zurew

Whats the response to this? Under the assumption where non-solipsism is true , how would you recognize using your epistemology that solipsism isn't true? Your epistemology would generate the exact same insight (that solipsism is true) and in that case you would be wrong, but still 100% confident in your delusion.

I agree with the qualia aspect, but thats not the issue, the issue about what kind of inferences you are making from there. I recognize that appearance is appearing and that I cant doubt that - okay how do you get starting from there to solipsism without making a bunch of inferences?

Your epistemology dont demarcate between possible worlds. If I pressupose a different foundation (we can go with Christianity or any other non-solipsistic view) and use your epistemology - your epistemology will fail to recognize that the foundation is not solipsism and would pressupose in every case that solipsism is true.

Yeah under the view where solipsism is true what you are saying make sense, the issue is under any other view using the method you are saying would just lead to self-deception and false conclusions and hence we are getting back to epistemic issues. Right now, we could be in a world that was created by the Christian god and using your epistemology you could delude yourself into believing that solipsism is true without a doubt. I dont understand why you think that the insights that you gathered and the confidence that you have in your insights couldn't be possibly replicated under any other worldview. Again - if you entertain for one moment that lets say Christianity is true - why do you think that you couldn't gather the exact same insights using your epistemology? Why do you think that under the thought experiment where Christianity is true , you running the exact same experiments and contemplation would somehow lead to anything different? It could lead you to the exact same conclusion that solipsism is true , its just that in that particular case you would be wrong about solipsism being true.

The question isn't "assuming that its relative" - the issue is about you providing justification that its not. Again its an epistemic issue. I dont claim to know or I dont pressupose that what you are saying is relative - what Im saying is that you dont have a good justification that would conclude that its not relative.

No - the issue that you have 0 good response or solution for (but pretend that you do) - is that even under the view where there is an Absolute Truth - How do you know which truth is actually an Absolute truth? You predefine your way there and then pretend that you solved the issue. The issue isnt ontological, the issue that I bring up is epistemological, that you again have 0 good response for.

Oh yeah, the difference is that you reject that when it comes to your specific truth claim, and pretend that yours is somehow not applicable to it , but everyone else's truth claim is subject to it.

So if you can be wrong about the insights that you gather using awakening - then why is it that you think that solipsism is something that you cant be wrong about?

Under the definition what JP provided for the term 'Christian' - You can be a Christian even if you think that Jesus didn't exist and you also think that no God exist at all. I don't understand why some people think that JP should be taken when it comes to theology or philosophy. Like this was a laughable performance by him.

Notice that you didnt provide a solution to the epistemic problem that I brought up, all you did there is that you raised an epistemic objection about questioning. Okay questioning is limited - now from there how you get to "awakening isn't limited" or how you get to "awakening wont give you false insights" ? "Actualized.org users are fooling themselves by understanding what they mean by revelation" We can play these games where I will play as a Christian for the sake of the argument and I will mirror all the objections and epistemic issues that you will bring up.

Or it could be gathering insights through revelation and the realization is that Christianity is true. You would appeal to your awakening and say "nono, I dont care what you gathered through your revelation im right, and you are wrong about Christianity being true" And the Christian would say "nono, I dont care what you gathered through awakening, im right and you are wrong about solipsism being true" Point here is that non-inferential justification is subject to some of the same epistemic limitations as inferential justification. If I question the validity of method by which you gathered your insight , you whole thing is undermined and you cant appeal to the same method to solve this, because that is whats in question. Yes, of course. Im not sure if you had the impression that I thought any differently - this is why I qualify almost all of my statements more than probably anyone on this forum - because I dont want to pretend that I have any beliefs or knowledge that I cant be wrong about.

No , you are not tracking there - the point is that you specify the method by which you gathered/realized those things to be true (you are honest about what they are contingent on and limited to) Yes, but all of those are contingent on other premises and none of them are infallible.

No its not about that, its about taking the method/process as infallible. Why treat the info that you gather / realize through a specific method to be infallible? Like why is it hard to just say - "The reason why I think x,y,z is true is because of awakening" - why say " x,y,z is true without a doubt and I cant be wrong about it"? For example, I dont treat inferential justification to be anything special - Its one system of justification, where justification is defined by inference - its useful, it can be used to solve a lot of disagreements, but it has its own limitations as well. It can also be used to establish whats logically impossible - but even there what is established is logical impossibility and not necessarily anything true related to reality. Yes I have, Ive had my own experiences and some of them were profound - but even there whats important is what kind inferences one makes about it and it seems there are many ways to make sense of those experiences.

JP did horrible. He couldnt engage, he dodged a bunch of questions , he redefined the term "God" in a way that makes it so that the term atheist becomes meaningless, he virtue signaled about morality and he said false things (like you cant have two or more mutually exlusive conceptions of God - of course you can)

Under how I use the term, all of you guys are relying on beliefs and inferences and no amount of appealing to awakenings will change that. The idea that you can be protected from objections, just because you use the label "direct consciousness" or "awakening" just doesn't work with me. None of you are above of being wrong, just because you use a magic label.

We can skip all this inferential talk and inferential reasoning, because I know some of you prefer non-inferential justification (like appealing to awakening) But I don't understand why you guys use inferential justification, when the inferential reasoning that you guys generally provide for solipsism is horrible in almost every case. Also - If you guys think, that all inferential justification is nonsense and garbage and useless - then why use it in a very bad and unpersuasive way?

I dont want anything sophisticated , my only bar is non-question-begging arguments , like how is that a high bar?😭 Like I want people to show what reasons they have to adopt the view they have. Like why is it that you are not agnostic about a given proposition, especially if you dont have any good response to underdetermination? (and by not good response, I mean all of your arguments are compatible with the view that you want to argue against). Like imagine the same attitude and reasoning in any other setting: There is a competition and you need to figure out the right answer to a given question. You are only provided with one premise (namely that there is at least one red marble in the bag). The question is, "how many red marbles are in the bag"? (Imagine you are not provided with any other background knowledge about the bag and about the situation). The first guy says, "there are 2 red marbles in the bag". After that, a second guy comes and says "there are 3 red marbles in the bag!". Then you come and say "I think the first guy is right - there are 2 red marbles in the bag!" then you are asked this question: Nemra, why do you think that first guy is right? "Well, because I was provided with the premise that there is at least one red marble in the bag " and then I come and ask you the question "Why do you think thats a good reason to go with the first guys's view , when that reason is compatible with the other guy's view as well?"

These are so bad arguments - like this couldn't even be used against physicalism, let alone against non-solipsist idealist views.

Wait how is that relevant with respect to the argument that you are cooking up? It sounds like that in order for me to accept whatever you are cooking up I need to believe first that what you are saying is true - sounds like a sneaky way to make a question-begging argument (again). Imagine me saying , for me to make my argument successfully first you have to believe that other minds exist. This is what Im saying that none of you can provide a non-question begging argument "which hasn't been there at all" "you only experience your own mind" these assertions are all loaded. Depending on what you mean by "you only experience your own mind" is compatible with even physicalism? If you entertain the idea (which im not arguing for btw, just for the sake of the argument) that physicalism is true, then the way you would experience the outside world would be through your mind as well - like do you think that if physicalism was true then the fact of "things appearing in your experience" would suddenly change? No - what you are saying there is compatible not just with multiple different versions of Idealism, its compatible with multiple different versions of physicalism as well.

It seems to me that there are epistemic limitations on Solipsism as well. So for example, if you ask yourself the question how do you definitely know that there are no other minds? Then Im not sure what kind of bulletproof justification you can provide there. It seems that just as how people on non-solipsistic cant provide a bulletproof justification that there are other minds, you as a solipsist cant provide a bulletproof non question-begging justification that there are no minds . Thats an inference that you are making but that doesn't show logical impossibility. You making the inference that you should be able to experience what other minds experience - but thats an inference that is something that I would ask a supporting argument for. Why should I think that: if there are other minds, then I should have the ability to experience those minds? Again my problem is underdetermination that your argument doesn't help with - your argument is compatible with a world where there are other minds and people don't have the ability to experience those minds.

Also waiting for a response to this as well

Whats the argument that everything that is true needs to be provable ? Like why would I accept this?

How does that proof of solipsism ? Again it only shows my epistemic limitations -which isn't anything other than a skill issue on my part (but it doesnt say anything about the ontology part). If you want to claim that others having consciousness is logically impossible - then I will ask an argument that shows that from starting with the premise 'others have consciousness' you can somehow show the entailment deductively that 'it is the case others have consciousness and it is not the case that others have consciousness'.

I dont understand how the issue that you raise there is only applicable to non-solipsistic views. 1) You raise an epistemic objection about the limitations of proving a given thing, but epistemic limitation doesn't show that its ontologically problematic, its just shows my lack of ability to prove something. It can be true that others have consciousness and it can also be true that I don't have ability to prove that. 2) I dont see how the same epistemic objection couldnt be raised when it comes to Solipsism.

So what is the argument that parts of a whole cant develop identity? Also what is the argument that parts of a whole should be considered illusory? Because labeling a wave as illusory doesn't make much sense to me, even if its part of an ocean.