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I know, im just fcking with you. Lets narrow things down, do you mean something like: There is a set (for example humanity), and there are members of that set and each member has a quality with a certain number assigned to it (for example spiritual development or income or strength or IQ) and average would just mean literally the mathematical average or being close to that mathematical average of a given quality. So the sum of all member's quality divided by the number of people who are in that set. Is that somewhat close to what you have in mind by the term average?

This is the reply what Carl was fishing for.

It isn't clear what kind of effect it would have on them. The same kind of question came up in the context of child porn, it isnt clear at all whether it would have a good effect on them or would make them do more harm than good. Finding out the empirics about this is obviously hardly, since even conducting the experiment is unethical in and of itself (unless maybe if we are talking about AI produced CP). So basically if we are rigorous about this and don't just want to appeal to our intuitions , then we probably shouldn't make claims about what kind of effect(s) it would produce, cause they are highly speculative.

Most of this would be fine ,if it would only be a critique of absolute morality (establishing or making an argument why absolute / objective morality doesn't exist) , however Leo seem to be saying more than that. But regardless whether objective morality is true or not (I am happy to grant that there isn't objective morality) - Whats the issue with making subjective moral arguments? Its not like stage yellow doesn't have any kind of subjective values that it wants to work towards. For example, making society more developed is a subjective value and if one can make a deduction or an empirical argument how constraining pedophiles in certain ways can achieve that goal better compared to not constraining them, then thats a valid argument in the context of that value. Also when Leo says there is no difference between a pedo and a saint, yeah sure in the context of objective morality, but that doesn't really respond to the criticism that was made. The criticism is made in the context of subjective morality and there is no claim about objective morality. In other words, the criticism wasn't that pedophilia is bad in the context of objective morality, but that it is bad with respect to certain set of subjective values and goals. So overall, Leo's analysis there isn't very sophisticated and doesn't really say anything other than "there is no objective morality" and maybe a claim about a nature of reality, but that also doesn't respond to most moral arguments since, most of them are about actions and not about the evaluation of the nature of things.

I think this is a fair criticism from JP.

Is your position basically, that God is infinity, and infinity includes all possible world, and infinity cannot not (must) include all possible world? In other words, under this semantics - if God exists, all possible world necessarily have to exist.

I think when Dawkins says "I care about facts" I doubt that he cares only about knowing those facts just for the sake of it - I think he just assumes that all scientific facts are necessarily useful, but thats not the case, especially for everyday people. Knowing about certain facts is completely irrelevant to the quality of your life, and in other cases, knowing about those facts can even make the quality of your life worse. I think the same thought is applicable to perennial patterns and abstract objects as well. If they don't have any effect on you, then the question of 'why should I care about them' comes up and I think thats a valid question in the context of pragmatism. But this assumes that there are no abstract objects that could change you or could have an effect on you.

Lmao. Reading that in JP's voice is really funny. Okay I see.

Is he stuck, or he simply doesn't give a fuck about other things than facts and science? I mean, im not familiar with the model in depth, but I assume there is a difference between having a preference for something and having a capacity to do things. If there is a difference (according to the model), then how do you make the case, that Dawkins doesn't have the capacity ?

I do agree with you on that Dawkins has a very naive realist distinction between real and imaginary, but at the same time I think that Jordan was dishonest and dodged a lot of questions and obfuscated unnecessarily. If a question is given to me in a specific context (in this case, the context was scientific and empirical) for example the question of Did Jesus rise from the dead (not in a metaphorical sense, but literally) - Jordan answering to that "Thats misses the point" or "I don't think its meaningful or valuable" is just a dodge. He can say that those parts of the Bible ought to be interpreted in a non-literal way, and at the same time give his position whether he thinks certain mentioned events actually happened historically in a literal way or not. This is irrelevant to the substance, but my speculation why Jorday doesn't want to give honest answers to empirical questions about the Bible, is because he doesn't want to upset his Christian audience. He probably means - proving it using the scientific method.

Being able to draw infinitely many conceptual distinctions is different from claming that those differences actually exist. In other words - do you claim that time and space are metaphysically necessary (things can't exist without having spatial and temporal aspects / attributes inherently to them) or do you just claim that one can draw infinitely many conceptual distinctions, but those distinctions don't really exist? Which one is your claim?

Fair enough. To be frank I can't come up with any example either, but I guess my main point is that I don't want to claim that there isn't one and I wouldn't claim either that there is one (because I cant make a principled argument for either position). In other words - my inability to come up with an example is a bad justification (in my view) to establish there isn't one or that there can't be one. Some other interesting surrouding topics are unintelligibility ,meaninglessness and semantic primitives. One of the closest one given the context of this thread is semantic primitives / semantic primes. This is the idea that some concepts cant be defined by other concepts. I have no strong position on this topic , but I can see how this could be weaponised so that one don't need to explain or give a definition for a given concept and can just infinitely gibberate about meaningless stuff.

Thats not what that theorem says, that theorem doesn't entail that those truths cant be proven by an outside system. it just says that given a system and all the logical entailments of that system, that system itself cant prove all its own logical entailments (but that doesn't mean that any outside system cant prove those things). But even if I grant that there are things that cant be simplified, that alone wouldn't be a good enough reason for me to believe that your given concept is in that category. You would need to do groundwork to establish why your concept is in that category. Btw, its unclear to me whats the relevance of bringing up the Theorem. I didn't ask for a systemic proof (where you need to prove all the logical entailments of a given system), I was just asking for giving a reason for a given proposition. Proving a given proposition is different from giving a proof for all the logical entailments of a given system.

Yeah its a false dichotomy. Creators being paid or compensated for their work and products is compatible with adding value to humanity. Bobby go ahead and work for free and provide net value to humanity for the greater good.

I agree with this heruistic, although im sure you treat that statement just as a heruistic and you don't treat it as some kind of truth that is applicable to all complex ideas - because we can probably find some exceptions (especially when it comes to metaphysics) where a complex idea cant be explained in a simple way. But to be fair, even in those exceptional cases I would personally push for an answer why that given idea cant be explained in a more simple way and push for an answer what kind of principle the interlocutor uses to decide what idea can and what idea cant be simplified. If the interlocutor isn't able to justify or spell out why it cant be simplified, then I would just assume either that he/she doesn't have a good understanding of the topic or actually just gibberate about it and doesn't say anything meaningful. Btw this is an interesting topic - to actually explore and create a theory about what can or cant be simplified (assuming certain things cant) or you can just reject this dicohotomy and make an argument for why there isn't such a thing.

Yeah I guess, the way I phrased the question doesn't make much sense ,because it contains a category error, because theories or ideas (or in this case fields) can't have the property of being cross-paradigmatic (if we are being strict about it, and if adhere to the model). Rephrasing my question - can you walk me through the reasoning why Meta-Integrative Holistics should be categorized or considered as a new field and not as a paradigm or metasystem or system? I like it that you push for rigor and correct errors , although if we use this strict kind of lense , that means that you have engaged in a category error as well For example: "Meta-Evolutionary Reinvention (MER) is cross-paradigmatic" So if you want to be very strict then lets be strict in a consistent way and say that given this model - only cognitive tasks or behavior can have the property of being cross-paradigmatic. But it seems that you are more lenient with yourself than with others .

Hopefully we do. I was referring to this: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_of_hierarchical_complexity And more specifically referring to stage 15 there , because thats what labeled as cross-paradigmatic.

Can you walk me through the reasoning ,why Meta-Integrative Holistics needs to be categorized as cross-paradigmatic and why it isn't categorized as any other stage?

What kind of new field(s) have you created?

Coming up with actually original ideas and systems of thought is very impressive - if its actually novel. Gibberating and being vague about things and claiming that there is novel substance there, doesnt count though. The problem is that its hard to differentiate sometimes between gibberish ideas and between actually novel ideas. This is a tangent , but generally speaking it seems to me that people sometimes think that being vague about a given idea is necessary or it is an entailment if the idea itself is on an abstract level or if its a big picture idea. Verveake outlined this very well with the following statement "Do not confuse the properties of a theory with the properties of the thing being referred to". In other words, I should (if there is actual substance there ) be able to talk about abstract concepts in a highly detailed way if I am pushed on it and I should be able to point out in a specific way how that given abstract idea is different from other abstract ideas (without gibberating and with actually showing a distinction). The application of rigor and the ability to point out the specific differences are both compatible with abstract ideas and big picture thinking. One can be vague about abstract ideas and concepts , on the other hand one can be specific and detailed and make meaningful arguments and be nuanced and know the relevance of these concepts and ideas. One herusitic to check whether you are gibberating or not: Check whether you are context sensitive (whether you are aware of how your given idea changes and applicable given different contexts and check whether you know how and when your idea is relevant) and check whether you have a clear understanding of what kind of norms your idea can be or should be judged by and lastly check whether you can clearly articulate how your idea is different from other ideas that are highly similar to yours.

I could generate a bunch of bad arguments as well why should Kamala win and why that would change the beliefs of MAGA and Christians. Also your argument doesn't seem to rely much on the premise that Trump needs to win, because the main premise seems to be Trump doing an action that would be considered horrendous by Christians, and that premise is compatible with Trump losing the election (even though I still think that that main premise is stupid in the context of the argument you are trying to make, because it can be explained away very easily to maintain their beliefs).

You are dodging and not really responding to any of my earlier points ( you dodging those, speaks volumes about you not really having a response to any of them and you not being able to concede that you have a bad argument that falls apart). Trump being Antichrist is compatible with being a Christian. But again for the last time, they don't need to categorize him as being Antichrist , him doing bad actions can be explained away multiple ways (1) deny that those things happened, 2) deny that those were committed by Trump 3) Even if Trump did it , he was forced to do those things by bad and evil actors) You had 0 response to my eariler points and you are desperately upholding this very naive and frankly bad argument, where you end up making conditional claims like Trump needs to kill people or that Trump needs to say bad things about Jesus (after winning the election in order to flip christian beliefs) none of which is grounded in reality in any way and none which would change chrisitans beliefs because all of that is compatible with being a Christian.

You have a lot of assumptions and even if we grant all your assumptions your argument still doesn't work. The idea that most Trump supporters consider trump a prophet is an assumption , if you want to claim that the majority thinks this way, then do you have any empirical evidence to support that claim? Even going with the assumption that they think Trump is prophet and further going with the assumption that Trump would do an action that would be considered horrendous by Christians - even going with that, that can still be explained in a way where they can maintain their faith. 1) They can just end up concluding that they were wrong about Trump being a prophet and he was just another puppet by the deepstate and he was used to deceive MAGA. 2) They can just end up concluding that Trump was a false prophet. 3) Trump was forced by evil forces to do that bad thing or to say bad things about Jesus. Christianity is compatible with Trump not being a prophet and also with Trump being a prophet and with Trump being a false prophet and with Trump being a retarded prophet who end up cussing/cursing Jesus. All of those scenarios are compatible with being christian. There are an endless amount of narratives and justifications that could be generated to infinitely uphold the christian faith. Your argument just doesn't work even if I grant all the assumptions that you can't justify.

No its not, it fails - your idea is naive and you lack the imagination how many different ways they can still maintain their beliefs. Do you think the idea of "I believe in the christian God" is incompatible with Trump doing bad things ? 1) They can just say that it was God's plan to use Trump to test how strong they believe in him and this is the real test of their loyalty to God. 2) They can outright reject the idea that Trump did bad things and they can just think that those are actually good things for the country in the end. 3) They can think that Trump was forced by external factors to do those bad things (like by the deepstate or devil or something) 4) They can just use the idea that God gave us free-will and he respects our free will and its on us when we do bad things and its on us to correct sin. These are just 4 ways off the top of my head how to completely dodge the outcome you thought necessarily follows from the premses you laid out. And there are obviously many more other ways (than just four I mentioned) for them to maintain their narrative about God.