Psychology, Cultural Reasons Behind 9/11

[Butters]

Last night I was watching this fascinating YouTube video that captures the 9/11 attacks minute-by-minute with news footage and air traffic control audio. 

It's interesting to see the contrast between these hyper American TV ads and then imagining the psychology behind these attacks from the Middle East. 

So I asked chatgpt, and the response is very cool. And today Leo also wrote a blog about Afghanistan, giving even more context. https://actualized.org/insights/afghan-underdevelopment

CHATGPT:

Great question—and a complex one. You're asking about the psychological, cultural, and developmental ecosystem that allows violent extremist ideologies like Salafi-jihadism to survive within societies that, at large, don't actually support them. Here's a layered breakdown:

1. Most People in the Middle East Oppose Extremism

The vast majority of Muslims in the Middle East reject terrorism and violence.

After 9/11 and ISIS, support for groups like al-Qaeda plummeted in surveys across the Muslim world.

Most just want stability, family, and work—not jihad or caliphates.

So: Extremists are a minority. But a dangerous one.

2. How Do They Still Exist Then?

a. Authoritarian Governments + Oppression

Many Middle Eastern countries are brutal dictatorships (e.g., Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia).

This creates fertile ground for radicalization: people feel powerless, angry, and hopeless.

Extremist ideologies give them a sense of identity, purpose, and revenge.

b. Lack of Education + Propaganda

In many regions, education is poorly funded or state-controlled, with little critical thinking.

Some madrassas (religious schools) teach a very narrow interpretation of Islam—some even glorify martyrdom.

State media in some regimes also fuel resentment toward the West or other sects (e.g., Sunni vs. Shia).

c. Tribal + Sectarian Loyalties

Many societies are not individualistic—they’re built on tribes, families, sects.

Loyalty often goes to clan or religious identity over state or human rights.

This makes it easy for radical groups to hide—not everyone supports them, but few will turn them in.

d. "Silent Sympathy" vs. Active Support

Many reject violence, but some share grievances with extremists (e.g., U.S. foreign policy, Israel/Palestine).

This leads to a form of passive tolerance: “I don’t agree with what they did, but I understand why.”

3. Psychological Development Factors

a. Developmental Psychology

In some areas, especially rural or war-torn regions, many people are operating from survival mode (Maslow’s bottom levels).

That makes abstract ideals like liberalism, tolerance, or pluralism irrelevant.

Fear, honor, shame, revenge—these dominate thinking where the rule of law is weak.

b. Collectivist vs. Individualist Culture

Many Middle Eastern societies are collectivist—group identity > personal expression.

In this context, religious or ideological conformity is often enforced by social pressure, not choice.

c. Trauma + War

Millions have grown up in conflict zones (Iraq, Syria, Yemen, etc.).

Chronic exposure to war, poverty, and corruption can create a desensitized, rage-prone mindset.

Jihadist groups offer a narrative of empowerment: "You were oppressed; now you're a warrior for God."

4. Why It Persists Despite Rejection

Extremist groups don’t need majority support—just enough to recruit, hide, and intimidate.

And in fragile or failed states, there's often no authority to root them out.

Plus, some states (e.g., Pakistan, Saudi Arabia historically) have looked the other way or even sponsored certain radical groups for geopolitical reasons.

Summary:

Extremists are the minority, but grievances, broken systems, and social structures allow them to exist.

Many ordinary people don’t support them, but also don’t have the power or safety to oppose them.

The Middle East is not “undeveloped,” but often under siege—by foreign interference, corrupt regimes, and ideological control.

Let me know if you want to dig deeper into any specific country, belief system, or how this ties to Western policy.

Edited May 23 by Butters