Reciprocality

If you pay attention to people who communicate with each other they will do one of four things. 1. They refer to the spatial or sensorial similarity between things. 2. They refer to themselves directly. 3. They tell stories or convey experiences with a morale directly or imply such a morale indirectly. 4. They refer to causes between things on the assumption or affirmation that 1. is a given. I am as many others are perpetually testing statements concerning any of these three against my own experience of myself and reality, but I no longer contribute back to it, it is not my interest any longer though obviously this statement is an exception to its own rule. The first is the archaic basis for everything mathematical, the second is the archaic basis for everything philosophical, the third is the archaic basis for anything ethical, the forth is the archaic basis for anything scientific. In virtually every sentence each of you write I see concealed or glaring purposivity, you wish to understand what I am saying for a purpose, but what if that kind of expectation removes you from the possibility of understanding the things that are a condition for instants of purposes in general, surely you can conceive that there should be such things? For instance, if I now describe these categories as non-disjunctive, as I am sure you can see them being, it may remove for some of you the whole point of those categories, and if I then ask you "what if it doesnt?" what would you reply? You probably think about yourself right now, so let me ask you directly, what is a condition for a purpose, or framed better: what are purposes conditioned on? Do you think about yourself again? Abstract concepts are to the self what maths are to space and shape, all concepts are here for a distinct purpose to a distinct someone and the distinctness of the "someone" is logically necessary for these purposes. You want to understand what I am saying but it would ruin the purposes for why you would understand something in the first place, so your mind finds its weird ways to conceal its own nature from you.

@OsaidIt is rarely wise to speculate about others intension, but when it is unimaginable that something is done in good faith then it is also unwise to not call it out. There is no possible perspective you can have where the meaning of the word solipsism changes because of it, and if you are a moderator on this precise forum then you know that definition. I said that if something exists consciously outside of this now then solipsism is negated, this is true because if the opposite is correct then that would affirm it, and you know but were trying to essentialise it into something entirely different and off the mark. To be clear, your statement "You are essentially saying "if something exists outside of existence then solipsism is false" infuses a personal perspective on what is and is not true about reality into definitions of words only to make it appear that "You are trying to turn existence/consciousness into an object which is separate from itself, which just wont work because it betrays its nature.".

@Osaid The disturbing part is that the rest of the comment goes accordingly and so it could not have been by mistake, you are actively undermining the meaning of words to present your metaphysical perspectives, I don't hope these tactics are used often on this forum and don't want to think about the sorry fellers who it works on.

@Osaid That first sentence of yours is so full of shit it is disturbing.

@Osaid If anything besides this now exists consciously then solipsism is false, I am saying that even if the body of a person we talk with is conscious then it may be someone else than the person we think we are talking to, it is very hard for us to even imagine this possibility because of how strong and distinct the ideas in our minds are, cus of how unimaginable intelligent humans are. The possibility that the person we are talking to not only is conscious but is actually the distinctness we think when we talk to them is conditioned on the same kind of thing that happens when a given tree is identifiable through its leafs, or when Trump is identifiable through his hair. The part must not merely imply the whole, but make it impossible that it pertains to something else than the whole, the problem is that when you talk with your mother you are creating the whole that you find the evidence for through perception, but just like someone could have the same hair as Trump without being trump so too could someone be the consciousness behind the appearance of your mother without that actually being the conception you have of them, a similar problem though far less problematic and easier to understand is that your mother almost certainly has a rather different self-identity than the distinct concept you think when you perceive her talk. To solve this problem bolded above we must know that some of the identifiable traits of our mother could not fail to induce in a purely reflective mind the very thought we think when we think of her, that would be an impossible science to actualise (impossible to falsify), the only possibility is therefore that there is some kind of a-priori relationship between those parts and the identity of the whole, that we in other words did not construe the conception of our mother the way we construe the conception of Halloween by building it part by part, but that instead the whole is necessitated through the parts like when we are dividing 1 into 5 as opposed to count five objects. I call it the actual problem of solipsism, as opposed to the false problem of solipsism, because it considers the problem at its roots as opposed to as a symptom of these roots. I am sorry that I can not write it better than this currently, but maybe ill try tomorrow.

@OBEler I hope my last comment made it clearer.

@Thought Art I am saying that the people that you love in your life are either 1. only physical bodies or 2. also someone you do not know unless the construction of the distinct concept you have of them in your mind is like a holon where the whole is "contained" in the part, that is, unless the identity or distinctness of that conception is actually who they are. And this is only possible if in the formation of that conception you are not adding anything to what reality is on its own, in other words, if there is no self or ulterior motive to create false or fantastical concepts.

So the conclusive remarks is that you do not exist, but you are that which you intended to talk about when you said that something could be of existence or reformulated: of existent things. You have presupposed that there is something about you which is different from your experiences, and you literally have to do so to survive, this is the nature of purposivity, will and spontaneity. Edit: the illusion is that the map could possibly contain attributes that are distinct from the territory, and if no such attribute is possible then you will have mapped all of existence without mapping the maps, the concept of mapping a map is what is self-refuting, the map of all maps is reducible to the map of all territory, existence is by virtue of mappable things so all existence is by virtue of all mappable things.

@Davino You do not need to map the map to map all of existence, you are assuming the infinity that you conclude with. What you do need is something that is distinct from mappable things, and this must be without attributes, that which is "of existence" is not existence itself and it is existence itself that can not be mapped, not the things that are of it, and these can be in principle mapped completely, even though that which is identical to all these distinct properties is unmappable. And if you reread my comment you may see that this is what I said. The complete map is not of existence but instead purely an abstraction to us, that does not mean that it is not something that can happen in principle, I would even say that we are a part of it right now and that we are an infinitely small part at that but can i know? If as you suggest the identity of all things without exception (being or isness) is one of the things that must be mapped for all of existence to be mapped then it would be correct that this is impossible, but I am saying that the impossibility of such a thing is a function of the contradiction between 1. a single subject being predicable by all predicates and 2. that same subject being predicable by non-predicates. All of existence are the things that predicates the single subject, discernibility is a condition for predicates and therefore the single subject is not a predicate of itself. A complete set of maps of discernible things are possible because maps add nothing to the territory and are themselves indiscernible, the maps do not exist because the maps are of existence. Our abstractions attempt to create discernibles in addition to those that already exists, but they can in fact only create discernibles by division of what already exists and the discernibles are therefore substantial. The set of them all may or may not be infinite. The bolded above is Leibnizian rationalism (or any rationalism really), Godel has not refuted it in the slightest. Our real object is to answer the question "how can we discern between 1. discernible things and 2. the thing which discerns between discernible things? in the first place", because we obviously can, and the answer is again contained in the discernible things that are not the thing which discerns. That is, if there is anything discernible at all then a distinctness of "I" called ego is formed so that it can partake among those things, the indeterminate collection of all egos is unfalsifiable by logic and science and becomes a matter of faith.

@Davino You can in principle map all of existence, but what you may mean to say is that you can not map existence as a whole. A better way to frame the above: let us say that you could not map all of existence, it would not be because you can not map existence as a whole. What is the difference?

Also, I have not circled back to that initial comment you referred to, explicitly, I am simply saying that nature is in need of a sense of self and that we can actually know through analysis and logic that if it did not have that need it would not be purposive cus even sufficient similarity on its own would require states that are not identical and non-identical states requires that which includes the other and that does not happen without active duality. To perhaps make it more familiar: All this is a variation of the conception of the impossibility of physical randomness, which I am sure you have heard about.

@Carl-Richard So it follows that the highest purposes belongs to the highest sense of selves. ..If purposivity in similar fashion to the self is over and beyond pattern-recognition, the function of sufficient similarity. Anyone who has questioned deeply their identity and therefore identities in general will have wondered how they come to have an ability to identify anything at all, sufficient similarity between memories follows from there, I mean it has to. Do you want to argue against that? Id be up for that, sounds exiting.

@Carl-Richard Well obviously that is the point, that they connect, but not that they connect in general, which they do, but instead that they connect and form a particular conclusion. If the principle that all memories at a given moment must either occur because they are sufficiently similar to whatever happened the previous moment or because they stand in relation to a self is correct then if that self has no characteristics then there would be no reason for any particular element in the set of all memories to occur as opposed to any of the other particular ones at a given moment except for because of its sufficient similarity to the previous moment.

@Carl-Richard This^you responded to the following sentence: "Everything x which is sufficiently different from the thing y upon which it follows must stand in relation to every other thing through a distinct self that contains the very attributes in relation to which that x, though the intellect could find no analogy between it and y for which the spontaneity of subsequents in general are owed, is spontaneously occurring." Yes I would certainly just put these words together in a huge pile just for shits and giggles. It is a sentence without concrete referents, humans can think concepts that does not pertain to particular things in the world with distinct characteristics, every word in your own sentence has the same structure to them as those in mine, you just piled seven dualities together to express confusion yet will insist that when other plays your game with set of dualities that together express unfamiliar meaning that therefore it can not make sense. Let me try to kind of write it as a composition of individual statements. There is spontaneity in particular. There is spontaneity in general. There are particular attributes. There are attributes in general. There are identities, there are differences. A relation in general is a relation in particular. A relation is not such a thing which can be different dependent on context, has no essence but serves an important function in language similar to syntax in general. There are things. Something can follow another thing, such things are called subsequent. Something can if so merely in principle occur without spontaneity. An x can represent partiality of plurality. Y and x can represent a plurality. Some things are imagined after other things. Some things are imagined because they are similar to the preceding moment, such occurrences implies sufficiency. There is sufficiency in general. There is randomness if so merely in principle. Some relationships between imagined things are nonrandom. Something that must happen can not fail to happen. There is a self. A self must have characteristics. If you take problem with any of these then lets hear, if you do not then the above statement should be computable and if you are able to write it better and clearer than I did then teach me your arts.

Pretty place this Leeds, yes got a decent energy about it too, probably didn't hurt that it were sunny that day either, the Grimsby looked awful, precisely how I imagine England, sorry : P

@BlueOak Appreciate the long format expositions of lived experience, they bring in the importance of not taking abstract depictions as not always pertaining to all situations, in the sense that being less attentive in certain neighbourhoods or cultures than others is less of a problem and far less a consequence of something excessive such as in the hypothesis of the overly civilised. If I were to try to reply to the above in the discursive way it probably deserves that comment would fall rather short so Ill avoid it, in general though it appears that you have had a lot of experience of different situations and can be critical of theories that don't fit observations thereof, this will almost always be ideal knowledge, far surpassing what can be known through logic. I don't think it is implied by my assertion that alertness to strangers is natural that people are born alert to the same thing, that would be a reduction ad absurdum. You raise the point of when crimes are likely to occur, that it is unlikely to happen on busy sidewalks or where there is busy in general, I agree to that.

@Rigel ^You said this in reference to remembering insignificant details, but are you sure the mind works similarly to a hard drive in these ways? In certain circumstances I would agree that there are upper limits in our mind the way there are upper limits to a hard drive, but while the information you can store on a hardrive in any given hour on a pc is limited by how much is already stored within that duration it appears from my own experiences that many times I will have a higher capacity to remember something particular from within the duration of a given hour the more things I were doing in addition to that thing, until perhaps the law of diminishing returns.

@Consept Neither, when I see people who do not have a healthy sense of alertness to chaotic, indeterminate or unidentifiable situations such as in the bench-example I see people who are very far removed from their natural instincts, this is in part what on occasions feels repulsive to me, adults should not only have the proclivity for alertness as instinctual however, they should and I believe most often do have a sense of why the alertness is important. That most people in this thread do not even seem to agree to the relatively chaotic, indeterminate and unidentifiable nature of these situations raises my suspicion against it even more, in that it perhaps is prone to rationalise or justify itself.

Everything x which is sufficiently different from the thing y upon which it follows must stand in relation to every other thing through a distinct self that contains the very attributes in relation to which that x, though the intellect could find no analogy between it and y for which the spontaneity of subsequents in general are owed, is spontaneously occurring. In plain language, our many kinds of memories are not only there to inform us of itself when something in experience is sufficiently similar to it, but informs us of itself because of the purpose something in experience has towards its achievement and only a distinct I could be the 1. mediatory reason and 2. ultimate end thereof, if you want to live purposefully you can not also become one with everything all the time. When you take solipsism or even idealism so seriously that the world around you is experientially identical with yourself your sense of identity will fade away (being needed less than before), the principled outlined above entails that your thinking will become merely analytical, where the spontaneity of your thinking is reactive to environments. I have used myself as a test subject for these "metaphysical" doctrines and lost my self-identity for certain periods in consequence, there have been benefits and drawbacks in these states of mind but it becomes obvious to me that if I want to be discerning and critical of the world, as opposed to merely reflect it back, then I have to maintain a strong sense of self. On the other hand, you can come to realise in a Neoplatonic/Plotinutic fashion that everything is one or an advaita style non-dualism without going through years of solipsistic and idealistic delusions, and this is what I would suggest. Kant helped us realise that proper metaphysics are faith-based by applying general skepticism of 1. synthetic propositions the possible ground for which are empirical to 2. synthetic propositions without any possible empirical grounds. Your beliefs about non-natural entities are conditioned either on concepts that you get from experience or concepts that you do not get from experience, but since as Kant demonstrated the concepts that you may not get directly from experience are intertwined and indeed the condition of possibility for these experiences and inconceivable without these experiences then not even these have any reason to apply beyond experiences such as is asked of metaphysics/metanature proper.

It should benefit if I clarifies the last sentence above. The substance must already exist there in your mind (otherwise there is no hope) in how you relate to your surroundings, how you analyse concrete information and your ability to have ongoing access to concrete memories from lived experience, it is these things the abstractions are supposed to represent. And also, I am actually avoiding as many isms as I can, if all I did were list those in the relevant situations, as people more knowledgable than me has a disturbing nag of doing then the possible world that could open up for you were you to read the definitions of certain concepts that I use and compute the context in which they are used would be too steep a mountain to climb.

@Consept I am saying the opposite of the bolded, that tribal people in Africa for instance would look at strangers as a threat and be suspicious of them, certainly pay attention to them, and incredibly rarely sit on a bench in a city, were they somehow located that way, absently minded. I think this clarifies the confusion. When someones body reacts to a situation as though it were dangerous when instead the healthy behaviour would be a light form of suspicion (which you will see i would say about 60% of the time) such as in the middle of a sidewalk then that as you suggest would also be an indicator of being less civilised. And also, in some ways I am smart and in other ways I am not, if you had familiarised yourself with the language I am using beforehand, which obviously you are not expected to have done, then some of the ideas I express will be easier to decode, on the other hand when I were in my early twenties nothing engaged me more than the language that helped me learn the quickest (on my better days at least) and the nature of some of my ideas are such that it is these people (with a similar attitude) that I hope my sentences to actually land on, and thirdly I will be writing for the rest of my life and I intend to make it as compact and efficient as I can in part because writing a lot is taxing on my mind and abstruse word do trick, fourthly these concepts are actually a part of the english canon, contain a lot of value and are far too underutilised. Edit: you are correct that there is almost no substance here, a philosophically inclined writer who wishes to install substance in his readers is delusional.

@Yimpa It takes courage for most people to not do groupthink, and it takes a lot of effort. The cringe gets me too sometimes, its only sensible that you still identify with certain groups, and to some extent I think we will always do so even if against our will. And interestingly: when the means by which you think for yourself is not itself something you have thought for yourself then to some extent you will actually not do so, to my awareness it takes scientists many, many years to actually contribute new insight, originate concepts and draw unseen relationships.

In other words, since my interests are rarely like those of people who has something very interesting to say, specialists and scientists, I am merely saying what once it has been understood were obvious all along, the following paragraph will distill that to its essence: When in an urban area you see signs of people imagining strangers as something which does not present any type of danger whatsoever you are in fact observing the not-so-good consequences that happens to a non-primitive human mind. Check your subliminal reactions next time someone is trying to hint to you that you have been living too comfortable for a long time, life is once, your body fragile and one stranger is all it takes.

@BlueOak @bebotalk @Consept The change from "civilised" to "civil" in this thread were unfortunate I should have arrested those bringing up that conflation immediately, subtle differences can have big consequences, and as several of you suggested already we should be very clear about what we mean. I will now bring up a dictionary definition of the word I referenced in the title not to show you why I were correct (which no dictionary could ever do except for in axiomatic systems) but to hopefully induce on your part a more healthy approach to people bringing up, from your point of view, original hypotheses. From Dictionary.com: "Having an advanced or humane culture, society, etc. polite; well-bred; refined." The way in which the concept of being civilised is different from its opposite does not contradict the tenants of that concept, the former approach to the concept is rationalistic, the latter is empirical, to make an analogy: you are adding 1+1 and get 2, and I am saying that every time you wish to add 1 with 1 you must divide 1 into 2. Or in the inverse direction: if you take a piece of a certain kind of cake you will identify the whole cake from that part, and if you take a piece from a different kind of cake you will not be able to identify the whole cake from that part, when you attempt to disagree with my assertion that people in general who are carefree and inattentive in the middle of sidewalks where thousands of strangers are walking past are so as a consequence of being overly civilised then it is as though you were to be unsure of whether something were a cheesecake or not despite the piece you are given being a cheesecake piece. If you are a fan of Gura then this kind of rationalistic thinking is present at least 20 times in most episodes, and should not be unfamiliar, the meaning of things are thinkable because of them being distinct from their opposite. The claim is, now refined due to the helpful criticisms in the thread, that if we consider humans on a spectrum of primitive to civilised, as we are bound to do and which all semantics concerned with politeness etc does necessarily (does not mean that one can not talk about the character of politeness without talking about that about politeness which does not pertain to the thing it shares with every other sub-set of "civilised"), then it will be a falsifiable (if statistical and inductive) assertion that can not possibly be undermined merely by semantic reevaluation, instead, if you want to wrestle with this topic, must be undermined by showing either that in primitive cultures there is a higher proclivity to be absent minded, or for the particular (non-inductive) version of the assertion you must show that such a person sitting on a bench carefree or absent minded did so while being indeed civilised in a modernised world while seperating that variable from the others that explains that behaviour, and this experiment you can not do. Which is why the nature of the assertion regarding the particular person on the bench is unfalsifiable and serves merely the purpose of being an example, is not our interest here. And to those who find my style of writing triggering or pretentious, whatever flavour of projection your subconscious hides, prose is integral to the efficiency of thinking itself, hard-earned and will be there to stay if you were like me and put in the hours.

However, let us not lose sight of the ball, if for arguments sake you were to entertain the anti-primitive definition of civility, then would you then be more apt to agree that it is a cause, over many years, to the kind of people who are carefree (to a fault even) of their surroundings, whether or not you still disagree that these are in higher risk of assault?