Reciprocality

Hello people Inferring what must be true about something from the absence of another thing about it, why can this succeed? To say or write is to appear with an intent, this intent is ineffective without a prediction of the recipient for whom we are appearing, these predictions require some coherence among one another to not themselves becoming the problem, that coherence is a model of reality, is it always this model we tap into when we infer positives from negatives, when we infer that something particular causes something to lack a given expected property? What is going on with the narrative in our rhetorical intents, is there some universal law to these that can be identified, how invariant are the fibres or quality in these intents among us? At which level of analysis are they identical and could we say that most below that level are inessential to the real meaning of the intent that allows us to converse with anyone?

Reminder: We'll need the girlfriend part first.

@Carl-Richard Have you ever observed that people who are the most serious laughs the most whole-heartedly and energetically when they do laugh?

Humour is the awareness of 1. what people generally expects and believes and thus awareness of what is odd and does not conform with expectations and 2. what people generally focus on and value. Armed with 1 and 2 we can craft a joke that takes the unexpected turn, an exaggeration somewhat on point or a vigorous image that were insufficiently unwanted. Said at the Republican National Convention: Jimmy is probably malnourished, response: Ah, I knew he were a liberal all along! Humour is a matter of experience, the more experienced you are the more on-point your predictions will be and the more often you will recognise or think of the unexpected or humorous.

Solipsism occurs when the boundary between self and world dissolves while one remains convinced that their subjective experience constitutes objective reality.

@Anton Rogachevski What if the given object is itself a chair because 1. our way of conceiving it as a chair taps into the only possible way it can be spontaneously seen, and that this process happens prior to our capacity to have perspectives and see it in different ways, and 2. it exists only in so far as it is seen by agents with the capacity that identifies it as a chair? What if the Witgensteinian "family resemblant" criterions that are satisfied by particular "chairs" are precisely such criterions that via their extreme generality and/or ineffability will be subject-invariant but not subject-independent, that some subject is necessary for the chair to both exist and to be a chair in itself but that each unique subject is expandable or accidental for this contingency?

@Anton Rogachevski I stubbornly stuck with this way of writing until it became hard to restrain it, I believe we are all honing in on our personal stamp through practice because it is the only means that is the most harmonious to our thoughts and all our thoughts seek harmony with each other. Also, thank you for the compliment. You say that time is an illusion founded on memory, this appear entirely consistent with your other idea that memory is a Humean secondary impression, given that something that has the capacity to create illusions must be substantial and substance must be immediate, whether diminished or not. But what is the mechanism, the universal invariance, that ensures not only that this illusion occurs but potentially also that its alternatives are mere fictions? I would propose that diminution of substance independently of its intensity could be that kid of bedrock, particularly because I believe phenomenologically we have always experienced that the linearity of time accompanies this diminutive invariance and that proposals of counter variants breaks linearity via time-paradoxes because the "now" would accumulate where there is most intensity. I want to ask you this, in the formation of memory, must there be agency that identifies the separation between it and phenomena? Must that separation be identified for memory to form? When some memory becomes meaning--so much so that words or analogies are formed that applies in all kinds of situations--do that meaning share its substance with the memories they were founded on? If not, what is the ontology of this additional--presumably platonic--substance?

From the limits of resources thresholds are set, spontaneous recollections of particular moments satisfies the threshold and from repeated exposure to this we intuitively couple the word "importance" to that invariant structure, allowing us to know what other mean when they use the term. What I wanna know is at which point does the human or personal kind of important become unique or distinct from the universal structure of importance, can precise point of distinctness be somewhat generalised, can the universal structure of importance be separated from other universal structures, or does that separation only exist in our head via its inherent ability to decouple variables?

@UnbornTao Can we only refer to a phenomenon either in particular or in general? If so then when we refer to it in general what is different between this and a concept? And when we refer to the particular phenomenon could something else that were not identical to it have replaced it without us knowing? If something else could have replaced the particular phenomenon you referred to without you knowing then would that imply that concepts are inescapable also when we refer to a phenomenon? And if not, then what is the difference between the distinction between a) phenomenon and b) its replicability vs c) phenomenon and d) our concept of it?

Do you want a good advice in how to resist the resistance? Perhaps yielding to the first order resistance is the least taxing way to go about it, perhaps it happens for reasons that are entirely necessary or natural.

@Natasha Tori Maru As I see it, points are something we are making when there is contention in a back and fourth dialogue, at least that is the context in which it is most often brought up. When there is no such contention there is still meaning, the set in which some elements are points, and I believe you had trouble with deciphering the meaning and though there are some grammatical mistakes they are far from sufficient for that trouble. Digressions and parenthesis are double edged swords that sometimes do more harm than good. It is not so much a stream of consciousness as a syntactical necessity that I write inter connectedly and long windily aphoristically, as the alternate would require that I would only connect two or three ideas in each sentence and that would often require four times more writing for it all to add up. A lot of things introduces flow, it is present throughout all our writing.

@UnbornTao How silly of me, i forgot to add in the words "contemplation" and "insight" so that my contemplations and insights did not appear like showing off in your projections on them.

@UnbornTao Beyond my comprehension, absurd. It is all purposive, but I don't connect with the ultimate end, I can only predict so much. I am the whole thing, but not for reasons I am aware of. The "what" of this experience is prior to the distinctions of it and my thinking of it, all my thinking does is reorganise it into structures that gives me a sense of harmony and ease because if I weren't a system which sought harmony I would not be alive. Experience is will, primal instincts at every second, a semi coherent narrative and myopia. All the words that tries to answer your question of what experience is are reshuffled from another set of experiences and now used to describe a moment that is not really new at all. The reshuffling of the words are insufficient because all they represent are analogies between now and then, all I can do is ask why is it here at all and my answer is that I am inventing the possibility of the alternative.

@Nodar Bakradze I understand, you boast about a huge philosophical undertaking where you literally will pick up the torch of Heidegger and integrate all kinds of philosophical domains, but when challenged to solve the most basic problems that gave rise to those different traditions it is beyond the scope of the very thread in which it were posted and where people have the opportunity to decide whether it is worth taking seriously by asking questions that directly relate to it. "My philosophical project—deepened fundamental ontology—integrates each and every major breakthrough of premodern, modern, and postmodern epochs." When we ask ourself what do we really know about the world and what it really is, how much of it are merely conjectures or perspectives in our head then the answers comes in a limited set of different kinds, those kinds corresponds to the breakthroughs of premodern, modern and postmodern epochs and my questions directly satisfies that criterion, and if I and anyone else were to take you seriously than we are justified in learning about how you answer them.

@Nodar Bakradze If some concepts, such as time, space and logical categories such as those in the Kantian tradition, were given to us independent of particular experiences, due to being merely formal and not themselves having any content such as the ideas we do derive directly from perception does, then it would at least be plausible that they exist as necessary substances in addition to the one of our perceptive fields. This would directly contradict phenomenology, whose main object is to ground all semantics, meaning, truth and reality in direct perception, thereby avoiding the metaphysical "otherness" of an additional substance that transcendental realism, dualism and theism commits to. Phenomenology can be described in several ways, but each variation will have in common that phenomenology stands in antithesis to the mainstream intellectual traditions of the belief that essences as either pertaining directly to the world itself and existing in that world independently of the perceiver or through the invariant perceiver called god, and that phenomenology attempts to reveal why these additional assumptions are not necessary by grounding everything in phenomena, by various means. Traditionally it appeared that there were a sharp dichotomy between the concepts that pertain to unique entities that includes shapes and phenomena and those that pertain to everything without exception or structural concepts like disjunction, conjunction and negation, where those who believed that both originates in the mind a priori were called pure rationalist and those who believed both originated in perception were called pure empiricists. It may not be as sharp as were previously suggested, and this is what has to be proven if we were to state that realism about such things as object-identity are definitely false, which surely are ideas you are familiar with.

@UnbornTao It certainly does point us in directions, that is what gesturing does. And I did precisely what you are asking of me in the first comment, but instead of taking responsibility of understanding what it means and asking questions that pertains directly to it you just posit that it is very abstract, yet I do my best with what I got and extrapolate on it only to receive the exact same response. Direct and substance are bijective, you use another term to refer to the same universal pattern that could only be denoted due to the repetitive nature of that pattern and have thusly already committed to my framing of it.

@UnbornTao My answer sounds abstract because the question elicits concepts without any particular qualifications, we were to describe experience in general, right? Describing unique experiences does not have much bearing on experiences as such, which everyone who even takes the posts question seriously therewith agrees to. Up to a certain threshold where inherent limits are met, however bright two color-phenomena are they diminish at the same rate when you close your eyes, thus do not diminish in proportion to their intensity, but what would happen if they did? The various intensive magnitudes of sensory phenomena, which we can rightfully consider to be the matter or substance of our minds from where everything else derives and pertains, if they did diminish in proportion to their intensity, would accumulate and be present in "times" much later than they arose, and from such a lifelong experience we would be fated to derive a different concept of time, a concept which would pertain as much to that reality as the linear one do to ours, although such a reality would involve paradoxical timeloops where the principle of identity naturally no longer applies. If in our own experience, in which the only known substance exists, (and substance are rightly defined to be the that of which everything else is a predicate or derivative) we derive the concept of linearity of time from the precise parameters of that substance and have no second substance to apply of the concept of linearity to and we can articulate the precise invariant condition that in our experience and thus in relation to that substance known for it to yield linearity then why should anything else be a sufficient condition for linearity than those parameters, the invariant diminution? If no a. structure, concept, duality, medium or universal idea exist except in so far as the b. substance underlying them exists, and we can achieve a demonstration of the precise origin of the former in the latter, and no question involving the concept of "experience in general" avoids answers of the form denoted by "a", then anyone trying to answer those questions are justified in embarking on a journey in those structures.

Intensive and extensive magnitudes that due to their invariant diminution manifests as the linearity and continuity of time, both physically and perceptively.

@Nodar Bakradze Interesting stuff. Given your post-metaphysical phenomenology, do you ground primitive dualities, categories, logic, and concepts in perceived reality? If so, do you rely on arguments from plausibility, or do you demonstrate why the alternative 1. includes contradictions, 2. overextends the predicate in certain judgements or 3. shows that possibilities as necessarily contingent? If my questions are ambiguous ill be happy to elaborate on them and why they matter.

I'm trying to go back to a state of mind where I don't believe that I know anything.

@AION Schopenhauer would describe seriousness as the consequence of the firm belief that reality is no different than ones idea of it. I buy it.

@gettoefl Doesn't "identical" and "something" correspond to "invariant" and "variant"? If so then do you mean to say that 10 means "any varied set of 10 invariant elements"? Are there several of those sets, or is there only the one set of 10 invariant elements, and is it numbers? If so then where does the variance or "something" come from? If the variance comes from the entities that satisfies the number 10 (10 invariant elements/units) then why introduce the concept of identity among those 10? Are you saying that there is something about any 10 elements that is identical/invariant, but merely that about them that satisfies the criterion of a unit, although they are not identical in any other respect? If so then would it be accurate to say that numbers are the only viable thing that satisfies what they satisfy, that nothing could replace them, if so what is the general criterion that we can employ to determine whether other entities also are uniquely applicable, both necessary and sufficient?

@jimwell But when we comprehend does the comprehension go from the external to the internal or from the internal to the external (it is a given that the content in the comprehension goes from the external to the internal, but the comprehension is surely not merely content)? Overall (over long timeframes) it may be bidirectional but in that moment of comprehension I would suggest it goes only one way, where the comprehension is a simulation of internal models to predict the outcome of the external system, infer its causes or construct its structure. Are these three modes of comprehensions infallible? If so, how? And if not, is it accurate to state that you have comprehended something if the comprehension is false? And if so, what makes a comprehension different from a judgement? And if not, then comprehensions are indeed infallible. But if comprehensions are infallible then how do you know in the particular case whether the idea is a comprehension and not merely a judgement? Are there clear general criterions to determine whether the external situation is comprehended, can you know that you have comprehended without criterions? Can the difference between a judgement and a comprehension be meaningful without also being subject to criterions that corresponds with the particular cases that instantiate them, and if not how can meaning be created purely semantically or abstractly, and if it can how does it by-pass the problems of self-reference and paradox?

@Mixcoatl Sure, although agency emphasises a tendency our minds have, a tendency that relates more to your question than merely a mind in general does, it could be conceivable for instance that minds could be without agency, at least they are conceptually different. The agency of minds would not mean much without their interaction with environments, the environment contains the distinctions that minds with sufficient agency are able to identify, and when they do they can conceive of those distinctions merely in their mind, and when they do this these distinctions will be employed even on distinctions they did not initially derive from and be employed onto themselves (nothing shackles them to any particular situation), this happens spontaneously (no premeditation required) and it gives rise to many beautiful things, among which are what we call numbers.

@Carl-Richard Seems more likely that the point is to maintain very strong and clear estimates of the percentage of the "others" are developed to a meagre tier 1 stage and then it becomes conveniently unclear and hard to determine whether particular people actually are in a given stage. It is almost like one could expect there to be some form of relationship between 1. conceptualising conscious development in society in general and 2. how many people in the real world one have evaluated to be of a certain conscious development.