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Everything posted by Hardkill
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While it is unrealistic for America to fall under an authoritarian regime like Russia or China in the foreseeable future, some experts have warned about the risk of “Orbanization” in the U.S. — meaning the country could increasingly resemble Hungary. Path-dependence of norms: Once a party learns that norm-breaking (press intimidation, selective non-compliance, threats to civil servants) pays and isn’t punished, it becomes the new baseline. Norm erosion is a ratchet. State-level power as a workaround: Even if federal capture is hard, state governments can alter election rules, districts, and media/public-records environments—creating pockets of tilted competition that add up nationally. Legal shifts that change incentives: Court decisions that insulate executive actions or weaken agency capacity can lower the cost of overreach, making Hungary-style tactics (pressure on regulators/independents) more tempting. Media economics, not censors: You don’t need a ministry of information if local news collapses, ad markets consolidate, and a few platform or carrier decisions can starve disfavored outlets. That can mimic capture’s effects. Intimidation at the nodes: Threats against election workers, prosecutors, and journalists can produce self-censorship and capacity loss even without formal control—an American analogue to “soft” authoritarian tools. Polarization + minority entrenchment: With gerrymanders, malapportionment, and partisan administration, a coalition can keep governing with minority support, making “win at all costs” strategies rational. Crisis opportunism: Wars, pandemics, or riots can be used to centralize discretion and marginalize oversight (emergency powers tend to outlive emergencies). However, after learning about how things work in Hungary or in other Eastern European countries like Ukraine, I now don't think that America will even go through a democratic backsliding to the degree that it will be like even Hungary or Ukraine. America’s mix of federalism, independent courts and agencies, decentralized media funding, much more entrenched protest culture and democratic traditions, overlapping watchdogs, and frequent competitive elections makes a single-party capture or wholesale media takeover far harder here than in Hungary or even in a country like Ukraine. What seems plausible in my mind is that there will be more uneven, state-by-state illiberalism, deeper chilling effects, and a gradually tilted national playing field if multiple stressors coincide (economic downturn + court shifts + state-level rule changes + intimidation). thoughts?
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Yeah, but actually in the US, no leader or party in power can own more than about 39% of the entire media environment unlike in Hungary because of how much more fragmented and diverse the media environment is in a country like the US than in a country like Hungary. Furthermore, the US has legal and structural guardrails that Hungary doesn't have including: 1. No single branch can dictate content. The First Amendment, the Administrative Procedure Act, and federal procurement and antitrust laws all block the executive branch from directly coercing media or corporations. 2. Independent agencies and courts intervene. The FCC, FTC, DOJ, and federal courts have all stepped in against overt political interference before — and would again if a line were crossed. 3. Private ownership diversity. U.S. media, entertainment, and legal industries are massive and decentralized. No administration can capture all studios, platforms, or firms simultaneously. We have to also considered the Political and market backlash that comes with an authoritarian leader in a county like America trying to cancel shows, movies, and news outlets just because our president and the Republicans didn't like what they heard: 1. Jimmy Kimmel, heavy-handed moves generate huge public, corporate, and advertiser backlash. 2. U.S. firms are highly brand-sensitive: if they’re seen as bowing to censorship, they lose younger audiences, international markets, and talent. 3. Shareholders, unions, and advocacy groups (WGA, SAG-AFTRA, ACLU, etc.) quickly mobilize when freedom-of-expression issues surface. There's more Institutional pluralism in the US than even in a country like Hungary: 1. There isn’t one centralized “elite” to capture. Power is distributed among states, regulators, courts, press outlets, streaming platforms, independent production houses, and NGOs. 2. Even if one network or company caves, others often go the opposite direction — competition itself protects pluralism. I now see that the real risk is incremental chilling, not total control: 1. I think that experts worry about self-censorship and “soft compliance” when threats become routine — not about full autocratic capture like Hungary or Russia. 2. The danger is cumulative erosion (companies avoiding controversy), but every attempt at direct suppression tends to spark loud resistance that reinforces democratic norms.
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Yeah, I mean I am still very worried about what may happen with the country in the future. However, the more I think about it and the more I learn about different countries outside of the US, the more I realize how different a country like Hungary or Ukraine is in terms of history, geography, system, culture, and traditions. Doesn't the USA still have a higher level of development and culture overall than Hungary or Ukraine do? Hungary doesn't have the decentralized democratic media environment that the U.S. does, doesn't have deep, successful protest traditions that repeatedly reset the political game the way the U.S. does, doesn't have the cultural diversity that the U.S. does, and its elections aren't nearly as decentralized as elections in the U.S. are; moreover, its elections do not have the same level of oversight, the same degree of voting protections, or the same independence and “teeth” of the courts and legal remedies that the U.S. system has. The U.S. has also always had better stability, anti-corruption systems, and journalist safety/protections than even Ukraine, which, of course, is still a strong ally of Western nations and clearly believes in EU-style democratic standards. Moreover, I now don't think that Trump and his party have the time or the means to install enough loyalists in the military, law enforcement, and other parts of the government who would allow him to do a true systemic capture of the military, law enforcement, the machinery of elections, other government agencies, or other institutions. Additionally, Trump has never had net positive approval ratings and popularity ratings amongst the general electorate in America, whereas Orban has had net-positive approval ratings and popularity ratings at various points during his time as PM of his country.
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Hardkill replied to Infinity16's topic in Society, Politics, Government, Environment, Current Events
So True. Btw, what do you think about how many people, including centrists and even some pragmatic progressives blame Biden for the historic level of illegal border crossings during his presidency? Personally, I feel like he did the best he could to deal with such an unprecedented wave of illegal foreigners desperately trying to get into the country due to the ending of COVID and their own countries having suffered from really bad conditions at the time. Not to mention all of the legal constraints, partisan gridlock in Congress, and lack of infrastructure he didn't until he finally had enough in place to close down the border effectively in the summer of 2024. Plus, that immigration crisis actually helped save our country from the inflation crisis and gave our entire economy a significant boost. -
I asked ChatGPT many questions on whether or not it thinks that the US will fall into a dictatorship like in Russia because of Trumpism. It said that that is very unlikely to happen for the following reasons: Structural guardrails Federalism & fragmentation: 50 states + thousands of counties/towns run elections, police, courts, and schools. There’s no single switch to flip. Independent judiciary by design: Life-tenured federal judges with protected pay; removal only by impeachment. State courts use mixed selection systems—no one pipeline to capture. Two-key appointment system: Presidents nominate, but the Senate confirms; turnover is staggered over decades, preventing personalist control. Decentralized elections with paper trails: Nearly universal paper ballots / verifiable records, routine audits, and bipartisan local administration. Reformed electoral certification: Post-2020 reforms (e.g., clarifying the VP’s ceremonial role, raising objection thresholds) closed a major loophole for national subversion. Legal and constitutional brakes First Amendment: Robust protections for press, speech, assembly—any blanket crackdown on critics/journalists gets enjoined fast. Due process & jury trials: Independent courts and juries, plus state/federal dual sovereignty, make retaliatory prosecutions hard to sustain. Military limits at home: Posse Comitatus and a narrow Insurrection Act; the armed forces are trained to refuse unlawful domestic orders. Plural power centers Free press & civil society: Investigative media, NGOs, universities, bar associations, watchdogs, and opposition parties operate freely and sue effectively. Elected and independent officials: Governors, state AGs, secretaries of state, DAs, and local clerks can—and do—resist federal overreach. Markets and investors: Heavy-handed illiberal moves trigger immediate political, legal, and economic blowback. Culture, norms, and incentives Public opinion: Americans are frustrated with performance, but majorities still prefer democratic rules; “strongman” support remains a minority view. Professional ethics: Judges, prosecutors, military, and career civil servants have strong norms and legal duties that resist politicization. Transparency & detection: FOIA/public-records laws, disclosures, audits, inspectors general, whistleblower protections, and an adversarial press raise the cost of corruption or covert schemes. What makes the U.S. different from Russia’s path No captured national media system: Government cannot lawfully nationalize or centrally script news; independent outlets proliferate. No centralized judicial discipline machine: The executive cannot hire/fire/discipline judges for outcomes; career leverage is limited. Competition remains real: Opposition candidates, parties, and courts operate nationwide; alternation of power happens regularly. Realistic risks to watch (not Russia-level, but worth vigilance) Soft illiberalism: extreme gerrymanders, partisan election-law “hardball,” chilling effects on protest/activism, or selective investigations. Concentrated influence that’s legal: big money in politics, media concentration, targeted funding of state/local offices. Disinformation & intimidation: threats to election workers, deepfakes, and harassment that strain administration capacity. Early-warning lights Proposals to let the executive discipline or remove judges. Laws that criminalize routine journalism or ban opposition on vague grounds. Moves to bar independent election observers, centralize election control, or curtail paper audits. Attempts to nationalize/censor major media or systematically block civil society. U.S. institutions are messy by design, with many veto points, strong constitutional rights, and a vibrant ecosystem of watchdogs. That architecture—plus public culture that still leans pro-democracy—makes a Russia-style authoritarian turn extraordinarily hard to execute or sustain. Continuous attention to the “soft” risks keeps it that way.
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What AI chat do you use and did you buy any paid versions?
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When I was your age, I used to think that maybe it was getting too late for me to learning pickup, dating, social skills, etc. I am glad that I was able to disprove that by the following year, which is when I really began to get real results. It was a very painful journey of self-improvement for me, but I only kept getting better and better with all of that in the long-run, including getting some sex partners without ever needing to pay for a hooker or escort and finally getting my first true gf ever by age 30. I believe that I could've gotten even much better and faster results if I got to game in a big city practically every day as a routine lifestyle during my first years of improving my social and seduction skills. Even when you get to your 30s, you will still be well into your prime for developing social and sex appeal, along with LTR experience. Plus, there is a reason why as a man in your 30s, 40s, and 50s you are generally at your peak potential years for a serious relationship, if you develop material success in your life by having a good career that you are happy with and make enough money for both you and your romantic partner to live off. To be clear, having those things aren't even necessary to attract women for casual or short-term relationships. However, the greater your material success, the greater appeal you will have to women who want to lock down a guy for an LTR, especially for marriage. Moreover, accomplishing serious achievements in your life helps improve your self-worth, increases your confidence around others, and makes you look like an impressive catch.
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It's not always feasible for scientists to come up with findings that are based on one individual. They usually aren't clinicians who work with individual patients.
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@Daniel Balan @NewKidOnTheBlock I get what you're saying and there is some truth to what you're saying about how using ChatGPT in the wrong way can lead to too much groupthink and atrophy of critical thinking skills and original thought. However, I constantly push back against AI whenever I find something it says that I don't agree with or doesn't add up. I also, try the best that I can to have it respond to me with little to no bias towards my views.
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But you know that no progressive politicians, including Bernie Sanders and the Squad, aren't for open borders. Even Bernie said before, "Nobody thinks illegal immigration is appropriate." Even Cenk and Ana believed that Biden should've closed the border much sooner, despite how complicated legally, logistically, and geopolitically it was for him.
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I would think that you would need some serious guts to do any kind of political activism in that country. See how much support you would get for any ideas you have for any kind of reforms.
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I’ve heard Leo say several times that eventually at least 50% of Americans will wake up — that people will see through the lies, the tribalism, and the authoritarian slide, and that progressives and centrists will eventually fight back and regain control. But I can’t shake this feeling that it might be too late by the time that happens. The Left and the Democratic Party have always been far more circular and divided than the Republican Party. The Right operates like a top-down machine: disciplined, unified, and emotionally cohesive. The Left behaves more like a loose confederation of internal wars — centrists vs. progressives, idealists vs. pragmatists, activists vs. institutionalists. It’s not that the Left lacks moral or intellectual grounding; it’s that it lacks strategic unity. Every attempt to form a broad coalition seems to implode under the weight of purity tests, ideological infighting, and a near-religious obsession with nuance. So, my question is: What makes you think the Democratic Party and the broader Left will get it together in time for any of the most critical elections — 2026, 2028, or even beyond — before it’s too late? Even if 50% of people “wake up,” how does that awakening translate into coordinated, effective political power? How does consciousness overcome disorganization, ego clashes, and the structural advantages the Right already holds in media, the courts, and the electoral system? I’m not trying to be cynical — I’m genuinely looking for the mechanism that connects awakening to real-world results. Because from where I stand, awareness without unity might not be enough.
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By the end of Obama’s two terms, Democrats had lost nearly 1,000 state-legislative seats, along with dozens of congressional seats and a dozen governorships—the party’s worst down-ballot wipeout since Herbert Hoover’s time. Even Democratic and Black commentators like Roland Martin have argued that Obama’s team prioritized his personal brand/OFA over rebuilding the DNC and state parties—contributing to those losses. Honestly, what makes this even harder to swallow is seeing how deeply the effects of that down-ballot collapse are still shaping the country today. Democrats haven’t held a majority of state power — not in legislatures, governorships, or trifectas — since 2010. That’s fifteen straight years of structural disadvantage. Republicans used that power to redraw maps, pass voter restrictions, reshape courts, and ultimately lock in control of the Supreme Court for an entire generation. The result is a political imbalance so entrenched that even a popular Democratic president can’t easily undo it. And now, with Trump’s movement still alive, the GOP controlling most of the states, and a conservative supermajority on the Court, it’s hard not to feel like democracy itself is hanging by a thread. Sometimes it feels like we’re watching the slow undoing of everything people fought for in the 20th century — civil rights, voting rights, environmental protection, women’s autonomy — all of it eroding in slow motion. It’s honestly depressing. Because it’s not just about Obama, or even the Democratic Party — it’s about the long-term failure to build durable power that can defend truth, fairness, and the rule of law.
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Yeah, I've been feeling that way too. It's hard to see how we get out of this dark place anytime soon.
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Even if he does win, his campaign strategy won't work for most Democrats outside of the city. He's way too far to the left for rural Americans, suburban Americans, those in the South, and those in Middle America.
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I mean, I suppose it's a good start, but what exactly are the people protesting going to be asking for? There is no unified or cohesive plan and no message discipline for sharpening any serious demands. What concrete demands do they want from the government and from the political parties? Do they want these ICE raids to go away for good? Are they wanting free and fair elections, including the elimination of nationwide gerrymandering for future elections? Do they want Trump to stop these stupid fucking tariffs and pressure him to help fix the people's financial situation like he promised he would? We desperately need an MLK or Obama-like figure to step up and give some kind of incredibly powerful speeches that will truly grab the people's attention and move them towards getting the support we need to get some kind of major policy win from the government.
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Lately, I’ve been feeling a growing dread that America might not even make it to 2028 with real democracy intact. This isn’t paranoia. It’s looking straight at the trends — the propaganda, the disinformation, the collapse of trust, the power grabs at state and federal levels — and realizing that we might be watching the slow-motion death of free and fair elections. And what terrifies me most is that I don’t see an easy way out of it. I don’t see any stable path forward that doesn’t involve massive social upheaval, disillusionment, or even violence. 1. The Feeling of Powerlessness It’s one thing to know that democracy is fragile — it’s another to feel it collapsing in real time. You can sense the numbness setting in. People are so divided and confused that even blatant authoritarian behavior gets normalized. Lies don’t matter. Institutions don’t matter. All that matters now is tribal victory and emotional gratification. Sometimes I honestly wonder if there’s any peaceful route left. If elections themselves lose legitimacy, then what tools do conscious people have left to restore truth and justice? 2. A Civilization Regressing in Consciousness From a developmental perspective, it feels like we’re witnessing a collective regression — from Green and Yellow values back down to Red and Blue. Fear and ego are swallowing empathy and truth. The system is too complex, too corrupted, too emotionally charged for most people to even perceive what’s happening, let alone correct it. It’s like watching a global mind fragment into incoherence. The higher functions are still there, but the organism is turning on itself. 3. Searching for a Response That Isn’t Hopeless I know there are people who say, “Just organize, just protest, just vote harder.” But what if that no longer works? What if the very mechanisms of accountability are rigged or erased? What if truth itself has no authority anymore? Part of me wants to believe in collective awakening. Another part sees how deep the rot goes — how addicted people are to outrage, how incapable they are of nuance — and it feels almost irreversible. Maybe the only thing left is to hold on to inner integrity — to refuse to let cynicism or hatred consume us, even as the structure around us collapses. To form small communities of sanity, consciousness, and love while the wider system burns. 4. The Hard Question If the United States truly loses free and fair elections — if the game itself becomes rigged beyond repair — what then? What do conscious people actually do when the political system no longer responds to truth or reality? Because right now, I honestly don’t know.
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We need a centralized, charismatic leadership to lead the entire No Kings protests. Otherwise, what will we really get out of any of it?
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Lately, I’ve been reflecting on something I’ve noticed in U.S. politics — specifically within the Democratic Party. Progressives often feel more authentic than moderate Democrats. Even when people don’t agree with their ideas, they often say: “At least I know what this person really believes.” Meanwhile, moderates tend to sound more calculated or scripted — even if they may actually be more pragmatic or experienced in governance. So, why is this? Is it simply that: Progressives’ messages align more closely with their moral convictions, giving off a stronger sense of integrity and passion? Or that moderates, by definition, have to balance multiple constituencies and compromise, which naturally dilutes perceived authenticity? Or could this be a media/psychological phenomenon, where our brains reward moral clarity and “unfiltered” communication — even if it’s less nuanced? From a Spiral Dynamics or consciousness-development perspective, maybe progressives are expressing Stage Green idealism (values-based authenticity), while moderates often operate from late Orange/early Green pragmatism — more focused on results and systemic stability than on “vibe” consistency. It also raises a deeper question: Is political authenticity about being true to your values, or about being honest about the trade-offs you’re willing to make to get things done?
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So, then how are moderate/establishment Democrats going to be able to fix their messaging problem or win in future elections if they can't sound "too authentic", but at the same time have an authenticity problem, which is a big part of why Harris and the Democrats lost in 2024? Btw, have you watched this vid from David Pakman on this problem?
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I kinda get what you're saying, but what about the presidents who actually became more fiery and populist after taking office — like TR, FDR, Truman, LBJ, Trump, and even Biden to some extent? Doesn’t that suggest that authenticity can evolve with responsibility rather than disappear under it? Maybe the real challenge for leadership today isn’t choosing between authenticity and restraint, but learning how to stay emotionally real while holding power. Especially now, when voters are so sick of polished, poll-tested language, do you think that kind of “strategic authenticity” might actually be what effective leadership requires?
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So, progressives can’t win much power because they will always be too radical for most Americans. Meanwhile, moderates are becoming less electable because people are tired of them sounding like soulless vessels who lack conviction, sound too rehearsed, don’t answer the questions like everyday people, come off as too pro-establishment/too pro-status quo, and have no clear bold reason for why they are running for office. I really feel so dejected about all of this….
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That's a pretty good list of reasons why it will be almost impossible for Trump and his party to pull off a true authoritarian takeover of the country. Although I am still very worried about the elimination of free and fair elections as a real possibility. Then again, I now think that maybe we have too much democracy because of how many stupid people we really have in this country.
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Hey Leo, About six years ago you wrote: I’ve been thinking about that after studying how the terms liberal and progressive have evolved. Historically, figures like TR and Wilson called themselves Progressives, while FDR branded himself a Liberal—yet FDR’s reforms were even more transformative and “progressive” in practice. Today the boundary between the two feels even blurrier: mainstream liberalism dominates U.S. politics, while progressivism functions as a reformist minority inside it. Do you still view progressivism as that deeper willingness to redesign the entire system rather than merely improve it? And how do you distinguish progressivism from liberalism now—from a developmental or consciousness perspective? Has your view shifted as politics has evolved since you first said that? Would like to hear your updated take
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But being a hardcore progressive/leftist doesn't work for winning the greatest amount of power.
