my political worldview. 

    As of now I only ask it stuff about geography or facts from society such as who was Michael Jackson or other petty stuff like this.

    What AI chat do you use and did you buy any paid versions?